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In: Critical Perspectives on Accounting, doi. 10.1016/j.cpa.2018.04.001
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In: Veldman, J. (2017) 'Self-regulation in International Corporate Governance Codes', in Du Plessis, J. and Low, C.K. (eds.) Corporate Governance Codes for the 21st Century. Cham: Springer, pp. 77-95.
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In: Organization: the interdisciplinary journal of organization, theory and society, Band 22, Heft 2, S. 269-271
ISSN: 1461-7323
In: Greenwood, M., Mir, R., WillmoA, H. (Eds.), Routledge Companion to Philosophy in Organization Studies. Routledge, New York, 2016
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Working paper
In: Organization: the interdisciplinary journal of organization, theory and society, Band 20, Heft 2, S. 323-324
ISSN: 1461-7323
In: British Journal of Management, Band 24, S. S18-S30
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In: Erasmus Law Review, Forthcoming
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In: Erasmus Law Review, Band 12, Heft 4
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In: Erasmus Law Review, Band 12, Heft 4
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In: Accounting, Economics, and Law: AEL ; a convivium, Band 10, Heft 2
ISSN: 2152-2820
AbstractThere is a broad call to integrate planetary boundaries and life-cycle based reporting into accounting theory and reporting standards. Although many practitioners back this call, including insurers, shareholders with a long-term orientation, and company law specialists who suggest that the inclusion of long-term stakeholder interests is necessary to counter both corporate and systemic risks, it remains unanswered. We argue that dominant assumptions about the status and architecture of corporations in corporate governance theory stand at the centre of this unanswered call in accounting theory and practice. As the status of the public corporation is interpreted as a nexus of contracts and its architecture as a restricted dyadic relation between 'principals' and 'agents', the object and audience for corporate reports are restricted to a very specific set of actors, interests and time-horizons. We argue that this conceptual setup unduly restricts notions of accountability and is connected to a specific notion of political economy. A broadening of reporting standards needs, therefore, to be accompanied by a critical assessment of the assumed object and audience of reporting in corporate governance theory.
'Management' is widely and deeply embedded in 'corporations'. Yet in many studies of management and organization the corporation is an influential but shadowy and largely unaccountable presence. Rarely is the modern, capitalist corporation thematized. This article contributes to remedying this omission by attending to how the corporation is a product of three imaginaries: legal, economic, and political. In the post-medieval order, the legal imaginary made possible the construction of the corporate form; the economic imaginary has promoted an expansion of this form and shaped its subsequent development; and, finally, the political imaginary offers a way of appreciating how politics, including the power of the state, is key to (i) the rise of the modern corporation, and (ii) to a recognition of how the primacy of the political in the formation and development of the modern corporation is articulated through, and obscured behind, the dominance of legal and economic imaginaries. Attending to the three imaginaries, it is argued, is central to a thorough comprehension of the modern corporation, a concomitant appreciation of its deeply divisive consequences, and lastly, to the development of policies designed to counteract its malign effects.
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In: Erasmus Law Review, Band 4
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In: Cambridge Journal of Economics, Band 41, Heft 5
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Working paper