Suchergebnisse

Introduction Sequence-based typing of hepatitis A virus (HAV) is important for outbreak detection, investigation and surveillance. In 2013, sequencing was central to resolving a large European Union (EU)-wide outbreak related to frozen berries. However, as the sequenced HAV genome regions were only partly comparable between countries, results were not always conclusive. Aim The objective was to gather information on HAV surveillance and sequencing in EU/European Economic Area (EEA) countries to find ways to harmonise their procedures, for improvement of cross-border outbreak responses. Methods In 2014, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) conducted a survey on HAV surveillance practices in EU/EEA countries. The survey enquired whether a referral system for confirming primary diagnostics of hepatitis A existed as well as a central collection/storage of hepatitis A cases samples for typing. Questions on HAV sequencing procedures were also asked. Based on the results, an expert consultation proposed harmonised procedures for cross-border outbreak response, in particular regarding sequencing. In 2016, a follow-up survey assessed uptake of suggested methods. Results Of 31 EU/EEA countries, 23 (2014) and 27 (2016) participated. Numbers of countries with central collection and storage of HAV positive samples and of those performing sequencing increased from 12 to 15 and 12 to 14 respectively in 2016, with all countries typing an overlapping fragment of 218 nt. However, variation existed in the sequenced genomic regions and their lengths. Conclusions While HAV sequences in EU/EEA countries are comparable for surveillance, collaboration in sharing and comparing these can be further strengthened. ; (VLID)5919696

Between 1 June 2016 and 31 May 2017, 17 European Union (EU) and European Economic Area countries reported 4,096 cases associated with a multi-country hepatitis A (HA) outbreak. Molecular analysis identified three co-circulating hepatitis A virus (HAV) strains of genotype IA: VRD_521_2016, V1625801 and RIVM-HAV16090. We categorised cases as confirmed, probable or possible, according to the EU outbreak case definitions. Confirmed cases were infected with one of the three outbreak strains. We investigated case characteristics and strain-specific risk factors for transmission. A total of 1,400 (34%) cases were confirmed; VRD_521_2016 and RIVM-HAV16090 accounted for 92% of these. Among confirmed cases with available epidemiological data, 92% (361/393) were unvaccinated, 43% (83/195) travelled to Spain during the incubation period and 84% (565/676) identified as men who have sex with men (MSM). Results depict an HA outbreak of multiple HAV strains, within a cross-European population, that was particularly driven by transmission between non-immune MSM engaging in high-risk sexual behaviour. The most effective preventive measure to curb this outbreak is HAV vaccination of MSM, supplemented by primary prevention campaigns that target the MSM population and promote protective sexual behaviour. ; (VLID)5899052

BACKGROUND: The development of a vaccine for norovirus requires a detailed understanding of global genetic diversity of noroviruses. We analysed their epidemiology and diversity using surveillance data from the NoroNet network. METHODS: We included genetic sequences of norovirus specimens obtained from outbreak investigations and sporadic gastroenteritis cases between 2005 and 2016 in Europe, Asia, Oceania, and Africa. We genotyped norovirus sequences and analysed sequences that overlapped at open reading frame (ORF) 1 and ORF2. Additionally, we assessed the sampling date and country of origin of the first reported sequence to assess when and where novel drift variants originated. FINDINGS: We analysed 16 635 norovirus sequences submitted between Jan 1, 2005, to Nov 17, 2016, of which 1372 (8·2%) sequences belonged to genotype GI, 15 256 (91·7%) to GII, and seven (<0·1%) to GIV.1. During this period, 26 different norovirus capsid genotypes circulated and 22 different recombinant genomes were found. GII.4 drift variants emerged with 2-3-year periodicity up to 2012, but not afterwards. Instead, the GII.4 Sydney capsid seems to persist through recombination, with a novel recombinant of GII.P16-GII.4 Sydney 2012 variant detected in 2014 in Germany (n=1) and the Netherlands (n=1), and again in 2016 in Japan (n=2), China (n=8), and the Netherlands (n=3). The novel GII.P17-GII.17, first reported in Asia in 2014, has circulated widely in Europe in 2015-16 (GII.P17 made up a highly variable proportion of all sequences in each country [median 11·3%, range 4·2-53·9], as did GII.17 [median 6·3%, range 0-44·5]). GII.4 viruses were more common in outbreaks in health-care settings (2239 [37·2%] of 6022 entries) compared with other genotypes (101 [12·5%] of 809 entries for GI and 263 [13·5%] of 1941 entries for GII non-GII.Pe-GII.4 or GII.P4-GII.4). INTERPRETATION: Continuous changes in the global norovirus genetic diversity highlight the need for sustained global norovirus surveillance, including assessment of possible immune escape and evolution by recombination, to provide a full overview of norovirus epidemiology for future vaccine policy decisions. FUNDING: European Union's Horizon 2020 grant COMPARE, ZonMw TOP grant, the Virgo Consortium funded by the Dutch Government, and the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund.

BACKGROUND: The development of a vaccine for norovirus requires a detailed understanding of global genetic diversity of noroviruses. We analysed their epidemiology and diversity using surveillance data from the NoroNet network. METHODS: We included genetic sequences of norovirus specimens obtained from outbreak investigations and sporadic gastroenteritis cases between 2005 and 2016 in Europe, Asia, Oceania, and Africa. We genotyped norovirus sequences and analysed sequences that overlapped at open reading frame (ORF) 1 and ORF2. Additionally, we assessed the sampling date and country of origin of the first reported sequence to assess when and where novel drift variants originated. FINDINGS: We analysed 16 635 norovirus sequences submitted between Jan 1, 2005, to Nov 17, 2016, of which 1372 (8·2%) sequences belonged to genotype GI, 15 256 (91·7%) to GII, and seven (<0·1%) to GIV.1. During this period, 26 different norovirus capsid genotypes circulated and 22 different recombinant genomes were found. GII.4 drift variants emerged with 2-3-year periodicity up to 2012, but not afterwards. Instead, the GII.4 Sydney capsid seems to persist through recombination, with a novel recombinant of GII.P16-GII.4 Sydney 2012 variant detected in 2014 in Germany (n=1) and the Netherlands (n=1), and again in 2016 in Japan (n=2), China (n=8), and the Netherlands (n=3). The novel GII.P17-GII.17, first reported in Asia in 2014, has circulated widely in Europe in 2015-16 (GII.P17 made up a highly variable proportion of all sequences in each country [median 11·3%, range 4·2-53·9], as did GII.17 [median 6·3%, range 0-44·5]). GII.4 viruses were more common in outbreaks in health-care settings (2239 [37·2%] of 6022 entries) compared with other genotypes (101 [12·5%] of 809 entries for GI and 263 [13·5%] of 1941 entries for GII non-GII.Pe-GII.4 or GII.P4-GII.4). INTERPRETATION: Continuous changes in the global norovirus genetic diversity highlight the need for sustained global norovirus surveillance, including assessment of possible immune escape and evolution by recombination, to provide a full overview of norovirus epidemiology for future vaccine policy decisions. FUNDING: European Union's Horizon 2020 grant COMPARE, ZonMw TOP grant, the Virgo Consortium funded by the Dutch Government, and the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund.

Between 1 June 2016 and 31 May 2017, 17 European Union (EU) and European Economic Area countries reported 4,096 cases associated with a multi-country hepatitis A (HA) outbreak. Molecular analysis identified three co-circulating hepatitis A virus (HAV) strains of genotype IA: VRD_521_2016, V16–25801 and RIVM-HAV16–090. We categorised cases as confirmed, probable or possible, according to the EU outbreak case definitions. Confirmed cases were infected with one of the three outbreak strains. We investigated case characteristics and strain-specific risk factors for transmission. A total of 1,400 (34%) cases were confirmed; VRD_521_2016 and RIVM-HAV16–090 accounted for 92% of these. Among confirmed cases with available epidemiological data, 92% (361/393) were unvaccinated, 43% (83/195) travelled to Spain during the incubation period and 84% (565/676) identified as men who have sex with men (MSM). Results depict an HA outbreak of multiple HAV strains, within a cross-European population, that was particularly driven by transmission between non-immune MSM engaging in high-risk sexual behaviour. The most effective preventive measure to curb this outbreak is HAV vaccination of MSM, supplemented by primary prevention campaigns that target the MSM population and promote protective sexual behaviour. ; Peer Reviewed

IntroductionSequence-based typing of hepatitis A virus (HAV) is important for outbreak detection, investigation and surveillance. In 2013, sequencing was central to resolving a large European Union (EU)-wide outbreak related to frozen berries. However, as the sequenced HAV genome regions were only partly comparable between countries, results were not always conclusive.AimThe objective was to gather information on HAV surveillance and sequencing in EU/European Economic Area (EEA) countries to find ways to harmonise their procedures, for improvement of cross-border outbreak responses.MethodsIn 2014, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) conducted a survey on HAV surveillance practices in EU/EEA countries. The survey enquired whether a referral system for confirming primary diagnostics of hepatitis A existed as well as a central collection/storage of hepatitis A cases' samples for typing. Questions on HAV sequencing procedures were also asked. Based on the results, an expert consultation proposed harmonised procedures for cross-border outbreak response, in particular regarding sequencing. In 2016, a follow-up survey assessed uptake of suggested methods.ResultsOf 31 EU/EEA countries, 23 (2014) and 27 (2016) participated. Numbers of countries with central collection and storage of HAV positive samples and of those performing sequencing increased from 12 to 15 and 12 to 14 respectively in 2016, with all countries typing an overlapping fragment of 218 nt. However, variation existed in the sequenced genomic regions and their lengths.ConclusionsWhile HAV sequences in EU/EEA countries are comparable for surveillance, collaboration in sharing and comparing these can be further strengthened. ; We have received valuable comments to the manuscript from Mike Catchpole, Piotr Kramaz and Marc Struelens and acknowledge their contribution in improving the paper. ; Sí

INTRODUCTION: Sequence-based typing of hepatitis A virus (HAV) is important for outbreak detection, investigation and surveillance. In 2013, sequencing was central to resolving a large European Union (EU)-wide outbreak related to frozen berries. However, as the sequenced HAV genome regions were only partly comparable between countries, results were not always conclusive. AIM: The objective was to gather information on HAV surveillance and sequencing in EU/European Economic Area (EEA) countries to find ways to harmonise their procedures, for improvement of cross-border outbreak responses. METHODS: In 2014, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) conducted a survey on HAV surveillance practices in EU/EEA countries. The survey enquired whether a referral system for confirming primary diagnostics of hepatitis A existed as well as a central collection/storage of hepatitis A cases' samples for typing. Questions on HAV sequencing procedures were also asked. Based on the results, an expert consultation proposed harmonised procedures for cross-border outbreak response, in particular regarding sequencing. In 2016, a follow-up survey assessed uptake of suggested methods. RESULTS: Of 31 EU/EEA countries, 23 (2014) and 27 (2016) participated. Numbers of countries with central collection and storage of HAV positive samples and of those performing sequencing increased from 12 to 15 and 12 to 14 respectively in 2016, with all countries typing an overlapping fragment of 218 nt. However, variation existed in the sequenced genomic regions and their lengths. CONCLUSIONS: While HAV sequences in EU/EEA countries are comparable for surveillance, collaboration in sharing and comparing these can be further strengthened.

Introduction Sequence-based typing of hepatitis A virus (HAV) is important for outbreak detection, investigation and surveillance. In 2013, sequencing was central to resolving a large European Union (EU)-wide outbreak related to frozen berries. However, as the sequenced HAV genome regions were only partly comparable between countries, results were not always conclusive. Aim The objective was to gather information on HAV surveillance and sequencing in EU/European Economic Area (EEA) countries to find ways to harmonise their procedures, for improvement of cross-border outbreak responses. Methods In 2014, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) conducted a survey on HAV surveillance practices in EU/EEA countries. The survey enquired whether a referral system for confirming primary diagnostics of hepatitis A existed as well as a central collection/storage of hepatitis A cases' samples for typing. Questions on HAV sequencing procedures were also asked. Based on the results, an expert consultation proposed harmonised procedures for cross-border outbreak response, in particular regarding sequencing. In 2016, a follow-up survey assessed uptake of suggested methods. Results Of 31 EU/EEA countries, 23 (2014) and 27 (2016) participated. Numbers of countries with central collection and storage of HAV positive samples and of those performing sequencing increased from 12 to 15 and 12 to 14 respectively in 2016, with all countries typing an overlapping fragment of 218 nt. However, variation existed in the sequenced genomic regions and their lengths. Conclusions While HAV sequences in EU/EEA countries are comparable for surveillance, collaboration in sharing and comparing these can be further strengthened. ; Peer Reviewed

IntroductionSequence-based typing of hepatitis A virus (HAV) is important for outbreak detection, investigation and surveillance. In 2013, sequencing was central to resolving a large European Union (EU)-wide outbreak related to frozen berries. However, as the sequenced HAV genome regions were only partly comparable between countries, results were not always conclusive.AimThe objective was to gather information on HAV surveillance and sequencing in EU/European Economic Area (EEA) countries to find ways to harmonise their procedures, for improvement of cross-border outbreak responses.MethodsIn 2014, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) conducted a survey on HAV surveillance practices in EU/EEA countries. The survey enquired whether a referral system for confirming primary diagnostics of hepatitis A existed as well as a central collection/storage of hepatitis A cases' samples for typing. Questions on HAV sequencing procedures were also asked. Based on the results, an expert consultation proposed harmonised procedures for cross-border outbreak response, in particular regarding sequencing. In 2016, a follow-up survey assessed uptake of suggested methods.ResultsOf 31 EU/EEA countries, 23 (2014) and 27 (2016) participated. Numbers of countries with central collection and storage of HAV positive samples and of those performing sequencing increased from 12 to 15 and 12 to 14 respectively in 2016, with all countries typing an overlapping fragment of 218 nt. However, variation existed in the sequenced genomic regions and their lengths.ConclusionsWhile HAV sequences in EU/EEA countries are comparable for surveillance, collaboration in sharing and comparing these can be further strengthened.

To access publisher's full text version of this article, please click on the hyperlink in Additional Links field or click on the hyperlink at the top of the page marked Download ; IntroductionSequence-based typing of hepatitis A virus (HAV) is important for outbreak detection, investigation and surveillance. In 2013, sequencing was central to resolving a large European Union (EU)-wide outbreak related to frozen berries. However, as the sequenced HAV genome regions were only partly comparable between countries, results were not always conclusive.AimThe objective was to gather information on HAV surveillance and sequencing in EU/European Economic Area (EEA) countries to find ways to harmonise their procedures, for improvement of cross-border outbreak responses.MethodsIn 2014, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) conducted a survey on HAV surveillance practices in EU/EEA countries. The survey enquired whether a referral system for confirming primary diagnostics of hepatitis A existed as well as a central collection/storage of hepatitis A cases' samples for typing. Questions on HAV sequencing procedures were also asked. Based on the results, an expert consultation proposed harmonised procedures for cross-border outbreak response, in particular regarding sequencing. In 2016, a follow-up survey assessed uptake of suggested methods.ResultsOf 31 EU/EEA countries, 23 (2014) and 27 (2016) participated. Numbers of countries with central collection and storage of HAV positive samples and of those performing sequencing increased from 12 to 15 and 12 to 14 respectively in 2016, with all countries typing an overlapping fragment of 218 nt. However, variation existed in the sequenced genomic regions and their lengths.ConclusionsWhile HAV sequences in EU/EEA countries are comparable for surveillance, collaboration in sharing and comparing these can be further strengthened.

Between 1 June 2016 and 31 May 2017, 17 European Union (EU) and European Economic Area countries reported 4,096 cases associated with a multi-country hepatitis A (HA) outbreak. Molecular analysis identified three co-circulating hepatitis A virus (HAV) strains of genotype IA: VRD_521_2016, V16-25801 and RIVM-HAV16-090. We categorised cases as confirmed, probable or possible, according to the EU outbreak case definitions. Confirmed cases were infected with one of the three outbreak strains. We investigated case characteristics and strain-specific risk factors for transmission. A total of 1,400 (34%) cases were confirmed; VRD_521_2016 and RIVM-HAV16-090 accounted for 92% of these. Among confirmed cases with available epidemiological data, 92% (361/393) were unvaccinated, 43% (83/195) travelled to Spain during the incubation period and 84% (565/676) identified as men who have sex with men (MSM). Results depict an HA outbreak of multiple HAV strains, within a cross-European population, that was particularly driven by transmission between non-immune MSM engaging in high-risk sexual behaviour. The most effective preventive measure to curb this outbreak is HAV vaccination of MSM, supplemented by primary prevention campaigns that target the MSM population and promote protective sexual behaviour. ; Sí

Between 1 June 2016 and 31 May 2017, 17 European Union (EU) and European Economic Area countries reported 4,096 cases associated with a multi-country hepatitis A (HA) outbreak. Molecular analysis identified three co-circulating hepatitis A virus (HAV) strains of genotype IA: VRD_521_2016, V16-25801 and RIVM-HAV16-090. We categorised cases as confirmed, probable or possible, according to the EU outbreak case definitions. Confirmed cases were infected with one of the three outbreak strains. We investigated case characteristics and strain-specific risk factors for transmission. A total of 1,400 (34%) cases were confirmed; VRD_521_2016 and RIVM-HAV16-090 accounted for 92% of these. Among confirmed cases with available epidemiological data, 92% (361/393) were unvaccinated, 43% (83/195) travelled to Spain during the incubation period and 84% (565/676) identified as men who have sex with men (MSM). Results depict an HA outbreak of multiple HAV strains, within a cross-European population, that was particularly driven by transmission between non-immune MSM engaging in high-risk sexual behaviour. The most effective preventive measure to curb this outbreak is HAV vaccination of MSM, supplemented by primary prevention campaigns that target the MSM population and promote protective sexual behaviour.