Suchergebnisse

Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Tables and Figures -- Preface -- Introduction -- PART ONE: A POLITICAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE -- One Trade and the Voter: A Survey of the Existing Literature -- Two The Electoral Regulation of Access -- Three The Trade Policy Process: A Typology -- Four Origins of the Trade Policy Process -- Five The Making of Trade Policy -- PART TWO: THE MAKING OF TRADE POLICY IN BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED STATES, 1860-1990 -- Six The Case Studies -- Seven Descent into Depression, 1860-86 -- Eight Crisis and Response, 1887-1913 -- Nine The First World War, 1914-18 -- Ten Tariff-Making and State-Building, 1919-39 -- Eleven Creation of the Cold War Trading Regime, 1940-62 -- Twelve The Rise and Fall of Industrial Policy, 1963-89 -- Thirteen Conclusion -- APPENDIXES -- Appendix One Mathematical Appendix to Chapter Two -- Appendix Two Tariff Levels -- Appendix Three Partisan Bias in Voting on Trade Bills -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index

A Political Theory of International Trade --Trade and the Voter: A Survey of the Existing Literature --The Electoral Regulation of Access --The Trade Policy Process: A Typology --Origins of the Trade Policy Process --The Making of Trade Policy --The Making of Trade Policy in Britain, France, and the United States, 1860-1990 --The Case Studies --Descent into Depression, 1860-86 --Crisis and Response, 1887-1913 --The First World War, 1914-18 --Tariff-Making and State-Building, 1919-39 --Creation of the Cold War Trading Regime, 1940-62 --The Rise and Fall of Industrial Policy, 1963-89 --Epilogue: Collapse of the Soviet Union and the Future of Existing Arrangements, 1990 to the Present --Mathematical Appendix to Chapter Two --Tariff Levels --Partisan Bias in Voting on Trade Bills.

AbstractGlobal governance complexes offer member states opportunities for "regime shifting": playing off an institutional forum against another with the goal of improving one's relative bargaining position. I probe the internal validity of this strategy. The model makes two contributions to the governance complex literature. Formally, first, the analysis goes beyond current "outside-option" models of regime shifting, involving a permanent break of negotiations, to "inside-option" models, involving temporary disagreements. Substantively, second, the article models two scenarios of regime shifting, one that works for the weak and another that works for the powerful, and then "tests" the claim held by some in the literature that powerful countries are more likely to avail themselves of the possibility of regime shifting than weaker countries. I conclude that regime shifting is more likely to work for the weak than for the strong.

The efficiency-oriented part of the literature on informal governance points to institutional costs as a reason for governments to prefer to cooperate with each other through commitments that are not binding. Left unexplained is what I call the dilemma of informal governance: how informal governance copes with the problem of cheating, to which formal governance has traditionally provided the solution. I show that like-mindedness, the current solution to the dilemma, is convincing but underspecified. Working from a model of governance encompassing the three time-honored dimensions of obligation, precision, and delegation, I analytically explore two other solutions, one that fails, information transmission, another that works, outside option, which I borrow from the power-oriented part of the literature on informal governance. A key finding is that informal governance, despite being neither self-enforceable nor informative, is sustainable for mild Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) types in the presence of outside options. I illustrate the model findings by tracing an historical correlation between power polarization and formalism in the design of security regimes.

The article addresses the question of how status-quo states can identify revisionist threats. After recasting the question within the collective security and social learning literatures, the article presents and models a new mechanism for the collective identification of threats — screening. It then identifies several conditions for the existence of screening mechanisms, among which states' mutual dependence on one another's support to enforce threats and promises, and restricted opportunities for moral hazard. The model's predictions are then tested on two most similar cases — the two Gulf wars — with collective learning taking place during the former but not the latter. The paired comparison suggests that rather than being misinformed or irrational, Saddam, in 2003, was not offered the kinds of incentives that would have led him to reveal the truth about the state of Iraq's nuclear weapons program.

The article addresses the question of how status-quo states can identify revisionist threats. After recasting the question within the collective security and social learning literatures, the article presents and models a new mechanism for the collective identification of threats -- screening. It then identifies several conditions for the existence of screening mechanisms, among which states' mutual dependence on one another's support to enforce threats and promises, and restricted opportunities for moral hazard. The model's predictions are then tested on two most similar cases -- the two Gulf wars -- with collective learning taking place during the former but not the latter. The paired comparison suggests that rather than being misinformed or irrational, Saddam, in 2003, was not offered the kinds of incentives that would have led him to reveal the truth about the state of Iraq's nuclear weapons program. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]