Suchergebnisse

Los artículos que recoge este libro fueron publicados durante los últimos cinco años. En este libro el autor nos conduce amena y rigurosamente por la vida política peruana de los años 2000. Aquí están reunidos los sustos, sopapos e histerias que acuden a cada tanto nuestra política

Pedro Castillo's election as president of Peru in 2021 unleashed an unexpected series of historical debates in the bicentenary year of Peru's independence. A left-wing union leader and rural teacher, Castillo was confronted by a stubborn conservative opposition that denounced his alleged communism, in a renewal of ideological confrontation that raised more questions about Peru's nation-building process. This article argues that, paradoxically, the country's present political precariousness created the conditions for the reemergence of these historical debates—and, because of that same reason, they might prove to be just another ephemeral process in a volatile country still coming to terms with its recent internal conflict.

Peruvians are bitterly divided over how—or even whether—the terrible violence that engulfed the country in the 1980s and '90s should be remembered.

From 2000 to 2010, Bolivia and Peru underwent similar processes of political decentralization toward the meso level of the government. Three elections later in Peru and two in Bolivia, the ability of national political parties to articulate interests differs markedly between the two countries. Peru tends toward fragmentation with national parties incapable of participating or successfully competing in subnational elections, while in Bolivia, the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) -- and other parties to a lesser extent -- are increasingly capable of participating and winning subnational offices. This paper argues that, despite having undergone very similar institutional reforms, the difference between the cases can largely be explained by two "society-side" variables: the caliber of the political ideas in debate and political social density. The substantive quality of ideas in debate and a greater political social density have been crucial to the Bolivian trend, while their absence has lessened the possibility of anything similar occurring in Peru. In general terms, the article sheds light on the social conditions that favor party-building in a context of decentralization reform. Adapted from the source document.

From 2000 to 2010, Bolivia and Peru underwent similar processes of political decentralization toward the meso level of the government. Three elections later in Peru and two in Bolivia, the ability of national political parties to articulate interests differs markedly between the two countries. Peru tends toward fragmentation with national parties incapable of participating or successfully competing in subnational elections, while in Bolivia, the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) - and other parties to a lesser extent - are increasingly capable of participating and winning subnational offices. This paper argues that, despite having undergone very similar institutional reforms, the difference between the cases can largely be explained by two "society-side" variables: the caliber of the political ideas in debate and political social density. The substantive quality of ideas in debate and a greater political social density have been crucial to the Bolivian trend, while their absence has lessened the possibility of anything similar occurring in Peru. In general terms, the article sheds light on the social conditions that favor party-building in a context of decentralization reform. (GIGA)

From 2000 to 2010, Bolivia and Peru underwent similar processes of political decentralization toward the meso level of the government. Three elections later in Peru and two in Bolivia, the ability of national political parties to articulate interests differs markedly between the two countries. Peru tends toward fragmentation with national parties incapable of participating or successfully competing in subnational elections, while in Bolivia, the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) – and other parties to a lesser extent – are increasingly capable of participating and winning subnational offices. This paper argues that, despite having undergone very similar institutional reforms, the difference between the cases can largely be explained by two "society-side" variables: the caliber of the political ideas in debate and political social density. The substantive quality of ideas in debate and a greater political social density have been crucial to the Bolivian trend, while their absence has lessened the possibility of anything similar occurring in Peru. In general terms, the article sheds light on the social conditions that favor party-building in a context of decentralization reform.

Introduction : leaving the path behind / Hillel David Soifer and Alberto Vergara -- Shining Path : the last peasant war in the Andes / José Luis Rénique and Adrián Lerner -- Civil wars and their consequences : the Peruvian armed conflict in comparative perspective / Livia Isabella Schubiger and David Sulmont -- From oligarchic domination to neoliberal governance : the Shining Path and the transformation of Peru's constitutional order / Maxwell A. Cameron -- The internal armed conflict and state capacity : institutional reforms and the effective exercise of authority / Hillel David Soifer and Everett A. Vieira III -- Impact and legacies of political violence in Peru's public universities / Eduardo Dargent and Noelia Chávez -- Peace for whom? legacies of gender-based violence in Peru / Jelke Boesten -- Indigenous activism and human rights NGOs in Peru : the unexpected consequences of armed conflict / Maritza Paredes -- Political violence and the defeat of the left / Paula Muñoz -- From a partisan right to the conservative archipelago : political violence and the transformation of the right-wing spectrum in contemporary Peru / Alberto Vergara and Daniel Encinas -- Public opinion, the specter of violence, and democracy in contemporary Peru / Arturo Maldonado, Jennifer L. Merolla, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister -- Contested memories of the Peruvian internal armed conflict / Paulo Drinot -- Conclusion / Steven Levitsky

Comparative analysis of the antibullfighting agenda in Bogotá, Lima, and Quito sheds light on the relation between new social movements and left parties. It suggests that, although a social movement is important to the visibility of the agenda, the key variable in achieving a ban on bullfighting in the three capitals has been a decisive left leadership that is not shy about confrontation with traditional elites.Un análisis comparativo de la agenda contra la tauromaquia en Bogotá, Lima y Quito devela la relación entre los nuevos movimientos sociales y los partidos de izquierda. Sugiere que, aunque la existencia de un movimiento social resulta importante para visibilizar dicha agenda, la variable clave para lograr la prohibición de la tauromaquia en las tres capitales ha sido un liderazgo decisivo por parte de la izquierda, que no se ha mostrado tímida cuando se trata de confrontar a las élites tradicionales.

Peru's posttransition democracy presents a paradox: presidents have remained unpopular despite presiding over a period in which democratic institutions strengthened and the economy grew rapidly. O'Donnell's work on delegative democracy suggests that the Peruvian paradox results from weak vertical accountability. Since Peru's return to democracy, parties and civil society have been too weak to hold elected leaders accountable. Furthermore, presidents have faced opposition to reform from entrenched neoliberal technocrats. With no one holding them accountable and little capacity to govern, presidents have chosen to delegate decision-making authority to technocrats. Even when leaders have won office on reformist platforms, continuity has prevailed, and citizens have lost trust in their elected leaders. The origins of the Peruvian paradox and weak vertical accountability can be traced to the destruction of the institutional and organizational foundations of democracy in the 1990s under Alberto Fujimori's authoritarian regime.La democracia pos-transición en Perú presenta una paradoja: los presidentes siguen siendo impopulares a pesar de presidir un período en el que las instituciones democráticas se fortalecieron y la economía creció rápidamente. El trabajo de O'Donnell sobre la demo-cracia delegativa sugiere que la paradoja peruana resulta de una débil rendición de cuentas vertical. Desde el retorno de Perú a la democracia, los partidos y la sociedad civil han sido demasiado débiles para responsabilizar a los líderes electos. Además, los presidentes han enfrentado la oposición a la reforma de tecnócratas neoliberales atrincherados. Sin que nadie los responsabilice y con poca capacidad para gobernar, los presidentes han optado por delegar la autoridad en la toma de decisiones a los tecnócratas. Incluso cuando los líderes han sido eligidos en plataformas reformistas, la continuidad ha prevalecido y los ciudadanos han perdido la confianza en sus líderes electos. Los orígenes de la paradoja peruana y la débil rendición de cuentas vertical se remonta a la destrucción de los cimientos institucionales y organizativos de la democracia en la década de 1990 bajo el régimen autoritario de Alberto Fujimori.