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Abstract
Research on legitimacy of international organizations (IOs) has often focused on discursive self-legitimation by IOs. This article explores the role of other (de)legitimizing actors. Distinguishing between elites of different political and societal sectors, we use unique data from a survey of 860 political and societal elites in Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, Russia, South Africa, the United States, and a global elite group, to perform the first systematic analysis of elites' (de)legitimation practices toward IOs. We analyze behavioral as well as discursive practices that may boost or challenge citizens' legitimacy beliefs toward IOs, and describe how elites' repertoires of (de)legitimation practices vary across IOs, elite sectors, and geographical locations. Explanatory analyses test whether the use of legitimation and delegitimation practices can be explained by characteristics of the interviewed elites. We find that most elites engage in (de)legitimation of IOs. Legitimation is more common than delegitimation. While discursive practices are more frequently used, behavioral practices are more widespread than acknowledged in previous research. Societal elites are more frequent (de)legitimizers of IOs than assumed in more state-centric accounts of global governance. Attitudes of elite individuals (confidence in the IO and ideological position) partly explain engagement in (de)legitimation. By providing the general pattern of elite (de)legitimation of IOs, the article sets the scene for more detailed case studies of diverse (de)legitimation practices toward specific IOs.

AbstractSweden's COVID‐19 policy was characterized by reliance on voluntary compliance. Citizens were expected to act responsibly. Previous research has not focused on the role of citizenship norms (duty‐based, engaged, and critical) in the COVID‐19 crisis. This is an important omission, since citizenship norms are expected to raise social responsibility and trigger prosocial behavior. This article asks how important citizenship norms are for explaining voluntary COVID‐19 policy compliance. Additionally, it considers perceptions of how other people comply, individual background factors, and interpersonal and institutional trust. The study focuses on Swedish high school youth, a group reported to comply less with voluntary COVID‐19 measures. Using survey data (N = 1823), we find higher reported voluntary compliance by high school youth who adhere more strongly to the duty‐based citizenship norm. Importantly, believing that other people follow the COVID‐19 recommendations is strongly associated with following them. Thus, next to citizenship norms, "descriptive norms" (i.e., what other people are doing) are central for individuals to decide how they will comply. We further find that differences in worry about the pandemic and socioeconomic background factors (migration background and economic situation of the household) explain variation in compliance. Institutional and interpersonal trust play a less important role. These findings challenge the strong focus on trust in previous research. Our findings have implications for research on policy compliance in the context of crisis, and for public policy.

AbstractThe expectation that state voice drives perceptions of the legitimacy of international institutions is a common theme in academic scholarship and policy discourse on global power shifts. This article tests this expectation empirically, using novel and unique survey data on legitimacy perceptions toward eight international institutions among political and societal elites in six countries, comprising both rising and established powers. The article finds only limited support for a link between a state's voice in an international institution and elite perceptions of legitimacy. Differences in formal state representation are only partly reflected in patterns of perceived legitimacy across the six countries. In addition, there is no evidence at the individual level that assessments of state voice shape elites' perceptions of institutional legitimacy. Instead, considerations of good governance best predict whether elites perceive of international institutions as more or less legitimate. These findings suggest that only institutional reforms which are seen to favor general qualities of good governance, and not narrow demands for state voice, are likely to be rewarded with greater legitimacy.

The expectation that state voice drives perceptions of the legitimacy of international institutions is a common theme in academic scholarship and policy discourse on global power shifts. This article tests this expectation empirically, using novel and unique survey data on legitimacy perceptions toward eight international institutions among political and societal elites in six countries, comprising both rising and established powers. The article finds only limited support for a link between a state's voice in an international institution and elite perceptions of legitimacy. Differences in formal state representation are only partly reflected in patterns of perceived legitimacy across the six countries. In addition, there is no evidence at the individual level that assessments of state voice shape elites' perceptions of institutional legitimacy. Instead, considerations of good governance best predict whether elites perceive of international institutions as more or less legitimate. These findings suggest that only institutional reforms which are seen to favor general qualities of good governance, and not narrow demands for state voice, are likely to be rewarded with greater legitimacy.

The expectation that state voice drives perceptions of the legitimacy of international institutions is a common theme in academic scholarship and policy discourse on global power shifts. This article tests this expectation empirically, using novel and unique survey data on legitimacy perceptions toward eight international institutions among political and societal elites in six countries, comprising both rising and established powers. The article finds only limited support for a link between a state's voice in an international institution and elite perceptions of legitimacy. Differences in formal state representation are only partly reflected in patterns of perceived legitimacy across the six countries. In addition, there is no evidence at the individual level that assessments of state voice shape elites' perceptions of institutional legitimacy. Instead, considerations of good governance best predict whether elites perceive of international institutions as more or less legitimate. These findings suggest that only institutional reforms which are seen to favor general qualities of good governance, and not narrow demands for state voice, are likely to be rewarded with greater legitimacy. © 2020 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

The expectation that state voice drives perceptions of the legitimacy of international institutions is a common theme in academic scholarship and policy discourse on global power shifts. This article tests this expectation empirically, using novel and unique survey data on legitimacy perceptions toward eight international institutions among political and societal elites in six countries, comprising both rising and established powers. The article finds only limited support for a link between a state's voice in an international institution and elite perceptions of legitimacy. Differences in formal state representation are only partly reflected in patterns of perceived legitimacy across the six countries. In addition, there is no evidence at the individual level that assessments of state voice shape elites' perceptions of institutional legitimacy. Instead, considerations of good governance best predict whether elites perceive of international institutions as more or less legitimate. These findings suggest that only institutional reforms which are seen to favor general qualities of good governance, and not narrow demands for state voice, are likely to be rewarded with greater legitimacy. © 2020 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

The expectation that state voice drives perceptions of the legitimacy of international institutions is a common theme in academicscholarship and policy discourse on global power shifts. This article tests this expectation empirically, using novel andunique survey data on legitimacy perceptions toward eight international institutions among political and societal elites in sixcountries, comprising both rising and established powers. The article finds only limited support for a link between a state'svoice in an international institution and elite perceptions of legitimacy. Differences in formal state representation are onlypartly reflected in patterns of perceived legitimacy across the six countries. In addition, there is no evidence at the individuallevel that assessments of state voice shape elites' perceptions of institutional legitimacy. Instead, considerations of good governancebest predict whether elites perceive of international institutions as more or less legitimate. These findings suggestthat only institutional reforms which are seen to favor general qualities of good governance, and not narrow demands forstate voice, are likely to be rewarded with greater legitimacy.

AbstractMany have depicted a steady rise in lifestyle politics. Individuals are increasingly using everyday life choices about consumption, transportation, or modes of living to address political, environmental, or ethical issues. While celebrated by some as an expansion of political participation, others worry this trend may be detrimental for democracy, for instance, by reducing citizens to consumers. Implicit in this common critique is the notion that lifestyle politics will replace, rather than coexist with or lead to, other forms of political participation. We provide the first detailed longitudinal analysis to test these hypotheses. Using unique panel data from 1538 politically active individuals from the Flemish region of Belgium (2017–18), we demonstrate that over time, lifestyle politics functions as a gateway into institutionalized and non-institutionalized modes of political participation and that this relationship is mediated by individuals' increased political concerns.

Many have depicted a steady rise in lifestyle politics. Individuals are increasingly using everyday life choices about consumption, transportation, or modes of living to address political, environmental, or ethical issues. While celebrated by some as an expansion of political participation, others worry this trend may be detrimental for democracy, for instance, by reducing citizens to consumers. Implicit in this common critique is the notion that lifestyle politics will replace, rather than coexist with or lead to, other forms of political participation. We provide the first detailed longitudinal analysis to test these hypotheses. Using unique panel data from 1538 politically active individuals from the Flemish region of Belgium (2017–18), we demonstrate that over time, lifestyle politics functions as a gateway into institutionalized and non-institutionalized modes of political participation and that this relationship is mediated by individuals' increased political concerns.

Many have depicted a steady rise in lifestyle politics. Individuals are increasingly using everyday life choices about consumption, transportation, or modes of living to address political, environmental, or ethical issues. While celebrated by some as an expansion of political participation, others worry this trend may be detrimental for democracy, for instance, by reducing citizens to consumers. Implicit in this common critique is the notion that lifestyle politics will replace, rather than coexist with or lead to, other forms of political participation. We provide the first detailed longitudinal analysis to test these hypotheses. Using unique panel data from 1538 politically active individuals from the Flemish region of Belgium (2017-18), we demonstrate that over time, lifestyle politics functions as a gateway into institutionalized and non-institutionalized modes of political participation and that this relationship is mediated by individuals' increased political concerns.

Many have depicted a steady rise in lifestyle politics. Individuals are increasingly using everyday life choices about consumption, transportation, or modes of living to address political, environmental, or ethical issues. While celebrated by some as an expansion of political participation, others worry this trend may be detrimental for democracy, for instance, by reducing citizens to consumers. Implicit in this common critique is the notion that lifestyle politics will replace, rather than coexist with or lead to, other forms of political participation. We provide the first detailed longitudinal analysis to test these hypotheses. Using unique panel data from 1538 politically active individuals from the Flemish region of Belgium (2017-18), we demonstrate that over time, lifestyle politics functions as a gateway into institutionalized and non-institutionalized modes of political participation and that this relationship is mediated by individuals' increased political concerns.