Suchergebnisse

Im Januar 2019 geschah in Russland etwas in diesem Jahrhundert äußerst Seltenes: Die Abmilderung eines der wichtigsten Instrumente der repressiven Politik trat in Kraft. Wir beobachten, wie Strafverfahren eingestellt werden und wie Vorstrafen von Menschen gelöscht werden, die wegen öffentlicher Äußerungen verur-teilt worden waren. Diese Veränderungen werden von Vertretern praktisch aller ideellen Ausrichtungen im Land begrüßt. Es wäre schlichtweg Grund zur Freude, wenn da nicht zwei »aber« wären: Zum einen geht es um den Paragraphen 282 des Strafgesetzbuches über die Erregung von Hass aufgrund der Rasse, der Religion oder anderer Merkmale (Volksverhetzung). Zweitens gibt es keinen Grund anzunehmen, dass diese Reform eine wirkliche Liberalisierung im Bereich der Meinungsfreiheit bedeutet.

Im Januar 2019 geschah in Russland etwas in diesem Jahrhundert äußerst Seltenes: Die Abmilderung eines der wichtigsten Instrumente der repressiven Politik trat in Kraft. Wir beobachten, wie Strafverfahren eingestellt werden und wie Vorstrafen von Menschen gelöscht werden, die wegen öffentlicher Äußerungen verur-teilt worden waren. Diese Veränderungen werden von Vertretern praktisch aller ideellen Ausrichtungen im Land begrüßt. Es wäre schlichtweg Grund zur Freude, wenn da nicht zwei »aber« wären: Zum einen geht es um den Paragraphen 282 des Strafgesetzbuches über die Erregung von Hass aufgrund der Rasse, der Religion oder anderer Merkmale (Volksverhetzung). Zweitens gibt es keinen Grund anzunehmen, dass diese Reform eine wirkliche Liberalisierung im Bereich der Meinungsfreiheit bedeutet.

Two issues preoccupying post-Soviet society are a wish to oppose outside influences (mainly from the West), and to resist aggressive behavior in matters of religion. It is not difficult to point out inconsistencies and contradictions in these approaches, but more germane is the fact that both have survived, if in modified form, to the present day. When the possibility of further restrictions on freedom of conscience are being discussed, a key topic is invariably the need to protect society from the 'expansionism' of new religious movements and radical Islam. Here, Verkhovsky studies the new blasphemy act and discusses why freedom of religion and belief continue to cause conflict in post-Soviet Russia. Adapted from the source document.

Examines the emergence of Russian ethnonationalism under President Vladimir Putin. Discussion opens with a look at the ideological changes in Russian nationalism between the periods of perestroika & Putin's second term. The development of ethno-xenophobia is discussed, highlighting the discourse of "migrantophobia," arguing that this became the dominating idea & the main means of propaganda. Attention is then given to various federal-level nationalistic organizations, eg, political parties, the Nazi skinhead movement, & the Movement against Illegal Immigration. It is asserted that "Russian nationalism" comprises a complicated system of partnership relationships & other kinds that include groups of different sizes & status & with differing viewpoints on nationalism & "nation." In closing, the prospect of a nationalist, ie, fascist, political victory in Russia is considered. D. Edelman

Ten years ago, the destruction of totalitarian Soviet society led many to fear that in a country with little experience of democracy, another totalitarian regime would supersede the old one. But which regime, and in what form? The national conflicts that accompanied the disintegration of the Soviet Union suggested a feasible answer right away, namely, a national dictatorship of the fascist sort, composed of nationalistic ideology and a totalitarian social structure. No such dictatorship has occurred in contemporary Russia and none is anticipated in the near future. The "Weimar Russia" scenario, which the political science expert Alexander Ianov developed in such great detail, has not materialized.

AbstractAmong the Russian citizens who fought in eastern Ukraine on the side of the separatists are representatives of Russian nationalist groups and organizations. After briefly reviewing the details of their participation in the war, this article looks at the various paths open to former militants upon their return from the war. This article identifies such options as continued military training and organization of military camps, participation in the war in Syria, participation in attacks on political opponents in Russia, racially tinged vigilantism, and attempts to return to political activities. Nationalist fighters who have returned from the war found themselves with limited options given the current decline of the radical far-right in Russia. The following three important conclusions can be made: (1) the return of deeply disappointed militants from the Donbas, especially those who had previously participated in radical groups, was perceived as a significant threat, but this threat has not yet materialized; (2) their return had no significant effect on the nationalist movement as a whole; and (3) some groups of former militants nevertheless remain potentially dangerous in the event of political destabilization.

This timely intervention exposes the euphemized language of the extreme right as a deceptive attempt to secure greater influence over public policy. Since the end of World War II, the extreme right has made strategic use of "doublespeak," which apes the language of liberal democracy. Attentive observation and accurate recognition of these tactics means taking the extreme right's deliberately crafted slogans, symbols, and themes seriously. These essays investigate the extreme right's attempts at "repackaging" contemporary ultranationalism to make it more palatable to mainstream European and American tastes