Suchergebnisse

It is increasingly recognised that the mobilisation and exchange of knowledge between different sectors (such as academia, policymakers, and practitioners) and regions (between North and South as well as among conflict regions) can be of paramount importance in the field of peacebuilding. As a result, the number of knowledge networks in this field has risen dramatically in recent years. This article aims to shed light on these initiatives and their potential by analysing the structural factors that shape the possibilities for knowledge exchange in networks in the field of development and peacebuilding. It maps recent thinking about knowledge networking and draws on conversations with network participants in North and South. Attention is paid to conditions and characteristics of knowledge networks, including theoretical frames for understanding them and ways of categorising them. In addition, the article deals with obstacles for successful knowledge networking, including organisational structure and culture, power issues, competition, and contested knowledge, embeddedness, regimes, donor relations, and discourse, the social and political situation in postconflict regions, cultural issues, and the issue of knowledge changing over time. The final section of the article concludes by listing a number of factors that influence the success of knowledge networks. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.

ABSTRACTUsing a case study of Prey Lang Community Network (PLCN) in Cambodia, this article adds to emerging literature on local responses to land grabbing. While much of this literature has focused on political opportunity structures, this article looks at the agency of local groups organizing in response to land grabbing. Noting that organization and connections have been 'missing links' in the literature, the authors draw on thinking on collective action and social networking. Their findings highlight the importance of identity politics in the development of movements responding to land grabbing. Transnational discourses and external support also play a significant role in local responses to land grabbing in general, and in the modest success achieved by the PLCN in particular. All this complicates the traditional understanding of political opportunity structures and calls for a more dynamic approach.

Current peacebuilding debates centre around the idea that international and local activities need to be better aligned. However, the distinction between 'local' and 'international' actors and processes obscures both power and interest differentials among actors and the various interconnections between international, national and local actors and discourses. This article proposes stakeholder analysis as a way to help understand power relations among various actors. This approach is applied to an empirical sample of land conflicts in Cambodia, in which local residents saw their livelihoods threatened by collusion between international private investors and national and local political interests. The findings suggest that building peace in insecure settings is not just a matter of harmonising approaches to strengthen the state with initiatives to support local groups. The reflex of international peacebuilders to strengthen the state and promote the rule of law overlooks the fact that governments may be unaccountable and laws may be illegitimate.

ABSTRACTState building is considered to be the solution to Afghanistan's ills. State‐building efforts largely aim to mirror Afghanistan to a market democracy. However, a market democracy is the outcome of specific historical and geo‐graphical circumstances, and cannot be replicated easily. This article explores four models of state formation: the Western, developmental, rentier and predatory state. Afghanistan can be characterized as a weak rentier state, subsisting on aid. Generally, the structural consequences of such aid rentierism are underestimated. 'State building' in this context cannot be successful. More aid 'ownership' and a strengthening of the Afghan bureaucracy will simply consolidate aid rentierism rather than reverse‐engineer a market democracy. A greater focus on economic policy is required to direct Afghanistan's rulers towards a more viable path of state formation. In this regard, the 'developmental state' offers some insights.

Civil society (CS) strengthening is central to peacebuilding policies for divided, post-war societies. However, it has been criticized for creating internationalized organizations without local backing, unable to represent citizens' interests. Based on in-depth empirical research in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this article focuses on the legitimacy of CS organizations (CSOs). It explores why legitimacy for donors rarely accompanies legitimacy for local actors. We hypothesized that whilst donors avoid supporting mono-ethnic organizations, seen as problematic for peacebuilding, 'ethnicness' may provide local legitimacy. However, our analysis of CSOs' ethnicness nuances research characterizing organizations as either inclusive or divisive. Moreover, local legitimacy is not based on ethnicness per se, but CSOs' ability to skilfully interact with ethnically divided constituencies and political structures. In addition, we offer novel explanations why few organizations enjoy both donor and local legitimacy, including local mistrust of donors' normative frameworks and perceived lack of results. However, we also show that a combination of local and donor legitimacy is possible, and explore this rare but interesting category of organizations.

Civil society (CS) strengthening is central to peacebuilding policies for divided, post-war societies. However, it has been criticized for creating internationalized organizations without local backing, unable to represent citizens' interests. Based on in-depth empirical research in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this article focuses on the legitimacy of CS organizations (CSOs). It explores why legitimacy for donors rarely accompanies legitimacy for local actors. We hypothesized that whilst donors avoid supporting mono-ethnic organizations, seen as problematic for peacebuilding, 'ethnicness' may provide local legitimacy. However, our analysis of CSOs' ethnicness nuances research characterizing organizations as either inclusive or divisive. Moreover, local legitimacy is not based on ethnicness per se, but CSOs' ability to skilfully interact with ethnically divided constituencies and political structures. In addition, we offer novel explanations why few organizations enjoy both donor and local legitimacy, including local mistrust of donors' normative frameworks and perceived lack of results. However, we also show that a combination of local and donor legitimacy is possible, and explore this rare but interesting category of organizations.

Civil society (CS) strengthening is central to peacebuilding policies for divided, post-war societies. However, it has been criticized for creating internationalized organizations without local backing, unable to represent citizens' interests. Based on in-depth empirical research in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this article focuses on the legitimacy of CS organizations (CSOs). It explores why legitimacy for donors rarely accompanies legitimacy for local actors. We hypothesized that whilst donors avoid supporting mono-ethnic organizations, seen as problematic for peacebuilding, 'ethnicness' may provide local legitimacy. However, our analysis of CSOs' ethnicness nuances research characterizing organizations as either inclusive or divisive. Moreover, local legitimacy is not based on ethnicness per se, but CSOs' ability to skilfully interact with ethnically divided constituencies and political structures. In addition, we offer novel explanations why few organizations enjoy both donor and local legitimacy, including local mistrust of donors' normative frameworks and perceived lack of results. However, we also show that a combination of local and donor legitimacy is possible, and explore this rare but interesting category of organizations.