Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Dediation -- Contents -- List of figures -- List of tables -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- List of abbreviations -- PART I Introduction -- Introduction -- PART II Conceptual framework and background -- 1 Neoclassical realism -- 2 India and China in Africa and West Africa -- PART III India and China -- 3 India and China: difference in power and political economies -- 4 Oil industry in India and China -- PART IV Case studies -- 5 India and China in Angola -- 6 India and China in Nigeria -- 7 India and China in eight countries in West Africa -- PART V Conclusion -- Conclusion -- Epilogue -- Appendix A -- Bibliography -- Index

AbstractIndia's neutrality and failure to publicly criticise Russia is driven by the Modi government's quest to be a great/leading power. It believes that Moscow can aid New Delhi in achieving this goal by enhancing the security pillar of its foreign policy strategy. However, publicly criticising Russia will undermine India's security pillar and will prevent India from becoming a leading power. Thus, India's response to the Ukraine war might be best described as 'varied consequentialism'. Additionally, India has also exhibited 'strategic opportunism'; that is, it has employed norms and values strategically to pursue its aspirations to emerge as a leading power. It has sought to use the Global South's discontent with the US‐led Western liberal order aggravated by the Russia–Ukraine war, to seek leadership of the Global South. It seeks to act as the leader of a new 'non‐alignment', which has emerged as a consequence of the war.

This article seeks to provide an answer to the question, "Why is China dismissive of India's great power ambitions?" It argues that China's dismissiveness of India's great power ambitions is explained by cognitive bias towards India based on its colonization and freedom struggle. This is because India was formally colonized by Great Britain, but China was never formally colonized. Second, India won its freedom from British colonial/imperial rule through a nonviolent struggle unlike China, which fought a bloody war of liberation against Japan and a civil war leading to the formation of the People's Republic of China.

This article argues that the formation of the second Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) is a case of déjà vu for China and that, despite its engagement with the new Taliban-led government, Beijing will be unable to meet its geopolitical, geostrategic, geo-economic and national security goals in the country. There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, similarly to the situation under the first IEA, the Taliban are finding it difficult to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. The security situation will remain perilous due to persistent attacks by the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) group. Secondly, and also just as during the first IEA, the Taliban cannot be relied upon as allies in China's "war on terror". This is due to the Taliban's ideological beliefs, decades of ties with the Uyghur militants in Afghanistan and concerns about reputational damage if it breaks links with Islamist groups or undertakes counterterrorism operations against these groups, damage which may undermine the second IEA.(Asian Aff/GIGA)

Employing BRICS as a case study, this paper argues that India's neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine war is not influenced by its quest for status via BRICS because a souring of the India-Russia bilateral relationship will not affect India's quest for status through the BRICS. First, India and Russia have joined and co-developed BRICS to achieve their national and foreign policy goals such as great power status, challenging US hegemony and achieving a multipolar world order, reform of the liberal international order and Bretton Woods institutions and other objectives. Both countries have much to lose by allowing their problematic bilateral relationship to adversely impact the BRICS. Second, the BRICS is structured in such a way that its operating procedures/principles including consensus-based decision making and intentionally omitting controversial issues implies that bilateral problems between member states are not tabled and they do not make the group dysfunctional.

Prachi Aggarwal, China's Energy Security: The Journey from Self-Sufficiency to Global Investor. Singapore, 2022, pp. 225, €109.99, ISBN: 978-981-19-2192-6.

This article seeks to provide an answer to the question which has not been explored in the relevant academic scholarship: What are the merits and demerits of China restoring status quo ante or maintaining status quo along the disputed Line of Actual Control and why? This article argues that status quo renders China multiple geopolitical, geo-economic and geostrategic advantages: restoring its 1960s claim line and tactical and strategic gains along the LAC, security of Aksai Chin and inhibiting India's rise. However, it also creates prospects for India–China conflict/war which will curtail (a victorious) China's quest to become the pre-eminent global power. And a defeat/stalemate in conflict/war with India will impact China's standing in global affairs, and repercussions for Communist Party of China's regime stability and regime survival. On the other hand, restoring status quo ante also has tactical and strategic costs, and can also have domestic political costs for President Xi Jinping.

This article seeks to provide answers to questions: why did India and the United States have a trade dispute under Trump and Modi administrations, and why were the two countries unable to resolve the trade dispute under Trump and Modi administrations? The article asserts that the primary reason for the trade dispute/disagreements between the two countries is the domestic economic and political environment and ideological considerations in the Trump and Modi administrations. This has manifested itself in a clash between Trump's 'America first' stance with the aim of 'Making America great again' and Modi's 'Make in India' initiative which envisions creating India as a manufacturing powerhouse and increasing the economic prosperity of Indian citizens. The article highlights each country's concerns and grievances regarding the other side's trade policies and what kind of trade access India wants from the United States and vice-versa.