Suchergebnisse

This article focuses on the role public agencies play in the policy making process. Based on a single embedded case-study of one Flemish public agency and two policy-programmes in which this agency is involved, the normative practitioner model of the policy/operations divide is tested. This model assumes (or prescribes) that policy making is a political prerogative, while public agencies as administrative actors should stick to implementing policy. The evidence shows that reality is more complex than the rhetoric of the practitioner model. Agencies may be more involved in policy preparation and policy decision-making than assumed, and political actors may in some cases have a large say in policy implementation. The evidence from my case-study shows that in reality the policy/operations divide might not be that clear-cut, and that this normative model should be revised on some points. Next to that, the findings may be discussed in the light of the current administrative reform projects in various countries that propagate a strict labour division between the political sphere (policy) and the administrative sphere (implementing policy). This discussion is particularly relevant for the Flemish public sector that is currently facing a major reform of that kind.

In many Western countries, alongside NPM-rhetoric, important tasks of public service delivery have been devolved to autonomous single purpose agencies. This was also the case in Flanders (Belgium). This reform rhetoric also has a clear vision on how tasks in the policy cycle are to be distributed between actors: policy-making is a political prerogative, supported by core governmental departments, whereas executive agencies have policy implementation as their main task. This article addresses whether this ideal-typical model really exists, drawing on two case studies of policy initiatives in Flanders. Our observations confirm a policy-operations divide between politics and administration, but it needs refinement: ministers and their advisors make the strategic policy decisions, in which they are assisted by executive agencies. Ministerial departments are hardly involved in the policy-making process. Executive agencies are more than policy implementers alone, as they often have a large input in the operational stages of policy-making.

The creation of executive agencies outside core departments has been a major element of administrative reforms throughout Europe during the past two decades, driven by a managerial logic, which also has been at the core of most academic works on "agencification." In this article, the authors take a different perspective by focusing on executive agencies' influence in the policy process. The authors analyze the policy influence of a large executive agency with service delivery tasks in the context of a parliamentary system of government (Flanders, Belgium). A comparison of the agency's influence in two major policy processes shows that a complex interplay of policy content, patterns of interaction, and mutual trust with the political leadership and organizational characteristics helps in explaining the observed patterns of influence. The findings also raise normative concerns regarding potential problems of disconnecting operations from policy formulation via agencification.

The involvement of private actors (non-profit and/or for-profit) in public service provision has a lot of consequences and implications not only for users and service providers, but also for government. This article explores the consequences for the relations within public-private service provision networks, by focusing on the governance regime of childcare in Flanders. Our case analysis clearly shows that public-private service provision networks may threaten the transparency of the service provision field for users, and challenge the role of the oversight authority, often requiring a two-level steering of the service provision field: a direct steering of individual service providers and the network and/or market steering of the whole service provision field (in a community or region). Governance regimes comprising service providers of different sectors may complicate this kind of network steering, as there seem to exist at least six relationships within such networks. Furthermore, we noticed that service providers may face conflicting (public) accountabilities.

Private nonprofit organizations (NPO) involved in publically funded welfare programs face the challenge of maintaining autonomy in their strategic decision-making processes. In this article we study the extent to which NPO managers perceive this autonomy vis-à-vis government in defining the NPO's mission, their working procedures, the target groups to be served and the results to be achieved. Empirical evidence is taken from a large-N sample of 255 NPOs engaged in social welfare provision in Belgium. Our findings suggest that public resource dependence does have a negative impact on the perception of NPOs about the level of organizational autonomy. Still, we will argue that, when looking at the relative share of public income in the NPO's total budget, the nature and intensity of the consultation process between government and NPO and some measures of organizational capacity, this picture is less black and white than presumed.