Suchergebnisse

> The European Union's 2016 Global Strategy calls for a more 'joined-up' approach – that is, for greater coherence – in the EU's external action. One aspect of this coherence concerns the strategic link between sectoral cooperation with third countries, such as participation in EU programmes, and matters of foreign policy more broadly (e.g. a diplomatic dispute). > The EU's 'privileged partnerships' with neighbouring countries offer them deeper market access in exchange for the institutionalisation of their relations with the EU. A case in which the EU has in recent years successfully managed to deploy a joined-up approach in this regard is its relationship with Switzerland. The EU is in particular linking further sectoral cooperation to the signature of an 'Institutional Framework Agreement'. This joined-up approach was facilitated by a significant degree of internal coordination and centralisation. > Whereas the EU's wish to engage in a consistent approach towards non-EU partners that participate in the extended Internal Market, stressing the balance of rights and obligations, is understandable, it increases the third countries' costs of non-compliance with the EU's position. This may, in turn, reduce the EU's attractiveness in those countries and also lead to the loss of benefits for the EU.

Current debates on the future of the European Union tend to privilege statist perspectives according to which geopolitical challenges and internal politicization either spur disintegration, or drive the EU towards more federalist, centralized and externally bounded features. Starting from the EU's multilevel and polycentric architecture, this article investigates how far such federalist dynamics reach out to task-specific, functionalist EU institutions, such as regulatory agencies. Enjoying a certain degree of autonomy from the EU's central, politically encompassing institutions, regulatory agencies have established close ties with third country regulators to tackle interdependence. Based on the comparative analysis of six regulatory agencies representing varying patterns of international interdependence, sectoral politicization and regulatory authority, we show that functionalist pressure for international cooperation indeed sustains fluid boundaries. However, EU central institutions such as the Commission and the Parliament have increasingly claimed control over agencies' external ramifications. The result is enduring functionalist de-bordering, but federally controlled.