Is Vote Buying Effective? Evidence from a Field Experiment in West Africa
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 124, Heft 574, S. F356-F387
ISSN: 1468-0297
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In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 124, Heft 574, S. F356-F387
ISSN: 1468-0297
In: Journal of development economics, Band 92, Heft 1, S. 28-38
ISSN: 0304-3878
In: Journal of development economics, Band 92, Heft 1, S. 28-38
ISSN: 0304-3878
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of development economics, Band 151, S. 102665
ISSN: 0304-3878
Political accountability requires informed voters and electoral participation. Both have been lagging in many developing countries like Mozambique. We designed and implemented a field experiment during the 2013 municipal elections in that country. We study the impact on political behavior of location-level distribution of a free newspaper and get-out-the-vote text messages aimed at mobilizing voters. As part of our design, we randomly assigned peers to experimental subjects in order to test for peer influence via text messages. Measurement of political outcomes comes from official electoral results at the level of the polling station, and from a range of behavioral and survey-based measures. We find that the distribution of the newspaper increased turnout and voting for the ruling party. The text messages led to higher political participation. When turning to influencing peers, we observe a clear role of male and older individuals, as well as complementarity with the distribution of newspapers. ; authorsversion ; published
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In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Band 129, S. 1-17
World Affairs Online
Investment in improved agricultural inputs is infrequent for smallholder farmers in Africa. One barrier may be limited access to formal savings. This is the first study to use a randomized controlled trial to evaluate the impact of using mobile money as a tool to promote agricultural investment. For this purpose, we designed and conducted a field experiment with a sample of smallholder farmers in rural Mozambique. This sample included a set of primary farmers and their closest farming friends. We work with two cross-randomized interventions. The first treatment gave access to a remunerated mobile savings account. The second treatment targeted closest farming friends and gave them access to the exact same interventions as their primary farmer counterparts. We find that the remunerated mobile savings account raised mobile savings, but only while interest was being paid. It also increased agricultural investment in fertilizer, although there was no change in investment in other complementary inputs that were not directly targeted by the intervention, unlike fertilizer. These results suggest that fertilizer salience in the remunerated savings treatment may have been important to focus farmers' (limited) attention on saving some of their harvest proceeds, rather than farmers being financially constrained by a lack of alternative ways to save. Our results also suggest that the network intervention where farming friends had access to non-remunerated mobile money accounts decreased incentives to save and invest in agricultural inputs, likely due to network free-riding because of lower transfer costs within the network. Overall this research shows that tailored mobile money products can be used effectively to improve modern agricultural technology adoption in countries with very low agricultural productivity like Mozambique. ; authorsversion ; published
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In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Band 114, S. 42-58
World Affairs Online
Electoral fraud is a common problem in young democracies. Election observers constitute one possible remedy. Yet, quantitative evidence of the causal effects of different types of observers is scarce. Data on the random assignment of observers during Mozambique's 2009 general elections are used to estimate the impact that observers have on electoral results. We are able to distinguish between domestic observers that stayed in the same ballot table for the whole of the election day, who were deployed countrywide, and international observers that circulated across a number of ballot locations, assigned within selected districts. We show that the presence of domestic observers reduced voter turnout and increased the share of blank votes countrywide. This suggests a reduction of ballot fraud activities. For the selected districts in which international observers were active findings are less clear, as we do not find ballot fraud-reducing effects for any of the two types of observers. A possible interpretation is that local politicians anticipate the presence of international electoral observers in convenient districts or use different fraudulent strategies. ; authorsversion ; published
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In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 124, Heft 574, S. F327-F355
ISSN: 1468-0297
In: Journal of development economics, Band 101, S. 27-48
ISSN: 0304-3878
In: NOVAFRICA Working Paper Series No. 1301
SSRN
In: NOVAFRICA Working Paper Series No. 1305
SSRN
In: Journal of development economics, Band 101, S. 27-48
ISSN: 0304-3878
World Affairs Online
In: Public choice, Band 153, Heft 1, S. 117-148
ISSN: 0048-5829