"Global warming is one of today's greatest challenges. The science of climate change leaves no doubt that policies to cut emissions are overdue. Yet, after twenty years of international talks and treaties, the world is now in gridlock about how best to do this. David Victor argues that such gridlock has arisen because international talks have drifted away from the reality of what countries are willing and able to implement at home. Most of the lessons that policy makers have drawn from the history of other international environmental problems WON'T ACTUALLY WORK ON THE PROBLEM OF global WARMING. VICTOR ARGUES THAT a radical rethinking of global warming policy is required AND SHOWS HOW TO MAKE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON GLOBAL WARMING MORE EFFECTIVE. This book provides a roadmap to a lower carbon future based on encouraging bottom-up initiatives at national, regional and global levels, leveraging national self-interest rather than wishful thinking"--
Even as the evidence of global warming mounts, the international response to this serious threat is coming unraveled. The United States has formally withdrawn from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol; other key nations are facing difficulty in meeting their Kyoto commitments; and developing countries face no limit on their emissions of the gases that cause global warming. In this clear and cogent book-reissued in paperback with an afterword that comments on recent events--David Victor explains why the Kyoto Protocol was never likely to become an effective legal instrument. He explores how its collapse offers opportunities to establish a more realistic alternative. Global warming continues to dominate environmental news as legislatures worldwide grapple with the process of ratification of the December 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The collapse of the November 2000 conference at the Hague showed clearly how difficult it will be to bring the Kyoto treaty into force. Yet most politicians, policymakers, and analysts hailed it as a vital first step in slowing greenhouse warming. David Victor was not among them. Kyoto's fatal flaw, Victor argues, is that it can work only if emissions trading works. The Protocol requires industrialized nations to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases to specific targets. Crucially, the Protocol also provides for so-called "emissions trading," whereby nations could offset the need for rapid cuts in their own emissions by buying emissions credits from other countries. But starting this trading system would require creating emission permits worth two trillion dollars--the largest single invention of assets by voluntary international treaty in world history. Even if it were politically possible to distribute such astronomical sums, the Protocol does not provide for adequate monitoring and enforcement of these new property rights. Nor does it offer an achievable plan for allocating new permits, which would be essential if the system were expanded to include developing countries. The collapse of the Kyoto Protocol--which Victor views as inevitable--will provide the political space to rethink strategy. Better alternatives would focus on policies that control emissions, such as emission taxes. Though economically sensible, however, a pure tax approach is impossible to monitor in practice. Thus, the author proposes a hybrid in which governments set targets for both emission quantities and tax levels. This offers the important advantages of both emission trading and taxes without the debilitating drawbacks of each. Individuals at all levels of environmental science, economics, public policy, and politics-from students to professionals--and anyone else hoping to participate in the debate over how to slow global warming will want to read this book.
Arild Underdal has been at the center of an important community of scholars studying global environmental governance. Since the 1990s that community, along with many other scholars globally, has offered important insights into the design and management of international institutions that can lead to more effective management of environmental problems. At the same time, diplomats have made multiple attempts to create institutions to manage the dangers of climate change. This essay looks at what has been learned by both communities—scholars and practitioners—as their efforts co-evolved. It appears that despite a wealth of possible insights into making cooperation effective very few of the lessons offered by scholars had much impact during the first two decades of climate change diplomacy. Indeed, basic concepts from cooperation theory and evidence from case studies—many developed in Arild's orbit—can explain why those two decades achieved very little real cooperation. The new Paris agreement may be changing all that and much better reflects insights from scholars about how to build effective international institutions. Success in the Paris process is far from assured and scholars can contribute a lot more with a more strategic view of when and how they have an impact.
Arild Underdal has been at the center of an important community of scholars studying global environmental governance. Since the 1990s that community, along with many other scholars globally, has offered important insights into the design and management of international institutions that can lead to more effective management of environmental problems. At the same time, diplomats have made multiple attempts to create institutions to manage the dangers of climate change. This essay looks at what has been learned by both communities—scholars and practitioners—as their efforts co-evolved. It appears that despite a wealth of possible insights into making cooperation effective very few of the lessons offered by scholars had much impact during the first two decades of climate change diplomacy. Indeed, basic concepts from cooperation theory and evidence from case studies—many developed in Arild's orbit—can explain why those two decades achieved very little real cooperation. The new Paris agreement may be changing all that and much better reflects insights from scholars about how to build effective international institutions. Success in the Paris process is far from assured and scholars can contribute a lot more with a more strategic view of when and how they have an impact.
Arild Underdal has been at the center of an important community of scholars studying global environmental governance. Since the 1990s that community, along with many other scholars globally, has offered important insights into the design and management of international institutions that can lead to more effective management of environmental problems. At the same time, diplomats have made multiple attempts to create institutions to manage the dangers of climate change. This essay looks at what has been learned by both communities—scholars and practitioners—as their efforts co-evolved. It appears that despite a wealth of possible insights into making cooperation effective very few of the lessons offered by scholars had much impact during the first two decades of climate change diplomacy. Indeed, basic concepts from cooperation theory and evidence from case studies—many developed in Arild's orbit—can explain why those two decades achieved very little real cooperation. The new Paris agreement may be changing all that and much better reflects insights from scholars about how to build effective international institutions. Success in the Paris process is far from assured and scholars can contribute a lot more with a more strategic view of when and how they have an impact.
