Suchergebnisse

Abstract
Among the functions of state borders is to delineate a domain within which outsiders may normally not interfere. But the human rights practice that has sprung up in recent decades has imposed significant limits on a state's right against interference. This article considers the connection between human rights on the one hand and justified interference in the internal affairs of states on the other. States, this article argues, have a right against interference if and because they serve their subjects. Interference by outsiders threatens to set back their capacity to serve and thus ultimately harms those over whom the state exercises power. Human rights, in turn, circumscribe the outer limits of what any state can do while plausibly claiming to be serving its subjects. On this view, human rights are distinguished from other rights because they function as cancelling conditions on the state's right against outside interference: while interfering in the internal affairs of a state normally wrongs that state, interfering where the state fails to respect human rights does not. Contrary to what is often thought, human rights violations do not justify outside interference. They merely make a state liable to such interference. The further considerations that must enter into an all things considered judgment in favor of interference are irrelevant for determining what human rights we have.

The service conception has, however, recently been criticized for being insufficiently attuned to the significance that procedural, and in particular democratic, features of political and legal institutions have for the justification of their authority. In this article I argue that the critics' arguments rest on a misunderstanding of the service conception; yet their worries point the way to an under-appreciated and interesting view of democracy as an authoritative arbitration procedure. Adapted from the source document.

Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- CONTRIBUTORS -- INTRODUCTION -- PART I MUST DEMOCRACY FAIL? -- 1 DEMOCRACY AS FAILURE -- 2 FAILING DEMOCRACY -- 3 WHY NO GOOD, VERY BAD, ELITIST DEMOCRACY IS AN ACHIEVEMENT, NOT A FAILURE -- PART II FAILURES OF REPRESENTATION -- 4 REPRESENTATION FAILURE -- 5 DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND DEMOCRATIC FAILURE A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH -- 6 DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATIVES AS EPISTEMIC INTERMEDIARIES -- 7 POLITICAL PARTIES AND PUBLIC POLICY -- PART III FAILURES OF KNOWLEDGE -- 8 DU BOIS'S DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACY -- 9 PRETEXTUAL POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC INCLUSION COMMENT ON DARBY -- 10 DEMOCRATIC REMEDIES IF IGNORANCE THREATENS DEMOCRACY -- INDEX

Der Usborne Verlag hat sich in diesem Buch ein grosses Ziel gesetzt. Er will Kindern gleichzeitig informativ aber auch fröhlich illustriert Grundbegriffe der Politik näherbringen und untersucht in sechs Kapiteln tatsächlich ausnehmend ausführlich alle wichtigen Facetten der Macht. Dabei wird die Bedeutung politischen Wissens und Bewusstseins auf glaubwürdige und mitreissende Weise an Kinder vermittelt. Das Buch kann auch als Schullektüre bzw. Referatsquelle funktionieren. Besonders für gemeinsame Lektüre mit den Eltern erwägenswert, zumal auch Erwachsene hier viel lernen können. Das angegebene Alter neun passt für die kindgerechte visuelle Aufmachung des Buches durchaus, allerdings erscheint mir die inhaltliche Tiefe für Kinder dieses Alters ein wenig zu herausfordernd zu sein. Gerade Fragen wie "Wo stehst du?" (am Spektrum der verschiedenen Ideologien) wirken für dieses Alter m.E. etwas zu motiviert. Kostengünstige und empfehlenswerte Bestandserweiterung für Kindersachbuchabteilungen, auch in Schulbibliotheken. Ab 10