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This article provides theoretical and empirical insights into the effects of transparency on civil society empowerment by analyzing the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in Myanmar. It identifies three processes through which the EITI (dis)empowers civil society: constituting, using, and debating transparency. Whereas most transparency literature focuses on the effects of information disclosure—( using transparency)–the empowering effects of constituting and debating transparency are, for the EITI in Myanmar, much greater. While civil society organizations (CSOs) hardly use the EITI report as it lacks actionable information, the EITI has given CSOs a previously unimaginable role through their involvement in designing and implementing the EITI—i.e., in constituting transparency—and in EITI-related awareness-raising activities and debates, or debating transparency. Though in unequal ways, the processes of constituting and debating transparency empower CSOs to request, collect, and use more actionable information than through the EITI alone. This article argues that transparency initiatives could benefit from focusing attention on not only what information to disclose but also through which processes.

The international environmental system consists of numerous organizations and hundreds of multilateral treaties that focus on different environmental issues. For decades, there is fierce criticism of the effectiveness and efficiency of this system because of a lack of a clear vision; overlapping and sometimes conflicting mandates and activities by insufficient coordination; weak implementation and enforcement; and conflicts with other international policy systems (notably trade). Although the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) mandate is to coordinate milieuge-related activities of the United Nations, it is severely limited by an inadequate and indescribable reliable budget, weak legitimate status and the overlap of the mandate of UNEP those of other international organizations. In the past 40 years, dozens of proposals developed by states, UN commissions and academics for a UN or World Environment Organisation (WEO/UNEO). This would have sufficient authority and budget should have to better coordinate environmental system. Adapted from the source document.

In the past forty years, numerous proposals to improve the fragmented international environmental governance (IEG) system have been developed, many of which call for the establishment of an international environment organisation. Although governments and scholars agree that the system needs improvement, no such substantial reform has yet been undertaken. Based on the literature study and more than twenty interviews, this article explains the absence of an international environment organisation, using three theories of new institutionalism: historical, rational choice and discursive institutionalism. Through the notion of path dependency, historical institutionalism explains how the self-reinforcing cycle of a rather diffused development of the IEG system, characterised by incremental changes, has made the system more complicated and prevented substantial institutional change. Historical institutionalism also highlights power inequalities and lack of trust between nation-states, as well as turf wars between international organisations, as key explanatory factors hampering IEG reform. Rational choice institutionalism complements such explanations by showing how incremental institutional changes that do not add up to substantial reform are the result of the fact that neither nation-states nor international organisations are interested in establishing a powerful environment organisation that might encroach upon their sovereignty. Finally, discursive institutionalism suggests that the norm to do at least something to improve the IEG system has prompted nation-states to create "symbolic" institutions. The concept of socialisation helps to explain why incremental institutional developments within the UN system are more likely than substantial reform. The article shows that new institutionalism theories complement rather than contradict one another, resulting in a more holistic explanation of lack of IEG reform. Adapted from the source document.

The discourse of sustainable development is highly influential in global and national governance frameworks, though its meaning and operationalisation are context-dependent and have evolved over time. The transition from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) reflects the most recent evolution in this discourse. We analyse key differences in storylines between the MDGs and SDGs and develop an analytical framework to study these, focusing on the objectives of sustainable development, the means to reach those objectives, and the relations between developing and developed countries. We use this framework in quantitative and qualitative discourse analyses of the policy coherence for development (PCD) approach of the Netherlands. This shows that global discourses are closely reflected in national-level policy frameworks. During the MDG era, the key objective of sustainable development was poverty reduction to be reached through economic growth and participation in the global trade system. The SDGs aim for a broader set of objectives across the full spectrum of the economic, social and environmental dimensions. This is reflected in the Dutch PCD approach, first through a conceptualisation of environmental and social safeguards for trade and economic growth, and later with social and environmental sustainability as equally important objectives alongside poverty reduction. While the MDGs mainly focus on national averages and the poorest, the SDGs target the most marginalised and vulnerable groups with a focus on disaggregate data. In this respect, the Netherlands was ahead of its time; already in the early 2000s it acknowledged that "there is no question of "the" developing countries". Related to this, the Dutch PCD approach also reflects the changed conceptualisation of the relations between developing and developed countries. This changed from aid to developing countries as reflected in the MDGs, toward partnerships with them, initially for the purpose of stimulating ...

Many resource-rich countries face the paradoxical situation that their wealth in natural resources coincides with low economic and human development rates. To address this so-called resource curse, academics and practitioners turn their hopes to institutional quality. Yet whether, how and with what consequences institutional quality is transformed in resource curse contexts remains poorly understood, especially so at subnational levels. The most widely implemented initiative that seeks to address the resource curse through enhanced institutional quality is the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). This article analyses to what extent and how the EITI transforms institutional quality at national and subnational levels in Myanmar, focusing on transparency, civil society participation and accountability. We show that many transformations go beyond the official EITI process and report. While the EITI report itself is not heavily used by civil society organisations (CSOs), the EITI process motivated CSOs to gather data and organise themselves both around and beyond EITI-related issues at subnational levels. Such participatory processes of constituting transparency improved relations between the (regional) government, CSOs and private companies, but also created new forms of in- and exclusion among civil society. While avenues opened up for CSOs to demand accountability regarding the impacts of resource extraction, the extent to which they are able to trigger action of extractive industry actors in their region remains limited. In conclusion, we argue that transformations in institutional quality are not characterised by a linear trajectory from transparency in the form of the EITI report to accountability, facilitated by civil society participation in EITI multi-stakeholder groups, as the EITI standard posits. Rather, transformations in institutional quality are characterised by spin-offs, dynamic interlinkages, trade-offs, limitations and a reinforcing cycle between participation and transparency within and beyond the EITI.

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), agreed in 2015, chart an integrated and universal policy agenda to be realised by 2030. To this end, policy coherence for sustainable development is embedded in the SDGs as both an end in itself and a means through which to ensure that the fulfilment of some goals does not come at the expense of others. Yet, as a transformative process and outcome, policy coherence, as articulated in the SDGs, is narrowly predicated on technical means to address incoherencies that are inherently political. Using the case study of the Netherlands, where the concept of policy coherence has animated the development policy discourse for decades, we question whether such means necessarily improve policies for sustainability, asking what institutional arrangements established for the SDGs do through their (re)configuration and operation, and to what ends. Drawing on an extensive document analysis and a series of semi-structured interviews, we show that the means established to resolve policy incoherence in the Dutch context cast an apolitical façade that limits, if not prevents, possibilities for transformation. In particular, the focus on 'neutral' institutional arrangements and 'win-win' constructions in coherence building privileges the appearance of coherence over the more fundamental issue of its sustainability, decentring the key political question of what is, or is supposed to be, sustained.

Abstract
In 2015, the United Nations agreed on seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDG s). These SDG s are not legally binding and lack strict enforcement mechanisms. International organizations that seek to implement these goals therefore rely on soft tools to influence governments and other actors, which is often described as "orchestration." This article focuses on regional governance and studies the yet unexplored role of the five UN Regional Commissions. These commissions seek to link the global ambitions of the SDG s with regional actors, contexts, and priorities. Drawing on extensive document analysis and a series of semistructured expert interviews, the article analyzes the orchestration efforts of all five Regional Commissions, focusing on agenda setting, coordination, and support. It concludes that instead of a unified orchestrating role, Regional Commissions play in practice a balancing role for agenda setting, a sharing role when it comes to coordination, and a conforming role in terms of support.

Abstract
In 2015, the United Nations agreed on seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to mobilize various actors, including international organizations, for a global transformation toward sustainability. The expectation was that international organizations would assist in the implementation of the goals and encourage, support, or coordinate others to work toward their achievement. But have international organizations over the last 8 years changed their behavior because of the SDGs? We present an in-depth examination of how the World Bank, an influential international organization with a broad development mandate, has engaged with the SDGs, especially with SDG 10 that seeks to reduce inequalities. Based on a mixed-method approach that included the study of 326 key documents and 23 interviews, we found no evidence of a policy impact of the SDGs on the World Bank. Instead, we conclude that the World Bank's engagement with the SDGs can best be described as "organizational jiu-jitsu," mobilizing the metaphor of the ancient martial art in which an actor uses the force and strength of the opponent to advance one's own position. We argue that the World Bank used the growing momentum of the SDGs to further its strategic objectives without being influenced by the SDGs in turn. The bank engaged with the SDGs selectively; efforts to integrate the goals into organizational practices remained limited; and their inclusion in country-level processes is primarily voluntary. These findings, which may be similar for other powerful international organizations, raise important questions about the ability of global goal-setting to realize a transformative impact.