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Abstract
While studies show that public opinion and educational workshops promoted by nonprofits affect judicial behavior, it remains unclear whether and how social movements affect judges' decision-making through disruptive actions. I develop a framework to explain the conditions under which and the mechanisms through which social movement mobilization affects the decision-making of judges, drawing on a mixed-methods study of anti-corruption protests in Brazil. I constructed an original dataset of decisions of corruption cases at the Brazilian Superior Court of Justice (2003–2016). Results showed that actions that target judicial cases (case-focused protests)—but not protests that simply put the issue on the public agenda—are associated with higher chances that judges will decide in ways that are aligned with the movements' demands. I supplemented this data with a qualitative analysis of appeals on two investigations of similar crimes and some of the same defendants but with different outcomes in appellate courts: Sandcastle (Castelo de Areia) and Car Wash (Lava Jato). Drawing on 110 interviews with prosecutors and judges and document analysis of criminal charges and judicial decisions, I show that case-focused protests affect judicial behavior through two mechanisms: by threatening the personal reputation of judges and the legitimacy of courts.

In contexts where political corruption is endemic, why would political elites build state capacity to prosecute corruption? Prior studies emphasize exogenous pressure from social movements or international organizations and the rise of political leaders committed to fighting corruption. While important, these factors are not sufficient to explain the case of Brazil, where politicians empowered investigative bureaucracies, even though several political elites later became victims of prosecution. Drawing on document analysis of charges and sentences and on 110 in-depth interviews with prosecutors, judges, and politicians, I develop a framework that focuses on the processes through which corruption is criminalized on the ground. By examining the initiatives of politicians in interaction with the actions of civil servants who investigate and prosecute cases of corruption, I show that political elites empowered investigators because, at the time, these steps seemed innocuous. Prosecutors later reframed how they talked about corruption—getting other colleagues to pay attention to this issue—and learned new strategies to uncover corruption schemes, but these changes happened under the radar: they were not visible to politicians. Popular pressure also led courts to broaden the definition of corruption and lower the threshold of evidence for it, but these decisions took place after the politicians' actions.

There is growing interest in how activist bureaucrats change policies; however, it remains unclear how bureaucrats become activists. This article develops a framework for the emergence of bureaucratic activism using the case of Brazilian prosecutors in the Belo Monte dam, a project that drew attention due to its social and environmental impacts. I show that two different types of prosecutors were involved in this case: activist prosecutors, who were committed to the proactive defense of affected communities, and conventional prosecutors, neutral agents that resorted to traditional tactics. Based on 82 interviews, document analysis, and participant observation, I argue that rather than being self-selected, prosecutors within conducive settings engaged in activism after they joined the state by developing long-term ties with local groups. By discovering the problems faced by affected communities and mediating their struggles with other policy actors, prosecutors internalized the grievances of these groups, building commitments to defend their causes.

There is growing interest in how activist bureaucrats change policies; however, it remains unclear how bureaucrats become activists. This article develops a framework for the emergence of bureaucratic activism using the case of Brazilian prosecutors in the Belo Monte dam, a project that drew attention due to its social and environmental impacts. I show that two different types of prosecutors were involved in this case: activist prosecutors, who were committed to the proactive defense of affected communities, and conventional prosecutors, neutral agents that resorted to traditional tactics. Based on 82 interviews, document analysis, and participant observation, I argue that rather than being self-selected, prosecutors within conducive settings engaged in activism after they joined the state by developing long-term ties with local groups. By discovering the problems faced by affected communities and mediating their struggles with other policy actors, prosecutors internalized the grievances of these groups, building commitments to defend their causes.

Esta pesquisa analisa etnograficamente os processos de construção e transformação de capacidades estatais no Ministério Público Federal (MPF) no contexto de implementação da usina de Belo Monte. Desde 2001, procuradores vêm mobilizando uma série de ações – judiciais e extrajudiciais – que contestam o modo como a barragem está sendo implementada e buscam mitigar seus impactos socioambientais. Neste artigo, exploro como três tipos de práticas de procuradores – os recrutamentos de aliados, as articulações internas e as bricolagens – mudaram as maneiras pelas quais o órgão vem atuando em processos de implementação de grandes projetos. Argumento que essas práticas geraram aprendizagens organizacionais que se traduziram na construção e transformação de diferentes tipos de capacidades no MPF, ressaltando assim o caráter dinâmico das capacidades estatais e a importância de olhar para o que estão efetivamente fazendo os agentes estatais que dão vida a essas capacidades.

Abstract
Despite the salience of corruption in elections in Latin America and beyond, it remains unclear what makes certain candidates attractive to voters as solutions to address corruption. Building on studies about the effect of candidates' professional affiliation on voting behavior, we hypothesize that police and military officers are perceived to be more competent to address corruption. We test our theoretical expectations through an online survey of Brazilian voters with an image-based factorial experiment that presents respondents with three randomly generated handbills, varying candidates' professional affiliations and potential confounders, such as economic policy, insider versus outsider status, and demographic features. Our results demonstrate that candidates affiliated with the police or the military are perceived to be more effective at reducing corruption, all else equal. The effect of police or military professions on candidates' perceived effectiveness to fight corruption varies according to respondents' ideology and is particularly significant among conservative voters.