Suchergebnisse

As part of an ongoing research, this paper focus on European monetary integration depicting to what extent existing theories and theoretical approaches fit with the ontology and subsequent developments of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). A special emphasis goes to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) as a crucial ingredient of European monetary integration, particularly for the political turmoil it produced in recent years. On a previous conference (UACES Annual Conference 2007: Exchanging Ideas on Europe: Common Values and External Policies, Portsmouth, UK, 3-5 September 2007), EMU and the SGP were assessed through the lens of neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, supranational governance, new institutionalism and the fusion thesis. This paper turns to the federal theory and the rational choice theory. Some argue that the power of ideas (the monetarist school) and national governments' adjustment to a new international setting provide the broad explanation of the move towards EMU. Others claim that the project of European monetary integration was independent from such exogenous inputs, understanding the step towards EMU as part of the dynamism encapsulated by European integration. I test these contrasting perceptions against the explanatory power of federal theory and rational choice. The analysis of the SGP (in both the original version and after the November 2005 reform) follows the same methodology. The rationale behind the paper is twofold. On the one hand, whether EMU and the SGP fit into one of the theories under examination, and whether the corresponding mapping is telling of theoretical prevalence or dissemination. On the other hand, whether the SGP (and subsequent reform) converges or diverges with EMU's theoretical matrix.

A political-economic model largely influenced by the monetarist school inspires European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Accordingly, neither income redistribution nor resource allocation is the cornerstone of economic policy mix. That role is reserved to the stabilisation function. Among those scholars who discuss whether the EU is comparable to existing cases of "conventional fiscal federalism", the analysis is frequently concentrated on allocation and redistribution. Despite macroeconomic stabilisation is the key aspect of EMU, the paper undergoes a comparative analysis between the European Union (EU) and five mature federations (United States, Canada, Australia, Germany, and Switzerland) as far as resource allocation is concerned. It first surveys the operation of the allocation function in these countries, concluding that there are remarkable differences when the countries under examination are measured within a centralisation/decentralisation continuum. Resource allocation is subsequently reviewed in the context of EMU to capture convergences and divergences with the federations examined – and to what extent do convergent aspects contribute to put a label on the EU in terms of fiscal federalism. The awareness that the discussion is sometimes plagued with conceptual oversight – the confusion between the desirability and feasibility of fiscal federalism in the European integration context – paves the way to the empirical dimension. The paper concludes with an input from statistical data assessing to what extent inter-state solidarity exists (or is absent) in the EU.

Federalism is a Trojan horse of European integration: instead of giving way to a consensual characterisation of the European Union (EU), it is profoundly divisive. Some hate the concept (for long, the reverberated 'f-word'), while for others federalism is clearly within the aims and nature of European integration. Still others neglect federalism in the EU context, as they purport a distinctive pathway for European integration, one that stands outside current, state-centric stereotypes. Left outside the realm of consensual issues of European integration, federalism is though a promising intellectual journey. The goal of the paper is to find out whether the EU currently incorporates federal elements. I am aware of the difficult task ahead, since there is no single theory of federalism. Assuming the existence of several models of federalism, the paper starts from a level playing field of federal features in order to understand whether the EU already matches with federalism. To that purpose, the paper surveys three federal criteria – legislative, teleological and institutional – and examines the EU through them. Nevertheless, additional difficulties arise for it is important to test to which mode of federalism the EU suits better (or, should one say, which mode of federalism matches with the EU?). New confederalism, cooperative federalism and regulatory federalism are the hypothesis under assessment. A methodologically coherent approach requires a final step: to seek the finalité of European integration, to put it differently, what is the EU as a polity. The paper surveys asymmetric confederation, federation without a federal state and emerging federal state as the working hypothesis.

O último alargamento é um acontecimento singular na vida da União Europeia (UE). A consequência mais notória é o acréscimo de heterogeneidade no interior da UE. Como as assimetrias de rendimento entre os Estados membros são mais acentuadas, interrogamo-nos se o funcionamento equilibrado da União não está em perigo. Faz sentido questionar o papel desempenhado pela política de coesão económica e social (em especial pela política regional). O artigo analisa duas soluções alternativas: a preservação do actual statu quo e a reforma da política regional. The recent enlargement is unprecedented for many reasons. One of the most visible implications is the sizeable heterogeneity that characterises the European Union (EU). Since income differentials between member states have widened, the question is whether the EU is affected by this intense heterogeneity. Therefore, the role of cohesion policy (especially regional policy) is at stake. The paper examines two alternative solutions: the preservation of the existing statu quo and the reform of regional policy.

The literature strongly suggests that the creation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was largely influenced by the "power of ideas", an accommodation to international markets challenges. The outcome was EMU's political-economy inspired by the monetarist school, a considerable disempowerment of national governments. Put in the perspective of European integration theories, EMU seemed to reject liberal intergovernmentalism claims that member states' interests are the major input to European integration developments. However, since the monetary union was launched several events showed that national governments re-captured the influence they theoretically lost with EMU. Notably the persistent breach of the Stability and Growth Pact might be the evidence that EU institutions (especially the Commission) and other societal actors lost ground to national governments. The paper asks whether the operation of EMU reflects a paradigm change in terms of European integration theories: how liberal intergovernmentalism emerged as the theory with greater explanatory potential of EMU in motion.

Paper presented to the Global Governance and the Search for Justice Conference, Sheffield, 2003. ; The paper focus on the constitutional implications derived from the specific nature of the European Central Bank (ECB) for the would-be polity formation in the European Union (EU). The emphasis is placed on the alleged absence of democratic legitimacy and the intertwined weak pattern of accountability the ECB shows. My argument tries to challenge the reasoning supporting this conventional criticism. Maybe the ECB is not so undemocratic; maybe the institutional arrangements for its accountability are not to be so harshly criticised. The denial of the conventional criticism relies on the specific nature of the supranational polity that is emerging, for which Economic and Monetary Union (and the ECB by large) plays a prominent role. The reasons for this alternative interpretation are twofold. One depicts the specific nature of the European integration process, and the inherent changes to the traditional vision of sovereignty, democracy and accountability. The other challenges the way member states themselves are currently unable to satisfy the requirements of democratic legitimacy and accountability for reasons related to a decay of parliamentary democracies and for the diminished ability nation states have to be the central agents of decision-making in a world of increased economic interdependence. Therefore the ECB may be in possession of sufficient democratic legitimacy (and thus the claims of limited accountability fall apart) if one assess its performance as being the guarantee for price stability as the main political-economic outcome the supranational bank can afford to the European citizens.

Annual Conference and 11th. Research Conference, 'Exchanging Ideas on Europe 2006 - Visions of Europe: Key Problems, New Trajectories', 36, Limerick (Ireland), 2006. ; There has been a lively debate among scholars about the feasibility and desirability of fiscal federalism in the European Union (EU). The paper addresses the question of whether 'conventional fiscal federalism' is feasible in the EU, considering the distinctiveness of European integration and the political-economic template of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It is an attempt to bridge the gap between economics and political science by adding the political conditions that might create difficulties to economics' rationale. The paper highlights how fiscal federalism is a multi-faceted concept embracing both a centralisation and a decentralisation outcome. Borrowing the Musgravian classification of allocation-equity-stabilisation, the EU is examined as far as redistribution is concerned. The aim is to conclude whether centralisation or decentralisation is the prevailing outcome. For that purpose, the EU is compared with five mature federations on two issues: the depth of regional asymmetries; and the extent to which regional inequalities are redressed through redistribution. Considering that in the EU: i) the current distribution of fiscal competences is favourable to member states; ii) decentralisation is the outcome for the redistribution function; iii) despite monetary policy is the main tool for macroeconomic stabilisation, and this is a policy arena where centralisation prevails; iv) the diminished scope for inter-state solidarity averts more centralisation in redistribution; and v) national governments' absent political willingness to increase the EU budget; all this suggests that centralised, 'conventional fiscal federalism' is ruled out as a feasible solution for the EU. Notwithstanding this doesn't imply that fiscal federalism is absent from the EU. A distinct, decentralised modality of fiscal federalism already exists, coping with the 'sui generis' nature of European integration.

Paper delivered to the International Conference on European and International Political Affairs, 2, Athens, 2004. ; There has been a lively debate among scholars about the feasibility and desirability of fiscal federalism in the European Union (EU). The paper addresses the question of whether 'conventional fiscal federalism' is feasible in the EU, considering the distinctiveness of European integration and the political-economic template of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It is an attempt to bridge the gap between economics and political science by adding the political conditions that might create difficulties to the economics' rationale. Starting from the conceptual instruments used (fiscal federalism, centralisation and decentralisation) the paper highlights how fiscal federalism is multi-faceted concept embracing both a centralisation and a decentralisation outcome. Borrowing the Musgravian classification of allocation-equity-stabilisation, the EU is examined as far as redistribution and macroeconomic stabilisation are concerned. The aim is to conclude whether centralisation or decentralisation is the prevailing outcome for both functions. Considering that in the EU: i) the current distribution of fiscal competences is favourable to member states; ii) the overall outcome for the aforementioned fiscal functions is decentralisation; iii) despite monetary policy is the main tool for macroeconomic stabilisation, and this is a policy arena where centralisation prevails; iv) the diminished scope for inter-state solidarity averts more centralisation in redistribution; and v) the absent political willingness from national governments to increase the EU budget; all this suggests that 'conventional fiscal federalism' is ruled out as a feasible solution for the EU. Notwithstanding this doesn't imply that fiscal federalism is absent from the EU. A distinct,decentralised modality of fiscal federalism already exists, coping with the 'sui generis' nature of European integration.

The paper reflects the nature of the Stability and Growth Pact capturing its innovative essence as a 'more-than-federal' device, following an alternative classification I propose. This classification is based on a comparative method using other countries as case studies, seeking their main characteristics when the rules of fiscal discipline states have to comply with are concerned. Then the attention shifts to a highly sensitive question – whether enforceability of the Stability and Growth Pact is the expected outcome. This is an important discussion since recent debates on the desirability to make the pact more flexibility fuelled intense controversy among scholars, member states and supranational institutions. Also recent events showing how key member states are unable to respect the rules of the pact feed further doubts about its strict implementation. Using several scholars' judgment that the pact's main shortcoming is its rigidity, the question is to know whether the pact is geared towards enforceability without any variation that undermines its original meaning. The methodology uses three types of sources. On the one hand, a literature review emphasising the main theoretical conclusions that emerge on this issue. On the other hand the results of interviews carried over at the Commission, the European Central Bank and a sample of nine member states at the level of Finance and Foreign Affairs ministries. Some divergence is found between the solutions devised by academics and the answers given by practitioners. This gap is heightened by the third methodological element: an examination of national governments' recent performance in terms of fiscal discipline, as well as the reaction of the Commission. This is a crucial task for concluding about the likely fate of the Stability and Growth Pact. ; Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian.