Suchergebnisse

Includes bibliographical references (leaves 68-74). ; Using a cross-sectional regression model, we answer two questions related to the determinants of highly active antiretroviral treatment (HAART) coverage across 108 countries using 2006 and 2009 HAART data. The first asks how political institutions function to enable better HAART coverage outcomes; and the second asks whether countries with higher levels of state capacity tend to have higher levels of HAART coverage. We find weak statistical evidence that both democracies and authoritarian countries can achieve high levels of HAART coverage; cultural fractionalization has less of an effect on coverage than we expected; and centralized governments achieve higher treatment coverage outcomes. The effect of political institutions is muted when we control for state capacity and funding. We apply two broad measures of state capacity, namely tax revenue as a share of GDP and our own state capacity index developed using Principal Component Factor Analysis. We find evidence that high levels of state capacity are positively related to HAART coverage outcomes.

ABSTRACTPower asymmetries in the governance of value chains mean that inequalities in access to resources and share of value added are skewed against smaller players. Policies enforcing market rules and ensuring fairness are ineffective when power is deeply entrenched, necessitating different rules to address such inequalities. South Africa's Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policies and competition laws target economic redress and inclusion of historically disadvantaged people in business ownership and control of economic activities. BEE criteria have been embedded in many industry charters and implementation codes, and competition law is well established and effectively implemented. Yet, the impacts of these instruments have been limited and slow, especially in sectors where a few companies dominate. This article examines the interactions between value chain dynamics and industrial fishery quota allocations, BEE policy and competition dynamics in the hake deep‐sea trawl fishery sector. It shows that, even in one of the most regulated sectors of South Africa's economy, large incumbents retain a disproportionate amount of power vis‐à‐vis smaller players. The article concludes that if rules protect incumbency, inequality will be sustained. Quota allocations, transformation and competition regulation should go hand in hand to facilitate the effective participation of black‐owned businesses as competitors in value chains.

AbstractThere is increasing interest in the study of globalization on whether the emergence and consolidation of global value chains (GVCs) have exacerbated inequalities within and across nations and/or how GVCs may be leveraged to mitigate them. Although power asymmetries have been identified as a central factor shaping (un)successful GVC participation, dominant discourses still disregard the links between power and inequality or use these concepts interchangeably. In this article, we provide an analytical approach to GVC‐related inequalities (within, along and through value chains) and examine how they may co‐evolve with different types of power (bargaining, demonstrative, institutional and constitutive). We apply this approach to the case study of the hake value chain in South Africa to illustrate how existing inequalities are manifested, challenged, mitigated or exacerbated—and draw an agenda for future research.

Shaping markets through competition and economic regulation is at the heart of addressing the development challenges facing countries in southern Africa. The contributors to 'Competition Law And Economic Regulation: Addressing Market Power In Southern Africa' critically assess the efficacy of the competition and economic regulation frameworks, including the impact of a number of the regional competition authorities in a range of sectors throughout southern Africa. Featuring academics as well as practitioners in the field, the book addresses issues common to southern African countries, where markets are small and concentrated, with particularly high barriers to entry, and where the resources to enforce legislation against anti-competitive conduct are limited. What is needed, the contributors argue, is an understanding of competition and regional integration as part of an inclusive growth agenda for Africa. By examining competition and regulation in a single framework, and viewing this within the southern African experience, this volume adds new perspectives to the global competition literature. It is an essential reference tool and will be of great interest to policymakers and regulators, as well as the rapidly growing ecosystem of legal practitioners and economists engaged in the field.