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Intro -- M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Seperation of Powers -- Front Matter -- Title Page -- Copyright Details -- Table of Contents, p. ix -- Preface to the Second Edition, p. xi -- Constitutionalism and the Seperation of Powers -- 1. The Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and Institutional Theory, p. 1 -- 2. The Foundation of the Doctrine, p. 23 -- 3. The Theory of the Balanced Constitution, p. 58 -- 4. Montesqueieu, p. 83 -- 5. The Matchless Constitution and Its Enemies, p. 107 -- 6. The Doctrine in America, p. 131 -- 7. The Doctrine in France, p. 193 -- 8. The Rise and Fall of Parliamentary Government, p. 233 -- 9. From the Third Republic to the Fifth, p. 263 -- 10. Progressivism and Political Science in America, p. 289 -- 11. Political Theory, Constitutionalism, and the Behavioural Approach, p. 323 -- 12. A Model of a Theory of Constitutionalism, p. 346 -- 13. Epilogue: The Separation of Powers and the Administrative State, p. 385 -- Bibliography, p. 421 -- Index, p. 443.

This highly acclaimed introduction to the essential elements of the American political system is now available in a new edition, having been fully revised to take into account the developments in American politics over the last ten years.

IT IS PERHAPS A SIGN OF THE GREATER MATURITY OF THE discipline of political science today that the 'great debate' of the immediate postwar period on the essential nature of the subject has now died down. The vast quantities of ink that were spilled (and not a little blood) did not result in a victory for either of the two great camps - the traditonalists or the behaviourists - but in a recognition, however reluctant, that the subject of the study of politics was too great, and too complex, to be approached only from this angle or that, but required the application of many different methods, and of many different kinds of minds, if progress was to be made towards the better understanding of the ways in which man provided for his own overnance. However, if the students of political thought, of constitutions and institutions, now work alongside the practitioners of 'empirical', and indeed of quantititive, techniques for the study of politics, it is in large part due to the efforts of Carl Friedrich, who saw the need to maintain the intellectual unity of a subject which, since the time of Aristotle, had progressed, as indeed all subjects can only progress, by the continual interaction between those who contemplate its theoretical underpinnings and those who are knowledgeable about the data by which, in the end, the theories must be tested. The normative dimension of the study of man and his political activities, is an additional complication, but it does not absolve the theorist from the need to relate his theory to perceived reality, nor the empiricist from the necessity of placing his observations within a context which alone will give them significance.

In a recent issue of this Review John P. Roche developed an explanation of the motivation behind the exercise of self-restraint by the United States judiciary. He related the scope available for the exercise of judicial power to the working of the American party system, i.e., to the extent to which the Court found itself faced by "cohesive majorities." Almost in passing he drew a comparison between the British and the American position. "No cohesive majority, such as normally exists in Britain," he said, "would permit a politically irresponsible judiciary to usurp decision-making functions, but, for complex social and institutional reasons, there are few issues in the United States on which cohesive majorities exist." The purpose of this essay is to test that thesis, and the concept of cohesive majorities, in the setting of Australian politics and judicial review.