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Laws have a major influence on the daily lives of young people. However, their role in legislative processes has been less studied. This research focuses on youth participation in the legislative processes and bullying narratives in the bills and statements related to the Finnish General Upper Secondary Schools Act. According to a qualitative content analysis of two bills and the consultation processes of 2016 and 2018, young people were consulted and participated more broadly in 2018, but the threshold to participate in legislative processes is high. The results show that young people's views on bullying at school were not incorporated into the bills. The empirical results show a correlation to the theoretical framework, which illustrated how through their narratives various actors participate or try to participate in policymaking as agenda setters and framers, but the gatekeepers' views function mainly as a basis in the legislative processes. ; acceptedVersion ; Peer reviewed

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Notes on c ontributors -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Intermediary liability for online user comments under the European Convention on Human Rights -- 3 Freedom of speech and online media in Denmark -- 4 Estonia - raising high the roof beams of freedom of expression: New media environment in Estonia -- 5 Finland -- 6 Icelandic online media law and the ECHR -- 7 Regulation of online media in Latvia -- 8 Human rights law and regulating freedom of expression in new media: Lithuania -- 9 Regulation of online media in Norway -- 10 Internet, freedom of expression and the right to privacy in Sweden -- 11 Comparative analysis of the Nordic/Baltic approaches and standards -- 12 Updating freedom of expression doctrines in the new media cases: lessons from Strasbourg and other international treaty bodies -- Index

Media governance has changed substantially after Russia's attack on Ukraine. A digital Iron Curtain was put up, as social media companies withdrew or were banned in Russia and Russian state sponsored news outlets were the targets of EU sanctions and deplatforming. This study analyses how 29 states, including 18 EU members, have dealt with the media governance questions related to the informational dimension of Russia's war on Ukraine. It appears that in only one country Finland did large private media outlets act quickly on their own initiative after the start of the military aggression against Ukraine to suspend the distribution of Russian news channels. There are examples that some companies in Austria and Latvia took similar actions, but the scale is smaller. In five countries Belgium, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland the national authorities issued instructions to suspend Russian media outlets shortly after the invasion, prior to the 1 March 2022 Council Regulation 2022/350 and even before the President of the European Commission announced on 27 February 2022 the intention to implement such a measure across the EU. Given the shortness of this "time window" it would be overly formal to give too much meaning to the question "Who acted first?" private media companies or national governments. What matters is that access to certain Russian and Belarussian media outlets was suspended within a very short period as a result of coordinated activity between national authorities and private actors. There are no reports of non-compliance with the respective state instructions. Most EU Member State responses were confined to the transposition of the sanctions imposed against Russia at the supranational level, including the ban on Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik, without taking further, more wide-ranging action. The transposition of Council Regulation 2022/350 was typically accompanied by communications by the respective regulatory agencies in EU Member States to media companies and internet providers on their new ...

Media governance has changed substantially after Russia's attack on Ukraine. A digital Iron Curtain was put up, as social media companies withdrew or were banned in Russia and Russian state sponsored news outlets were the targets of EU sanctions and deplatforming. This study analyses how 29 states, including 18 EU members, have dealt with the media governance questions related to the informational dimension of Russia's war on Ukraine. It appears that in only one country - Finland - did large private media outlets act quickly on their own initiative after the start of the military aggression against Ukraine to suspend the distribution of Russian news channels. There are examples that some companies in Austria and Latvia took similar actions, but the scale is smaller. In five countries - Belgium, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland - the national authorities issued instructions to suspend Russian media outlets shortly after the invasion, prior to the 1 March 2022 Council Regulation 2022/350 and even before the President of the European Commission announced on 27 February 2022 the intention to implement such a measure across the EU. Given the shortness of this "time window" it would be overly formal to give too much meaning to the question "Who acted first?" - private media companies or national governments. What matters is that access to certain Russian and Belarussian media outlets was suspended within a very short period as a result of coordinated activity between national authorities and private actors. There are no reports of non-compliance with the respective state instructions. Most EU Member State responses were confined to the transposition of the sanctions imposed against Russia at the supranational level, including the ban on Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik, without taking further, more wide-ranging action. The transposition of Council Regulation 2022/350 was typically accompanied by communications by the respective regulatory agencies in EU Member States to media companies and internet providers on their new duties emanating from the sanctions. Hence, the role of regulatory agencies was mostly confined to informing norm addressees of the new European legislation. The majority of non-EU states, (in our survey Albania, Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Iceland, Israel, Moldova, Norway, Serbia, South Africa, and Turkey), have not imposed any sanctions at all. Outside the EU, the United Kingdom stands out: the media regulator Ofcom opened 27 investigations against RT, and the UK's public service broadcaster, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), halted all content licensing with its Russian customers. In contrast, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina chose to rely on general liability regulations for spreading disinformation and not conforming with the journalistic principles of objective information and transparency. Most governments did not propose or introduce domestic legislation aimed at regulating platforms, social media accounts or TV channels in response to the war in Ukraine. A small number of states located within geographical proximity to Russia or Belarus introduced legislative changes; for example, via amendments to existing laws, such as Estonia and Latvia; by introducing a state of emergency that extends to the control of broadcasting and social media, such as Lithuania; or by conferring additional powers on security agencies to monitor the media coverage of the war, such as Moldova. In addition, several governments asked their respective national regulators to ban or block access to Russian TV stations. For example, in Belgium, the Flemish (regional) parliament asked the government to take all possible measures against Russian disinformation, and to advocate for a stronger EU-wide framework against disinformation.

This comparative study looks into the proposed "vaccine passport" initiative from various human rights aspects. It was undertaken by the Global Digital Human Rights Network, an action started under the EU's Cooperation in Science and Technology programme. The network currently unites more than 80 scholars and practitioners from 40 countries. The findings are based on responses to questions put to the network members by the authors of this study in February 2021 (questions attached in Annex I). We acknowledge individual contributions from colleagues (listed in the table of contributors above), whose views are sometimes presented in a generalised fashion. The study concentrated on the availability of a legal framework for the proposed "vaccine passport", whether such a "passport" would create binding obligations in the public and private sectors or, alternatively, what would be the scope of discretion allowed to public and private entities to make their decisions affecting rights holders' access to various services. The attitudes prevalent in different states and in the media were also analysed, along with the aspects that need to be considered to avoid potential human rights violations. There has been no thorough analysis in most countries as to whether a normative national basis exists to restrict fundamental rights through the requirement of having a "vaccine passport" to access certain locations or services. Compatibility of the proposed passport with European and/or international human rights rules and principles is a marginal issue in public discourse. Conceptualisation about such compatibility remains general and theoretical, and has not reached the level of practicality and effectiveness. Most countries have not enacted concrete legislative acts or provisions to deal with a pandemic of this scale and magnitude. [Excerpt from Introduction and Synopsis] ; peer-reviewed