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This study posits a theoretical framework for understanding the role and value of agency input in presidential-legislative policy making. The author asserts that by using agency input for policy development, presidents instill their proposals with a degree of bureaucratic objectivity, expertise, process transparency, and agency support, which aids their legislative passage while lowering the extent of changes made to policy substance in the process. To test his hypotheses, the author conducts binary and ordered logistic regression analyses using pooled cross-sectional data across 12 administrations from 1949 to 2010. The author finds that agency input serves as a key component for increased presidential-legislative success.

"The Study of Discrete Emotions in Politics" published on by Oxford University Press.

This study investigates whether and to what extent the thematic relevance of emotive stimuli embedded in presidential speeches affects people's risk perceptions and policy support regarding military interventions in civil conflict. Conducting an experimental study with a total of 1,187 participants, we find the induction of anger via thematically relevant emotive triggers leads to higher levels of support for military interventions in civil conflict even though people's risk perceptions—which were high across all conditions—remain unaffected. By comparison, the effects of anger on policy support observed in the thematically irrelevant condition do not differ significantly from the emotion‐neutral control condition. Thus, although members of the public are highly sensitive to the risks of military interventions in civil conflict and can compartmentalize their feelings within the relevant policy sphere (thereby negating a spillover effect), stimulated anger can nevertheless generate greater public support for military interventions. Still, the potential for such opinion movement to help justify and facilitate policy action depends highly on the president's strategic positioning.

This study applies attribution theory to examine public appraisals of the president. To date, most political science research on attribution theory has focused on domestic policy, and no work has considered both domestic and foreign policy domains in tandem. To fill this gap, we formulate and experimentally test a series of hypotheses regarding the level of responsibility and credit/blame that individuals attribute to the president in both policy domains across varying policy conditions. We also consider how party compatibility affects people's attribution judgments. Our findings provide a new contribution to the literature on political attributions, executive accountability, and public perceptions of presidential performance.

AbstractIn this article, we examine the difficult leadership position President Barack Obama inherited as he took office with respect to science and technology policy making and implementation, particularly following the Bush administration and years of the so‐called "war on science." We contend that the Obama administration's challenge is not only to take substantive policy action, but also to reform certain administrative practices, particularly in light of the previous administration's practice of the politics of strategic vacancies, a managerial technique that rearranges an agency's ideological inclinations not through the usual forms of active politicization (i.e., by filling the appointee ranks with like‐minded ideologues) but instead by "starving" the agency of staff and co‐opting its agenda that way.

Scholars traditionally frame presidential efforts to politicize the federal bureaucracy as the result of divergence between the president's preferences and an agency's output. The authors argue that presidential concern with agency output is dynamic and is in part conditioned by the president's relationship with the public. To assess the relationship between politicization and public opinion, the authors use a data set that combines information on presidential efforts to politicize the Council of Economic Advisers from 1989 to 2004 with that of public attitudes concerning the president's handling of the economy. Their results indicate that public opinion does indeed bear a marginal, yet statistically significant, influence on presidential efforts to manage the federal bureaucracy, thus, providing a new contribution to the debate concerning presidents and the politics of bureaucratic structure.

We argue that scholars of the presidency should begin to apply their rich descriptive understanding of White House organization and personnel to questions of causality. To help guide this effort, we offer a theory-driven empirical model that explains organizational performance. Importing theory from the public management literature, we show how scholars can use the Meier-O'Toole (MO) model to explain performance outcomes and dynamics for key political and policy functions within the institutional presidency. We introduce the MO model and discuss its potential impact on the field of presidency studies.