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AbstractPrevious research shows that violence is an important factor driving ethnic identification and grievances, but most works that explore micro-level effects focus on specific cases and have limited external validity. This article looks at the individual-level consequences of civilian victimization in a large sample across Africa. Combining georeferenced survey data from several rounds of the Afrobarometer, victimization events from the UCDP-GED, and data on collective targeting from the ethnic one-sided violence dataset, it studies the effect of exposure to violence on ethnic identification and self-reported ethnic grievances. Results show that violence increases ethnic identification and ethnic grievances particularly when it is committed by state forces and among individuals who belong to an ethnic group that was collectively targeted in the past.

Wartime civilian victimization produces a counter-reaction against the perpetrator. However, this effect hinges on the creation of collective memories of wartime events. In many countries, former fighting actors and political elites try to redirect memories of wartime events through denial, propaganda, and co-optation. Previous works have ignored these aspects. I argue that the effect of violence is conditional on the capacity of local communities to build collective memories and bypass those efforts. I test this argument using local-level data from Guatemala. The results show that the effects of state violence on postwar voting depend on prewar exposure to political mobilization.

Recent research has focused on the legacies of civil war violence on political preferences, finding that wartime victimization decreases support for the perpetrator or its political identity in the long run. However, we know little about the conditions under which this effect takes place. Historical accounts from civil wars suggest that the long-term effect of violence is not homogenous, nor consistent across areas within a single conflict. Addressing this gap, this article explores the effects of wartime victimization on long-term political preferences at the local level, looking at the conditioning effect of the local social context. In particular, I argue that the effect of wartime violence depends on the existence of local networks that create and maintain memories of the violence and capitalize on them for future mobilization. This argument is tested in the context of the Spanish Civil War. I build a novel dataset using archival data, historical secondary sources, and already existing datasets, covering 2,100 municipalities across Spain. In line with the argument, it is found that Francoist wartime victimization during the civil war is linked to an increase in leftist vote share after democracy was restored four decades later, but mainly in those municipalities where clandestine, left-leaning political networks were active after the conflict.

This dissertation examines the long-term consequences of wartime violence against civilians on political preferences. Previous research suggests that violence either produces a counter-mobilization against the perpetrator or demobilizes the targeted population. However, it is unclear under which conditions each of these two effects prevails. In this dissertation I bridge these two arguments and argue that the social context surrounding the victims determines the consequences of violence. In particular, the effect of violence depends on the ideological context, defined as the presence of ideologically-aligned social networks at the local level. The first empirical part tests this argument in the case of Spain, building a novel dataset using archival data, historical secondary sources, and already existing datasets. I analyze the effect of Francoist violence against civilians during the civil war on electoral support for the Left after democracy was restored four decades later. I show that wartime victimization is linked to an increase in leftist vote share, but mainly in those municipalities where clandestine, left-leaning political networks were active after the conflict. In areas where these networks were not present, violence did not have any meaningful consequences. The second empirical part tests the theoretical argument in a very different case, Guatemala. I again build a local-level dataset using several data sources and analyze the effects of state-led violence against civilians during the civil war on postwar voting patterns, particularly for the leftist party linked to the former rebels that fought against the right-wing government. I find that state-led violence increases electoral support for the former rebels in those municipalities which had been exposed to leftist political mobilization before the war. In municipalities without such exposure, state-led violence against civilians does not have any significant effect. These analyses offer robust evidence supporting the theoretical argument from two very different contexts, which nonetheless constitute single cases. The third part adopts a broader perspective and tests the external validity of the argument, focusing on a global sample of ethnic groups and analyzing the impact of ethnically based violence against civilians. On the one hand, I find that previous theories on the consequences of violence are not able to explain the effect of violence on conflict recurrence. On the other hand, using survey data from several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, I show that my argument might be a good explanation for the consequences of violence on political attitudes.

Memories of old conflicts often shape domestic politics long after these conflicts end. Contemporary debates about past civil wars and/or repressive regimes in different parts of the world suggest that these are sensitive topics that might increase political polarization, particularly when transitional justice policies are implemented and political parties mobilize discontentment with such policies. One such policy recently debated in Spain is removing public symbols linked to a past civil war and subsequent authoritarian regime (i.e., Francoism). However, the empirical evidence on its impact is still limited. This article attempts to fill this gap by examining the political consequences of street renaming. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we show that the removal of Francoist street names has contributed to an increase of electoral support for a new far-right party, Vox, mainly at the expense of a traditional right-wing conservative party, PP. Our results suggest that revisiting the past can cause a backlash among those ideologically aligned with the perpetrator, and that some political parties can capitalize on this.

While many studies provide insights into the causes of wartime civilian victimization, we know little about how the targeting of particular segments of the civilian population affects the onset and escalation of armed conflict. Previous research on conflict onset has been largely limited to structural variables, both theoretically and empirically. Moving beyond these static approaches, this article assesses how the state-led targeting of specific ethnic groups affects the likelihood of ethnic conflict onset and the evolution of conflicts once they break out. Relying on a new data set with global coverage that captures the ethnic identity of civilian victims of targeted violence, we find evidence that the state-led civilian victimization of particular ethnic groups increases the likelihood that the latter become involved in ethnic civil war. We also find tentative, yet more nuanced, evidence that ethnic targeting by state forces affects the escalation of ongoing conflicts.

While many studies provide insights into the causes of wartime civilian victimization, we know little about how the targeting of particular segments of the civilian population affects the onset and escalation of armed conflict. Previous research on conflict onset has been largely limited to structural variables, both theoretically and empirically. Moving beyond these static approaches, this article assesses how the state-led targeting of specific ethnic groups affects the likelihood of ethnic conflict onset and the evolution of conflicts once they break out. Relying on a new data set with global coverage that captures the ethnic identity of civilian victims of targeted violence, we find evidence that the state-led civilian victimization of particular ethnic groups increases the likelihood that the latter become involved in ethnic civil war. We also find tentative, yet more nuanced, evidence that ethnic targeting by state forces affects the escalation of ongoing conflicts.