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In 2007 African swine fever (ASF) arrived at a Black Sea harbour in Georgia and in 2014 the infection reached the European Union (EU), where it still expands its territory. ASF is a fatal viral disease affecting domestic pigs and wild boar of all ages with clinical presentations ranging from per-acute to chronic disease, including apparently asymptomatic courses. Until the detection of the first case inside the EU, infections in the current epidemic were mainly seen among pig farms with generally low biosecurity, and with incidental spill over to the wild boar population. In the EU, however, the infection survived locally in the wild boar population independently from outbreaks in domestic pigs, with a steady and low prevalence. Apart from the wild boar population and the habitat, the current epidemic recognizes humans as the main responsible for both long distance transmission and virus introduction in the domestic pig farms. This underlines the importance to include social science when planning ASF-prevention, −control, or -eradication measures. Based on experiences, knowledge and data gained from the current epidemic this review highlights some recent developments in the epidemiological understanding of ASF, especially concerning the role of wild boar and their habitats in ASF epidemiology. In this regard, the qualities of three epidemiological traits: contagiousity, tenacity, and case fatality rate, and their impact on ASF persistence and transmission are especially discussed.

Aim: A BIOPIGEE OneHealth EJP expert group aimed to clarify the term "biosecurity measure" (BSM) for swine farms. Methods: I) In- and exclusion-criteria related to biosecurity applied in over 5 BIOPIGEE task groups were collected, discussed, and relevant criteria were summarized. II) A literature scoping review with the search terms "biosecurity measures" AND (swine OR pig) in titles, abstracts, or keywords using Scopus, Pubmed, Web of Science, and Google Scholar databases was conducted. On the final record subset, we performed R- based bibliometric analysis. Finally, the first hundred terms with the highest occurrence frequency were used to perform a hierarchical clustering analysis. Results: The scoping review did not reveal a clear definition for BSM, and six specific research themes were identified. Based on these results, in combination with the relevant in- and exclusion-criteria we propose a preliminary definition for the term BSM: "A BSM – is the implementation of a segregation, hygiene, or management procedure (excluding medically effective feed additives and preventive/curative treatment of animals) that specifically aims at reducing the probability of the spread of any potential pathogen to, within, or from a pig farm or geographical area." Conclusions: While "biosecurity" for swine operations is well defined, a harmonized definition of BSM has been lacking. The proposed preliminary definition provides a basis for clear communication of BSM within and among BIOPIGEE task groups and will improve communication of scientific results to the public and thus improve the understanding, acceptance, and implementation of BSM from the farm to the policy level. (This work was supported by funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation programme under grant agreement No 773830: One Health European Joint Programme)

African swine fever (ASF) was introduced into the Eastern European Union in 2014 and led to considerable mortality among wild boar. In contrast, unexpected high antibody prevalence was reported in hunted wild boar in north-eastern Estonia. One of the causative virus strains was recently characterized. While it still showed rather high virulence in the majority of experimentally infected animals, one animal survived and recovered completely. Here, we report on the follow-up characterization of the isolate obtained from the survivor in the acute phase of infection. As a first step, three in vivo experiments were performed with different types of pigs: twelve minipigs (trial A), five domestic pigs (trial B), and five wild boar (trial C) were inoculated. 75% of the minipigs and all domestic pigs recovered after an acute course of disease. However, all wild boar succumbed to infection within 17 days. Representative samples were sequenced using NGS-technologies, and whole-genomes were compared to ASFV "Georgia 2007/1". The alignments indicated a deletion of 14560 base pairs at the 5' end, and genome reorganization by duplication. The characteristic deletion was confirmed in all trial samples and local field samples. In conclusion, an ASFV variant was found in Estonia that showed reduced virulence.

African swine fever (ASF) was introduced into the Eastern European Union in 2014 and led to considerable mortality among wild boar. In contrast, unexpected high antibody prevalence was reported in hunted wild boar in north-eastern Estonia. One of the causative virus strains was recently characterized. While it still showed rather high virulence in the majority of experimentally infected animals, one animal survived and recovered completely. Here, we report on the follow-up characterization of the isolate obtained from the survivor in the acute phase of infection. As a first step, three in vivo experiments were performed with different types of pigs: twelve minipigs (trial A), five domestic pigs (trial B), and five wild boar (trial C) were inoculated. 75% of the minipigs and all domestic pigs recovered after an acute course of disease. However, all wild boar succumbed to infection within 17 days. Representative samples were sequenced using NGS-technologies, and whole-genomes were compared to ASFV "Georgia 2007/1". The alignments indicated a deletion of 14560 base pairs at the 5' end, and genome reorganization by duplication. The characteristic deletion was confirmed in all trial samples and local field samples. In conclusion, an ASFV variant was found in Estonia that showed reduced virulence.

EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases ('Animal Health Law'). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia (CBPP). In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts review the effectiveness of: (i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, (ii) monitoring period, (iii) the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zones, and (iv) the minimum length of time the measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere. Several scenarios for which these control measures had to be assessed were designed and agreed prior to the start of the assessment. Different clinical and laboratory sampling procedures are proposed depending on the scenarios considered. The monitoring period of 45 days was assessed as not effective and at least 90 days (3 months) is recommended in affected areas where high awareness is expected; when the index case occurs in an area where the awareness is low the monitoring period should be at least 180 days (6 months). Since transmission kernels do not exist and data to estimate transmission kernels are not available, the effectiveness of surveillance and protection zones for CBPP was based on expert knowledge. A surveillance zone of 3 km was considered effective, while a protection zone including establishments adjacent to affected ones is recommended. Recommendations, provided for each of the scenarios assessed, aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of further pieces of legislation, as well as for plausible ad hoc requests in relation to CBPP.

This update on the African swine fever (ASF) outbreaks in the EU demonstrated that out of all tested wild boar found dead, the proportion of positive samples peaked in winter and summer. For domestic pigs only, a summer peak was evident. Despite the existence of several plausible factors that could result in the observed seasonality, there is no evidence to prove causality. Wild boar density was the most influential risk factor for the occurrence of ASF in wild boar. In the vast majority of introductions in domestic pig holdings, direct contact with infected domestic pigs or wild boar was excluded as the route of introduction. The implementation of emergency measures in the wild boar management zones following a focal ASF introduction was evaluated. As a sole control strategy, intensive hunting around the buffer area might not always be sufficient to eradicate ASF. However, the probability of eradication success is increased after adding quick and safe carcass removal. A wider buffer area leads to a higher success probability; however it implies a larger intensive hunting area and the need for more animals to be hunted. If carcass removal and intensive hunting are effectively implemented, fencing is more useful for delineating zones, rather than adding substantially to control efficacy. However, segments of fencing will be particularly useful in those areas where carcass removal or intensive hunting is difficult to implement. It was not possible to demonstrate an effect of natural barriers on ASF spread. Human‐mediated translocation may override any effect of natural barriers. Recommendations for ASF control in four different epidemiological scenarios are presented.

EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases ('Animal Health Law'). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for Contagious Caprine Pleuropneumonia (CCPP). In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts review the effectiveness of: (i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, (ii) monitoring period, (iii) the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zones and iv) the minimum length of time the measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere. Several scenarios for which these control measures had to be assessed were designed and agreed prior to the start of the assessment. Different clinical and laboratory sampling procedures are proposed depending on the scenarios considered. The monitoring period of 45 days was assessed as effective in affected areas where high awareness is expected, and when the index case occurs in an area where the awareness is low the monitoring period should be at least 180 days (6 months). Since transmission kernels do not exist and data to estimate transmission kernels are not available, a surveillance zone of 3 km was considered effective based on expert knowledge, while a protection zone should also be developed to include establishments adjacent to affected ones. Recommendations, provided for each of the scenarios assessed, aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of further pieces of legislation, as well as for plausible ad hoc requests in relation to CCPP.

An update on the African swine fever (ASF) situation in the 10 affected Member States (MS) in the EU and in two neighbouring countries from the 1 September 2019 until the 31 August 2020 is provided. The dynamics of the proportions of PCR‐ and ELISA‐positive samples since the first ASF detection in the country were provided and seasonal patterns were investigated. The impact of the ASF epidemic on the annual numbers of hunted wild boar in each affected MS was investigated. To evaluate differences in the extent of spread of ASF in the wild boar populations, the number of notifications that could be classified as secondary cases to a single source was calculated for each affected MS and compared for the earliest and latest year of the epidemic in the country. To evaluate possible risk factors for the occurrence of ASFV in wild boar or domestic pigs, a literature review was performed. Risk factors for the occurrence of ASF in wild boar in Romanian hunting grounds in 2019 were identified with a generalised linear model. The probability to find at least one PCR‐confirmed ASF case in wild boar in a hunting ground in Romania was driven by environmental factors, wild boar abundance and the density of backyard pigs in the hunting ground area, while hunting‐related variables were not retained in the final model. Finally, measures implemented in white zones (ASF‐free zones that are geographically adjacent to an area where ASF is present in wild boar) to prevent further spread of ASF were analysed with a spatially, explicit stochastic individual‐based model. To be effective, the wild boar population in the white zone would need to be drastically reduced before ASF arrives at the zone and it must be wide enough. To achieve the necessary pre‐emptive culling targets of wild boar in the white zone, at the start of the establishment, the white zone should be placed sufficiently far from the affected area, considering the speed of the natural spread of the disease. This spread is faster in denser wild boar populations. After a ...

This update on the African swine fever (ASF) outbreaks in the EU demonstrated that out of all tested wild boar found dead, the proportion of positive samples peaked in winter and summer. For domestic pigs only, a summer peak was evident. Despite the existence of several plausible factors that could result in the observed seasonality, there is no evidence to prove causality. Wild boar density was the most influential risk factor for the occurrence of ASF in wild boar. In the vast majority of introductions in domestic pig holdings, direct contact with infected domestic pigs or wild boar was excluded as the route of introduction. The implementation of emergency measures in the wild boar management zones following a focal ASF introduction was evaluated. As a sole control strategy, intensive hunting around the buffer area might not always be sufficient to eradicate ASF. However, the probability of eradication success is increased after adding quick and safe carcass removal. A wider buffer area leads to a higher success probability; however it implies a larger intensive hunting area and the need for more animals to be hunted. If carcass removal and intensive hunting are effectively implemented, fencing is more useful for delineating zones, rather than adding substantially to control efficacy. However, segments of fencing will be particularly useful in those areas where carcass removal or intensive hunting is difficult to implement. It was not possible to demonstrate an effect of natural barriers on ASF spread. Human‐mediated translocation may override any effect of natural barriers. Recommendations for ASF control in four different epidemiological scenarios are presented.

This report provides a descriptive analysis of the African swine fever (ASF) Genotype II epidemic in the affected Member States in the EU and two neighbouring countries for the period from 1 September 2020 to 31 August 2021. ASF continued to spread in wild boar in the EU, it entered Germany in September 2020, while Belgium became free from ASF in October 2020. No ASF outbreaks in domestic pigs nor cases in wild boar have been reported in Greece since February 2020. In the Baltic States, overall, there has been a declining trend in proportions of polymerase chain reaction (PCR)‐positive samples from wild boar carcasses in the last few years. In the other countries, the proportions of PCR‐positive wild boar carcasses remained high, indicating continuing spread of the disease. A systematic literature review revealed that the risk factors most frequently significantly associated with ASF in domestic pigs were pig density, low levels of biosecurity and socio‐economic factors. For wild boar, most significant risk factors were related to habitat, socio‐economic factors and wild boar management. The effectiveness of different control options in the so‐named white zones, areas where wild boar densities have been drastically reduced to avoid further spread of ASF after a new introduction, was assessed with a stochastic model. Important findings were that establishing a white zone is much more challenging when the area of ASF incursion is adjacent to an area where limited control measures are in place. Very stringent wild boar population reduction measures in the white zone are key to success. The white zone needs to be far enough away from the affected core area so that the population can be reduced in time before the disease arrives and the timing of this will depend on the wild boar density and the required population reduction target in the white zone. Finally, establishing a proactive white zone along the demarcation line of an affected area requires higher culling efforts, but has a higher chance of success to stop ...

EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases ('Animal Health Law'). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for peste des petits ruminants (PPR). In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts review the effectiveness of: (i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, (ii) monitoring period and (iii) the minimum radii of the protection and surveillance zones, and the minimum length of time the measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere; nonetheless, the transmission kernels used for the assessment of the minimum radii of the protection and surveillance zones are shown. Several scenarios for which these control measures had to be assessed were designed and agreed prior to the start of the assessment. The monitoring period of 21 days was assessed as effective, except for the first affected establishments detected, where 33 days is recommended. It was concluded that beyond the protection (3 km) and the surveillance zones (10 km) only 9.6% (95% CI: 3.1–25.8%) and 2.3% (95% CI: 1–5.5%) of the infections from an affected establishment may occur, respectively. This may be considered sufficient to contain the disease spread (95% probability of containing transmission corresponds to 5.3 km). Recommendations provided for each of the scenarios assessed aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of further pieces of legislation, as well as for plausible ad-hoc requests in relation to PPR.