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"Did the Bush administration fundamentally harm the international human rights system through its rejection of human rights norms? This is the central question explored within US Human Rights Conduct and International Legitimacy, which analyses the practices of legitimacy between the Bush administration, states, and international organizations in cases of torture, habeas corpus, and rendition. Vincent Keating argues that despite the material power of the United States, there is little evidence that the Bush administration gravely damaged international norms on torture and habeas corpus as few nations have followed in America's footsteps, and that the Bush administration's deviation from international norms has served to reaffirm worldwide commitment to human rights"--

There has been a long-standing debate over the ethics of targeted killing, with many scholars voicing concern over whether technological advancements and normative change are driving the normalization of these operations. Framed through social constructivism, they argue that the persistent use of these operations, combined with a lack of vocal opposition among states, makes a global norm cascade in favor of targeted killing increasingly possible. However, given the increasing number of states that have conducted these operations persistently over the past twenty years, why are these operations still bounded to violent non-state actors? This paper puts forward an alternative perspective that explains the bounded persistence of these operations via a novel construction of the international society/international system distinction found in the English School of International Politics. It argues that international society acts as a firewall against the generalization of these practices, compartmentalizing the potential norm erosion. In doing so, this paper not only reintroduces the theoretical utility of one of the more fundamental theoretical contributions of the English School, but also provides a new framework to understand interactions between members of international society and other violent non-state actors.

Does the interstate cooperation in the CIA rendition programme imply the anti-torture norm was severely degraded in the war on terror? Most scholarship currently suggests yes, pointing to the widespread cooperation of dozens of states, including many liberal democracies, in a programme designed to facilitate torture. This article argues that this conclusion is driven primarily by a focus on outcome, that states cooperated, and ignores the process through which cooperation happened. Using the data provided in the Senate report on the CIA's detention and interrogation programme, this article demonstrates that studying the process of cooperation instead of merely the outcome allows us to see that the anti-torture norm had continuous causal effects that are currently unrecognised in the literature. This finding not only provides a counterpoint to much of the literature on the United States rendition programme that focusses on the negative human rights outcomes, but also builds on research which has argued that fundamental international human rights norms were not as damaged by American conduct in the war on terror as many scholars and activists had initially feared.

In the 2012 Martin Wight Memorial Lecture, Nicholas Wheeler explored how trust might be built between political leaders, drawing primarily on how the interpersonal relationship between Reagan and Gorbachev changed the diplomatic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. This paper engages the theoretical and empirical claims made in this article, arguing that the focus on the interpersonal relationship obscures more potentially important dynamics of trust-building between states. It seeks to show how focusing on the interpersonal relationships alone not only cannot account for long-term trust building, but also how the focus on the interpersonal relationship creates a highly simplified narrative that fails to account for important structural conditions that transformed the diplomatic relationship. Contrary to the claim that 'trustworthiness belong[s] to the individual and interpersonal level,' this paper suggests that investigations of diplomatic transformation through trustbuilding must include both international and societal components and examines the issues that must be considered to build a larger theory of state trust.

This article is a contribution to the theoretical debate over whether the Bush administration's defection from international torture norms led to a norm cascade favouring the Bush administration's preference for a more lenient definition of torture is a contribution to the theoretical debate over the relationship between material power and the ability to legitimate preferences in international society is a clarification of the utility of material capabilities with respect to legitimacy is a detailed historical presentation of the discursive interactions between the United States and other states within international society over the defection of the United States from the torture norm which is currently not present in the literature. This article examines the effect of Bush administration's human rights preferences during the war on terror with respect to torture by analysing a large-n sample of public legitimation strategies of both the United States and other members of international society. The article asks two questions: first, has the defection of the United States from these human rights norms led to a 'norm cascade' that delegitimized the norms? Second, did the material preponderance of the United States help it to legitimate its preferences in international society? The article argues that despite initial ambiguity in the response to the Bush administration's preferences from key liberal states, there is little evidence by the end of the Bush administration's term that a core group of states supported their preferences, nor did its material preponderance help the Bush administration to legitimate its position. Adapted from the source document.

Research Highlights and AbstractThis article,is a contribution to the theoretical debate over whether the Bush administration's defection from international torture norms led to a norm cascade favouring the Bush administration's preference for a more lenient definition of torture; is a contribution to the theoretical debate over the relationship between material power and the ability to legitimate preferences in international society; is a clarification of the utility of material capabilities with respect to legitimacy; is a detailed historical presentation of the discursive interactions between the United States and other states within international society over the defection of the United States from the torture norm which is currently not present in the literature.This article examines the effect of Bush administration's human rights preferences during the war on terror with respect to torture by analysing a large-n sample of public legitimation strategies of both the United States and other members of international society. The article asks two questions: first, has the defection of the United States from these human rights norms led to a 'norm cascade' that delegitimized the norms? Second, did the material preponderance of the United States help it to legitimate its preferences in international society? The article argues that despite initial ambiguity in the response to the Bush administration's preferences from key liberal states, there is little evidence by the end of the Bush administration's term that a core group of states supported their preferences, nor did its material preponderance help the Bush administration to legitimate its position.

The salience of the debate over Russian political interference in the USA has increased significantly during the Trump administration. However, there is no consensus over how to respond to the interference of this openly illiberal power. This paper argues that we need to reconceptualize our understanding of Russian influence to understand this high level of contestation. While the current understanding of Russian influence is characterized as a problem of unwanted information flows, we argue that we also need to take seriously the ideological influence that the Russia regime has in the USA—that the appeal of the Russian regime's conservative and populist ideology can help to explain this division. By taking ideological attraction seriously, we can explain why it is currently difficult for the USA to respond to this threat and why solutions to Russian interference based on the information flow models need to be reconsidered.

The study of soft power in international relations suffers from a liberal democratic bias. Throughout the literature, liberal concepts and values are assumed to be universal in their appeal. This bias has led scholars to underestimate Russian soft power by instrumentalizing it, that is, to see it purely as the effect of government-sponsored programs, and to focus primarily on the cultural pillar of soft power. This paper argues, alternatively, that Russia's conservative values and illiberal governance models generate admiration and followership, even outside of what Russia claims to be its post-Soviet sphere of influence. Crucially, this admiration and followership perform the traditional function of soft power: generating support for controversial Russian foreign policy decisions. Admitting that soft power can be based on conservative values is necessary not only to understand Russia's foreign policy potential, but also the ability of non-Western states to successfully challenge the Western liberal order.

The study of soft power in international relations suffers from a liberal democratic bias. Throughout the literature, liberal concepts and values are assumed to be universal in their appeal. This bias has led scholars to underestimate Russian soft power by instrumentalising it, that is, to see it purely as the effect of government-sponsored programmes, and to focus primarily on the cultural pillar of soft power. This paper argues, alternatively, that Russia's conservative values and illiberal governance models generate admiration and followership, even outside of what Russia claims to be its post-Soviet sphere of influence. Crucially, this admiration and followership perform the traditional function of soft power: generating support for controversial Russian foreign policy decisions. Admitting that soft power can be based on conservative values is necessary not only to understand Russia's foreign policy potential, but also the ability of non-Western states to challenge successfully the Western liberal order.