Suchergebnisse

PurposeIn this contribution to EDI's professional insights, the authors develop practical and evidence-based recommendations that are developed for bias mitigation, discretion elimination and process optimization in panel evaluations and decisions in research funding. An analysis is made of how the expectation of "selling science" adds layers of complexity to the evaluation and decision process. The insights are relevant for optimization of similar processes, including publication, recruitment and selection, tenure and promotion.Design/methodology/approachThe recommendations are informed by experiences and evidence from commissioned projects with European research funding organizations. The authors distinguish between three aspects of the evaluation process: written applications, enacted performance and group dynamics. Vignettes are provided to set the stage for the analysis of how bias and (lack of) fit to an ideal image makes it easier for some than for others to be funded.FindingsIn research funding decisions, (over)selling science is expected but creates shifting standards for evaluation, resulting in a narrow band of acceptable behavior for applicants. In the authors' recommendations, research funding organizations, evaluators and panel chairs will find practical ideas and levers for process optimization, standardization and customization, in terms of awareness, accountability, biased language, criteria, structure and time.Originality/valueShowing how "selling science" in research funding adds to the cumulative disadvantage of bias, the authors offer design specifications for interventions to mitigate the negative effects of bias on evaluations and decisions, improve selection habits, eliminate discretion and create a more inclusive process.

While the selection of top managers is vital to the performance and survival of organizations, the process by which these managers are selected remains uncharted territory. In this conceptual article, we propose that both structural conditions of and the selection process for top management positions are different from those at lower organizational levels. We build on the existing literature on succession, tournament models, and promotion systems to characterize top management selection. The main situational component of this characterization is that of relative versus absolute selection, which leads us to adopt the "arena" as a metaphor and critical framework for top management selection. Finally, we argue that due to certain cognitive features, the arena is an efficient but not necessarily effective selection process, which may contribute to side effects and negative outcomes for organizations. We conclude by setting the agenda for further research on top management selection.