Suchergebnisse

AbstractA central tenet in the electoral systems subfield is that parties seek desired outcomes via the strategic adoption of electoral rules. Such partisan self‐interest, however, is merely one explanation for reform: A second is that an actor may attempt to maximize her core values, which constitute her perception of the "common good." Although the extant literature has demonstrated the motivational power of core values, their effect on electoral rule choice has not been tested. Using a factorial experimental design that manipulates the partisan‐ and values‐implications of a fictitious reform proposal, I find evidence in favor of core values: Not only do they have an effect net of partisan concerns, but they also attenuate the effect of partisan self‐interest when the two predispositions countervail. The results provide evidence that partisan self‐interest offers an incomplete picture: Actors hold—and pursue through electoral reform—objectives that are not immediately partisan in nature.