Committees as Active Audiences: Reputation Concerns and Information Acquisition
In: JPUBE-D-22-00352
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In: JPUBE-D-22-00352
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We study two aspects of globalization. It allows a decision-maker to go beyond his own local experience and to learn from other decision-makers in addressing common problems. This improves the identification and diffusion of best practices. It also provides extra information to `markets' that evaluate decision-makers: comparisons become possible. We identify conditions under which the globalization of markets helps or hurts (i) the communication among decision-makers about their own experience and (ii) the quality of the decision that is taken next. An important mediating factor is whether decision-making is centralized or decentralized.
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Transparent decision-making processes are widely regarded as a prerequisite for the working of a representative democracy. It facilitates accountability, and citizens may suspect that decisions, if taken behind closed doors, do not promote their interests. Why else the secrecy? We provide a model of committee decision-making that explains the public's demand for transparency, and committee members' aversion to it. In line with case study evidence, we show how pressures to become transparent induce committee members to organize pre-meetings away from the public eye. Outcomes of pre-meetings are less determined, more anarchic, than those of formal meetings, but within bounds. We characterize feasible deals that are credible and will be endorsed in the formal meeting.
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In: Public choice, Band 129, Heft 3-4, S. 435-460
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Band 129, Heft 3, S. 435-460
ISSN: 0048-5829
A committee makes a decision on a project on behalf of the public. Members of the committee agree on the a priori value of the project, and hold additional private information about its consequences. They are experts who care about the value of the project and about being considered well informed. Before voting on the project, members can exchange their private information simultaneously. We show that reputational concerns make the a priori unconventional decision more attractive and lead committees to show a united front. These results hold irrespective of whether information can be manipulated or not. Also, reputational concerns induce members to manipulate information and vote strategically if their preferences differ considerably from those of the member casting the decisive vote. Our last result is that the optimal voting rule balances the quality of information exchange and the alignment of interests of the decisive voter with those of the public.
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Democracies delegate substantial decision power to politicians. Using a model in which an incumbent can design, examine and implement public policies, we show that examination takes place in spite of, rather than thanks to, elections. Elections are needed as a carrot and a stick to motivate politicians, yet politicians who are overly interested in re-election shy away from policy examination. Our analysis sheds light on the distance created in mature democracies between the political process and the production of policy relevant information; on the role played by probing into candidates' past; and on the possibility of crowding out desirable political behaviour by increasing the value of holding office.
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Collective decision procedures should balance the incentives they provide toacquire information and their capacity to aggregate private information. In a decisionproblem in which a project can be accepted or rejected once information about its qualityhas been acquired or not, we compare the performance of a delegation structure with that oftwo voting procedures. Delegation makes one's acceptance decision pivotal by definition.The decisiveness of one's vote in a voting procedure depends on the other agent's vote.This in turn determines the decision to acquire information. In the debate about a rationalchoice foundation of Condorcet's Jury Theorem, the distribution of information was leftexogenous. Mixed (acceptance) strategies were required to validate the Theorem.Endogenizing information acquisition as we do reveals mixed (acceptance) strategies to bedetrimental for welfare as they lead to indifference between buying and not buyinginformation.
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In: IMF Working Paper No. 2022/105
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In: ECB Working Paper No. 2021/2569
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Can vanity do any good? It may seem obvious to answer this question in the negative, as economists have shown how reputational concerns lead agents e.g. to ignore valuable information, to herd, and to become overly risk averse. We explore how proud agents may be a social blessing. An agent may exert effort to become informed about the uncertain benefits of aproject. A smart agent's efforts make him better informed; a dumb agent's efforts are to no avail. If an agent does not know his type, pride is socially beneficial. If an agent knows his type, a dumb agent takes inefficient, unconventional decisions to mimick a smart agent. The latter exerts more effort in order not to be mistaken for a dumb. This holds whether or not project rejection is a save haven for the dumb.
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