Suchergebnisse

This article provides new insights into size variation of national delegationsto plenary meetings of international organizations. Plenaries are supremedecision-making bodies representing a symbol of national sovereignty as allmember states of the given organization can participate in the negotiationsand collective decision-making. However, this article argues that the right toparticipate in plenaries is utilized differently by different countries, whichmay have political and normative implications for internationalorganizations and global governance as such. Drawing upon an actor-centred institutionalist approach and a newly created dataset coveringseventeen plenary meetings, I suggest there is considerable variation in thedelegation size caused by country-based factors. Namely, financialcapacities, ideational capacities and national interests motivate states todelegate more representatives. In contrast, regional partnerships enablecountries to rely on their partners and delegate fewer representatives.Finally, administrative capacities, the nature of the domestic politicalregime, and the institutional design of international organizations have noor only an inconclusive effect in this regard.