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AbstractPopular protest, which repeatedly occurred in Communist regimes, turned into massive mobilizational waves in the late Communist period. Why did some protests result in state cooptation and particularist nationalism (Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union), and others in state-society polarization (Poland) and protest containment (China), when these states shared important historical, political, and institutional legacies? Political regimes with origins in indigenous popularly-based revolutionary movements are more resilient to popular protests and other major crises than other authoritarian regimes. Protracted ideological armed struggle largely overlaps with broader patriotic causes, such as liberation wars or struggles against foreign intervention. The revolutionary regimes thus acquire patriotic credentials, while boundaries between partisan and patriotic identities become blurred, which strengthens their elite unity and popular base. Popular protests thus facilitate a complex political game of old and new actors that may result in regime survival or transformation. In other regimes, popular unrest tends to produce state-society polarization and, ultimately, regime delegitimation and breakdown. Popular contention in complex multinational institutional settings, if there is no major external threat, highlights old and triggers new conflicts along these structural and institutional divides and, where dual political identities prevail, facilitates identity shifts in particularist direction.

By reporting on some conflicts but not on others, and by representing conflicts they report on in particular ways, the media strongly influence the dynamics and outcomes of democratisation conflicts, and thus also shape the prospects of success of conflict parties. This paper explores the literature on media and conflict by focusing on the ways in which media frame inter-state and civil wars, institutionalised conflicts and social movements in western democracies, and conflicts in nondemocratic and democratising states. Much of the literature discusses the ways in which western media frame foreign conflicts and domestic election campaigns and policy debates, while there is considerably less focus on domestic conflicts in nonwestern settings, such as those that arise during and after transitions from nondemocratic rule. There are only limited attempts to draw parallels between the media coverage of disparate conflicts. In contrast, this study builds upon research findings in these related areas to draw lessons for empirical research of media framing of the contentious dimension of contemporary democratisation. This study concludes that the political context is the main factor that shapes the media framing of various forms of political conflict. Several dimensions of the political context matter in this respect, such as regime type, international (foreign) or domestic perspective, elite consensus or conflict, policy consensus or uncertainty, policy area, more or less institutionalised nature of the political conflict at stake, and the stage of democratisation. Also, the literature suggests that media framing strongly influences political outcomes and thus fosters or undermines democratic institutions in new democracies. . ; Izveštavajući o nekim sukobima, a ne o drugima, i predstavljajući ih na određeni način, mediji bitno utiču na dinamiku i rezultate sukoba tokom demokratizacije i tako oblikuju izglede na uspeh sukobljenih strana. Ovaj rad analizira literaturu o medijima i političkim sukobima, naročito onaj deo o medijskom predstavljanju međudržavnih i građanskih ratova, institucionalizovanih sukoba, protesta i društvenih pokreta u demokratijama Zapada, kao i sukoba u nedemokratskim režimima i tokom demokratizacije. Najveći deo literature bavi se načinima na koji Zapadni mediji predstavljaju strane sukobe - oružane i druge - i domaće izborne kampanje i rasprave o javnim politikama, dok je medijsko izveštavanje o domaćim sukobima u nezapadnom okruženju, kao što su oni koji nastaju tokom i posle nedemokratske vladavine, nedovoljno istraženo. Retko se povlače paralele između medijskog izveštavanja o tim, veoma različitim oblicima sukoba. Ovaj rad upravo insistira na upoređivanju nalaza iz ovih srodnih oblasti jer takvo poređenje sugeriše pouke - u vidu argumenata i hipoteza - za empirijsko istraživanje medijskog predstavljanja konfliktne strane savremene demokratizacije. Najznačajniji nalaz ove studije jeste da je politički kontekst ključni činilac koji utiče na predstavljanje različitih oblika političkih sukoba u medijima. Najvažnije dimenzije političkog konteksta iz ovog ugla su oblik političkog režima, međunarodni (spoljni) ili domaći ugao, konsenzus ili sukob elita, oblast javne politike i konsenzus ili neizvesnost oko njihovog donošenja i/ili sadržaja, oblik i nivo institucionalizacije sukoba i etapa demokratizacije. Pored toga, medijsko predstavljanje sukoba značajno utiče na političke ishode i tako podržava ili podriva nove demokratske ustanove.

By reporting on some conflicts but not on others, and by representing conflicts they report on in particular ways, the media strongly influence the dynamics and outcomes of democratisation conflicts, and thus also shape the prospects of success of conflict parties. This paper explores the literature on media and conflict by focusing on the ways in which media frame inter-state and civil wars, institutionalised conflicts and social movements in western democracies, and conflicts in nondemocratic and democratising states. Much of the literature discusses the ways in which western media frame foreign conflicts and domestic election campaigns and policy debates, while there is considerably less focus on domestic conflicts in nonwestern settings, such as those that arise during and after transitions from nondemocratic rule. There are only limited attempts to draw parallels between the media coverage of disparate conflicts. In contrast, this study builds upon research findings in these related areas to draw lessons for empirical research of media framing of the contentious dimension of contemporary democratisation. This study concludes that the political context is the main factor that shapes the media framing of various forms of political conflict. Several dimensions of the political context matter in this respect, such as regime type, international (foreign) or domestic perspective, elite consensus or conflict, policy consensus or uncertainty, policy area, more or less institutionalised nature of the political conflict at stake, and the stage of democratisation. Also, the literature suggests that media framing strongly influences political outcomes and thus fosters or undermines democratic institutions in new democracies. .

This article explores the relationship between competitive authoritarianism and popular protest. Building upon comparative regime analysis and social movement research, it argues that this hybrid regime type facilitates popular protest by providing opposition forces with considerable institutional resources to organize themselves and confront regime elites, along with grievances that provide strong incentives for popular challenges. In turn, popular protest may trigger regime crisis and extract important concessions from regime incumbents. In the long run, popular politics strongly shapes the interests, identities and capacities of regime elites and opposition forces, as well as the regime's formal and/or informal institutions, and may lead to government change and/or regime change. Evidence is provided from Serbia under Milošević, which experienced massive opposition protest campaigns in 1991, 1992, 1996-1997, 1999 and 2000, which resulted in regime change.

Large popular protests against non-democratic rule swept much of the Middle East during the Arab Spring. Why did non-violent and armed rebellions emerge in some countries, but not in others? Why did some autocrats fall from power under pressure 'from below', but not others? Theoretical debates on the impact of structural and institutional factors on the stability of political regimes and democratization suggest possible avenues for research. Oil wealth empowered some autocrats to avoid large popular protests and helped others to weather them out without major problems. Huge profits from oil exports reduced demands for political representation, enabled autocrats to 'buy' loyalty of their population and strengthened the repressive apparatus, as well as the readiness of its members to use force against their political opponents. In addition, the survival of Arab monarchies, and of the Algerian regime, suggests that authoritarian regimes are more stable than sultanist (personalist) ones. The broader social base of authoritarianism and resulting regime coalitions, and strong political institutions, reduced the pool for recruitment of protesters and made a firm government response possible. Sultanistic regimes, by contrast, faced existential threat because of highly unpopular personalist rule and dynastic tendencies, narrow social base, widespread corruption and ineffective rule. ; Masovni protesti protiv nedemokratske vlasti zahvatili su tokom arapskog proleća veći deo Severne Afrike i Bliskog Istoka. Zašto nenasilne ili oružane pobune nisu izbile u svim zemljama regiona? Zašto su neki nedemokratski vladari smenjeni pod pritiskom 'odozdo', a drugi opstali na vlasti? Teorijske rasprave o uticaju strukturnih i institucionalnih činilaca na stabilnost političkih režima i demokratizaciju ukazuju na moguće pravce analize ovih problema. Bogatstvo naftom omogućilo je pojedinim nedemokratskim vladarima da izbegnu široke proteste a drugima da ih uspešno i gotovo bezbolno neutrališu. Veliki prihodi od eksploatacije nafte umanjili su zahteve građana za političkim predstavljanjem, olakšali kupovinu lojalnosti i ojačali represivni aparat, kao i spremnost njegovih pripadnika da upotrebe silu prema protivnicima režima. Pored toga, opstanak arapskih monarhija, kao i alžirskog republikanskog režima, sugeriše da su autoritarni režimi stabilniji od sultanističkih (ličnih) režima. Šira društvena osnova autoritarnih režima, i na njoj zasnovane režimske koalicije, kao i jake političke ustanove, smanjili su regrutni potencijal protesta i obezbedili čvrst odgovor vlasti. Sultanistički režimi, s druge strane, suočili su se s egzistencijalnom pretnjom usled omražene lične vladavine i pokušaja dinastijske sukcesije u republikama, uske društvene osnove režima, velike korupcije i neefikasne vlasti.

Članak razmatra uspon, oblike i posledice protesta u nedemokratskim režimima, oslanjajući se na noviju literaturu iz uporedne analize političkih režima i društvenih pokreta. Oblik režima značajno oblikuje izglede za izbijanje protesta, kao i njegove oblike i posledice. Protesti često proizvode bitne promene u personalnom sastavu i politici vlasti, koje značajno utiču na strukturu i delovanje nedemokratskih režima, i ponekad vode promeni režima. Primeri su navedeni iz kasnog komunističkog autoritarizma u Poljskoj i Jugoslaviji, u kojima su dugotrajni protesti doprineli padu režima i države, i postkomunistički autoritarni režimi u Srbiji i Ukrajini koji su više puta uzdrmani a zatim i dokrajčeni "pritiskom odozdo". ; The paper explores the politics of protest in non-democratic regimes using insights from comparative regime analysis and social movement theory. A regime type strongly shapes factors that trigger popular mobilization, the repertories of collective action and their implications. Protest politics may produce a considerable political change, such as policy and personality change in the political establishment, as well as important shifts in the structure and operation of non-democratic regimes, even regime change. The paper provides evidence from the late communist authoritarian Poland and Yugoslavia, in which sustained protests contributed to the collapse of regime and state, and the post-communist competitive authoritarian Serbia and Ukraine, which experience repeated protest waves and were brought down by protest politics.

This paper presents an overview of the main findings from a quantitative content analysis covering different types of democratisation conflicts (i.e., conflicts over citizenship, elections, transitional justice and distribution of power) in Egypt, Kenya, Serbia and South Africa. The key findings from the content analysis are organised around several themes: causes of democratisation conflicts, portrayal of conflict parties, preferred solutions to conflicts, perceptions of democracy, role of the media, authoritarian past, and tone of reporting and polarisation. The main finding is that cross-national variations depend on several factors: specific country contexts (and contexts of broader regions from which they come from, including the Arab Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and post-communist Europe); regime type and the stage of democratisation; and type of democratisation conflict (which reflects the main arenas of political contestation). Across all countries, the quality of media coverage is limited by bias, emotionalisation and - most importantly - polarisation. In particular, conflicts over the distribution of power trigger sharp polarisation, whereas elections-contrary to existing literature - seem to force media towards a more restrained style of reporting. The sample involves 5162 newspaper articles and news stories from the four countries.

This article examines how political cartoons reflected and mobilized resistance to growing authoritarianism and the personalization of power in contemporary Serbia. The focus is on the work of Dušan Petričić, the most influential political cartoonist in Serbia, which was published in daily Politika and weekly NIN between 2012 and 2017. Petričić's cartoons offer interesting insights into a dramatic decline of press freedom and the rise of authoritarian personalist rule in terms of both their content and political impact. The authors draw on quantitative content analysis and qualitative multimodal analysis to examine the key representational and stylistic features of Petričić's cartoons, both as a way to understand the relationship between his aesthetics and his political statements, and in order to critically assess some of the ways in which democratization conflicts may be expressed visually. Their analysis also draws on evidence from an in-depth interview with the author. In combining a systematic analysis of key visual patterns across a sample of cartoons with a comprehensive evaluation of how both visual and linguistic features work together to promote anti-authoritarian ideals and resistance, the article offers a framework to understand the political import of aesthetics in Serbia's democratization process.

1.Introduction: Democratization conflicts as communicative contestations -- 2. Media, power, citizenship: democratization in an age of media abundance -- 3. Conflict-Sensitive Journalism? Journalistic Role Perceptions and Practices in Democratization Conflicts -- 4. Peace but at what cost? Media coverage of elections and conflict in Kenya -- 5. Creativity and strategy: how civil society organizations communicate and mobilise in Egypt, Kenya, Serbia and South Africa -- 6. Tweeting in precarious times: Comparing Twitter use during the 2013 general election in Kenya and the 2012 presidential election in Egypt -- 7. Minority Media, Democratization conflicts and the politicization of Coptic communal identity in Egypt -- 8. Hybrid governance, strategic communication and the quest for institutional legitimacy -- 9. Communicating power and resistance in democratic decline: the 2015 smear campaign against Serbia's ombudsman -- 10. Dialogue of the Deaf: Listening on Twitter and Democratic Responsiveness during the 2015 South African State of the Nation Address -- 11. The Participation Approach in Media Development Cooperation -- 12. Conclusion