Equal Pay for Equal Work?: Wage and Productivity Differentials During Slovenia's Transition
In: Eastern European economics: EEE, Band 52, Heft 5, S. 87-110
ISSN: 1557-9298
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In: Eastern European economics: EEE, Band 52, Heft 5, S. 87-110
ISSN: 1557-9298
In: Eastern European economics, Band 52, Heft 5
ISSN: 0012-8775
In: Post-communist economies, Band 31, Heft 5, S. 603-622
ISSN: 1465-3958
Članak analizira poticaje za prijelaz iz nezaposlenosti u zaposlenost izražene pomoću različitih financijskih pokazatelja u Sloveniji i uspoređuje ih s onima u državama EU. Članak daje pregled glavnih značajki politika isplativosti rada i raspravlja razloge za njihovu primjenu u Sloveniji. Pokazuje se da u Sloveniji obitelji i pojedinci koji ne rade imaju slabe poticaje za pronalaženje posla, jer za mnoge se "posao ne isplati". Naknade za nezaposlene i novčane naknade, zajedno s visokim poreznim klinom, odvraćaju od rada. Kako bi se riješio ovaj problem, Slovenija bi trebala razmotriti uvođenje dodataka za zapošljavanje, naknada za zaposlene ili oboje. Trenutačno takve politike gotovo ne postoje. U svjetlu međunarodnih uspješnih iskustava s takvim politikama i s obzirom na visoki destimulirajući učinak koji stvaraju zamke nezaposlenosti, neaktivnosti i niskih plaća, takve politike u Sloveniji imaju veliki potencijal za poticanje prijelaza iz nezaposlenosti u zaposlenost i ostanak u radnom odnosu. ; The paper analyzes incentives for making transition from non-employment to work as expressed by various financial indicators in Slovenia and compares them to the EU countries. It also provides an overview of the main features of making-work-pay policies and discusses reasoning for their implementation in Slovenia. The paper shows that in Slovenia, families and individuals who are not working have poor incentives to find a job – because for many, "it does not pay to work." Unemployment benefits and cash transfers, coupled with high tax wedge, create high work disincentives. To address this issue, Slovenia should consider introducing into-work benefits, in-work benefits, or both. Presently such policies are virtually non-existent. In the light of international successful experiences with such policies and given the strong work disincentive created by unemployment, inactivity and low-pay traps, in Slovenia such policies have a great potential to stimulate transitions from non-employment to employment and stay in employment.
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We examine the effects of a 2013 labour market reform in Slovenia which made permanent contracts less restrictive and fixed-term contracts more restrictive. Using matched employer-employee database covering the entirety of Slovenia's labour market participants, we compare the difference in outcomes for workers employed under permanent vs. fixed-term contracts before and after the legislative change. We find that the reform achieved both its stated goals of reducing labour market segmentation and improving access to jobs for vulnerable groups: (i) it increased the probability of accessing permanent jobs via transitions from both fixed-term jobs and unemployment, and (ii) it improved the accessibility of permanent jobs for both young and old workers.
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In: IZA journal of European Labor Studies, Band 2, Heft 1, S. 9
ISSN: 2193-9012
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 9783
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In: Bonn
The paper analyses the effects of a 2011 increase in the unemployment benefit replacement rate on the job-finding rate of Slovenian benefit recipients. Using registry data on the universe of Slovenian unemployment benefit recipients, we exploit legislative changes that selectively increased the replacement rates for certain groups of workers while leaving them unchanged for others. Applying this quasi-experimental approach, we find that increasing the replacement rate significantly decreased the hazard rate of the transition from unemployment to employment, with an implied elasticity of the hazard rate with respect to benefit replacement rate being 0.7 to 0.9. The results also show that the increase of the unemployment benefit replacement rate does not affect the job-finding probability of jobseekers whose reason for unemployment is employer exit, and that the effects of the increase of replacement rate are present only upon exit to employment and not to inactivity.
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The paper analyses the effects of a 2011 increase in the unemployment benefit replacement rate on the job-finding rate of Slovenian benefit recipients. Using registry data on the universe of Slovenian unemployment benefit recipients, we exploit legislative changes that selectively increased the replacement rates for certain groups of workers while leaving them unchanged for others. Applying this quasi-experimental approach, we find that increasing the replacement rate significantly decreased the hazard rate of the transition from unemployment to employment, with an implied elasticity of the hazard rate with respect to benefit replacement rate being 0.7 to 0.9. The results also show that the increase of the unemployment benefit replacement rate does not affect the job-finding probability of jobseekers whose reason for unemployment is employer exit, and that the effects of the increase of replacement rate are present only upon exit to employment and not to inactivity.
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 14318
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 9548
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 12123
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In: Bank of Greece Working Paper No. 129
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This paper uses information from a rich firm-level survey on wage and price-setting procedures, in around 15,000 firms in 15 European Union countries, to investigate the relative importance of internal versus external factors in the setting of wages of newly hired workers. The evidence suggests that external labour market conditions are less important than internal pay structures in determining hiring pay, with internal pay structures binding even more often when there is labour market slack. When explaining their choice firms allude to fairness considerations and the need to prevent a potential negative impact on effort. Despite the lower importance of external factors in all countries there is significant cross-country variation in this respect. Cross-country differences are found to depend on institutional factors (bargaining structures); countries in which collective agreements are more prevalent and collective agreement coverage is higher report to a greater extent internal pay structures as the main determinant of hiring pay. Within-country differences are found to depend on firm and workforce characteristics; there is a strong association between the use of external factors in hiring pay, on the one hand, and skills (positive) and tenure (negative) on the other.
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In: ECB Working Paper No. 1153
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