Suchergebnisse

This paper investigates the role of monetary policy in a small open economy, where exchange rate shocks are important. VAR models are estimated for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Contemporaneous and sign restrictions are imposed in order to identify the effect of monetary policy and risk premium shocks. Estimates from the same model for Canada, Sweden and the UK are used as benchmark for developed economies with low inflation. The results suggest that the typical size a of risk premium shock renders it almost impossible for the interest rate policy to smooth the exchange rate with the aim of minimising inflationary consequences. On the other hand, low inflation may decrease the exchange rate pass-through, which helps the monetary policy ignore exchange rate shocks.

This paper attempts to aggregate and summarise fresh results concerning the monetary transmission mechanism in Hungary. Within a research project at the MNB nine studies have been published investigating the channels through which Hungarian monetary policy affects the economy. We create a framework for synthesising particular results based on Mishkin's (1996) classification. We analyse how aggregate demand is affected through those channels. Our conclusion is that during the past ten years monetary policy did exert a measurable influence on real activity and prices. The dominance of the exchange rate channel explains why prices respond faster and output responds more mildly than in closed developed economies like the U.S. or the euro area. We expect that after adopting the euro the absence of exchange rate will be compensated by the fact that the interest rate channel will work through foreign demand as well. Therefore, no significant asymmetries can be expected inside the euro area in terms of monetary transmission.

A standard approach in measuring the effect of monetary policy on output and prices is to estimate a VAR model, characterise somehow the monetary policy shock and then plot impulse responses. In this paper I attempt to do this exercise with Hungarian data. I compare two identification approaches. One of them involves the 'sign restrictions on impulse responses' strategy applied recently by several authors. I also propose another approach, namely, imposing restrictions on implied shock history. My argument is that in certain cases, especially in the case of the Hungarian economy, the latter identification scheme may be more credible. In order to obtain robust results I use two datasets. To tackle possible structural breaks I make alternative estimates on a shorter sample as well. The main conclusions are the followings: (1) although the two identification approaches produced very similar results, imposing restrictions on history may help to dampen counterintuitive reaction of prices; (2) after 1995 a typical unanticipated monetary policy contraction (a roughly 25 basis points rate hike) resulted in an immediate 1 per cent appreciation of the nominal exchange rate (3) followed by a 0.3% lower output and 0.1-0.15% lower consumer prices; (4) the impact on prices is slower than on output; it reaches its bottom 4-6 years after the shock, resembling the intuitive choreography of sticky-price models; (5) using additional observations prior to 1995 makes identification more difficult indicating the presence of a marked structural break.

This paper assesses the effect of monetary policy on major components of aggregate demand. We use three different macromodels, all estimated on Hungarian data of the past 10 years. All three models indicated that after an unexpected monetary policy tightening investments decrease quickly. The response of consumption is more ambiguous, but it is most likely to increase for several years, which may be explained by the slow adjustment of nominal wages. On the other hand, we could not detect any significant change in net exports during the first couple of years after the shock. The weak response of net exports can be due to the fact that the drop in exports is coupled with a fall in imports of almost the same magnitude, highlighting the relative importance of the income-absorption effect, as opposed to the expenditure-switching effect.

This paper provides an overview of the impact of unconventional central bank instruments, the relevant international experiences and the room for application in Hungary. The use of unconventional instruments may be justified by the existence of financial market friction, turmoil, failure or constraint, when instruments that change the size and/or composition of central bank balance sheets may be more efficient in achieving monetary policy objectives than traditional interest rate policy. Empirical analyses found the unconventional instruments applied in developed countries successful in easing market tensions, increasing market liquidity and reducing yields. Although they proved to be unsuccessful in providing a boost to economic growth, they were able to mitigate the fall in lending and output. Vulnerable emerging countries with a lower credit rating and high external debt have much less room for manoeuvre to apply non-conventional instruments. Even liquidity providing instruments, which are otherwise considered the least risky, may result in exchange rate depreciation and flight of capital during a crisis. The interventions that involve risk taking by the government may add to market concerns about fiscal sustainability. Due to Hungary's vulnerability, high country risk premium and large foreign exchange exposure, most of the instruments applied in other countries would entail financial stability risks at home. In theory, the sharp reduction in the supply of bank credit could provide sound justification for the use of unconventional central bank instruments in Hungary. It should be noted, however, that insufficient credit supply is mainly attributable to a lack of willingness by banks to lend, which can be less influenced by the Bank, rather than to any lack of capacity to lend. In addition to banks' high risk aversion, uncertain macroeconomic environment and economic policy measures affecting the banking sector also decreased willingness to lend, which is beyond the authority of the central bank. Therefore, these instruments at most may have a role in preventing a possible future deterioration in banks' lending capacity from becoming an obstacle to lending in a turbulent period.