Suchergebnisse

Main description: 1921 erschien der Tractatus logico-philosophicus unter dem Titel "Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung" erstmals; ein Jahr später dann in deutsch-englischer Version unter dem geläufigen Titel. Seit seinem Erscheinen gilt dieses einzige von Wittgenstein selbst veröffentlichte Buch als schwierig und rätselhaft. Für einen Logiker wie Russel schien es eher ein Beitrag zur Mystik als einer zur Logik zu sein. Es ist nicht verwunderlich, daß dieses Buch von Mißverständnissen verfolgt wurde. Erst allmählich wurden die Tiefe, die Bedeutung und die philosophischen Dimensionen des Textes erkennbar. Der Tractatus ist einer der wenigen Schlüsseltexte der zeitgenössischen Philosophie. Seine Bedeutung für Logik, Sprachphilosophie und Metaphysik ist größer, als dies noch vor zwei Jahrzehnten vermutet wurde. Die Beiträge in diesem Band sind mit wenigen Ausnahmen bisher unveröffentlicht. Sie sollen einen Zugang zum Tractatus vermitteln und dessen Verständnis vertiefen.

Abstract

"The ethical is no fact of the matter." On Wittgenstein's ethical paradox discusses Wittgenstein's "Lecture on Ethics" of 1929. In this lecture to the Heretics Society at Cambridge he proposes an ethical paradox based on two incompatible types of facts, the natural facts offered by science and the supernatural facts, which he claims to be the core of ethics. The paradox is partly due to his Tractarian belief that ethics has no descriptive content. Yet, although it has no descriptive content the ethical is represented by a feeling which has a metaphysical and an undeniable factual character too, as Wittgenstein claims. This kind of fact is his personal, private if not solipsistic feeling. The paper tries to clarify this highly controversial type of feeling. It seems probable that the change from the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations resolves the ethical paradox along the new therapeutical lines of PU. It is argued that this is not the case. The content of the ethical paradox remains unchanged.

AbstractRule following has been estimated as a major issue in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. It seemed to be a key to understand his philosophy of language, and a criterion for the correct use of words. It was further valued as a notion, which conforms to standards required in a theory of language. In this essay I shall argue that these views are neither supported in the Philosophical Investigations nor in any other of Wittgenstein's writings. In my view rule following serves as a default option to clarify that there are no definite standards of the correct use of words and in consequence, that the actual use of a language is not to be explained at all. Any approach to an explanation of the actual language use by means of rules appears to be nonsensical and beside the point. In order to recognize this view one has to take Wittgenstein's proposition seriously and at face value that the use of a language is a practice. Providing that only the practice counts the famous "paradox" reappears in a new light.