Computing in economics and finance
In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 29, Heft 1-2, S. 1-2
ISSN: 0165-1889
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In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 29, Heft 1-2, S. 1-2
ISSN: 0165-1889
In: Economic Complexity; International Symposia in Economic Theory and Econometrics, S. 125-157
In: European journal of economic and social systems: an international journal on economics, management, organizational and all social sciences, Band 15, Heft 3, S. 185-202
ISSN: 1292-8909
In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 24, Heft 1, S. 1-19
ISSN: 0165-1889
We thank participants of the WEHIA meeting in Nice, the SAET conference in Rio de Janeiro and the Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society in Hong Kong, as well as seminar participants at King's College for comments and discussions. Part of this research has benefited from financial support from the French government managed by l'Agence Nationale de la Recherche under Investissements d'Avenir UCAJEDI(ANR-15-IDEX-01). In particular, we thank the UCAinACTION project. ; International audience ; We study a linear location model (Hotelling, 1929) in which n (with n ≥ 2) boundedly rational players follow (noisy) myopic best-reply behavior. We show through numerical and mathematical analysis that such players spend almost all the time clustered together near the center, re-establishing Hotelling's " Principle of Minimum Differentiation " that had been discredited by equilibrium analyses. Thus, our analysis of the best-response dynamics shows that when considering e.g. market dynamics as well as their policy and welfare implications, it may be important to look beyond equilibrium analyses
BASE
We thank participants of the WEHIA meeting in Nice, the SAET conference in Rio de Janeiro and the Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society in Hong Kong, as well as seminar participants at King's College for comments and discussions. Part of this research has benefited from financial support from the French government managed by l'Agence Nationale de la Recherche under Investissements d'Avenir UCAJEDI(ANR-15-IDEX-01). In particular, we thank the UCAinACTION project. ; International audience ; We study a linear location model (Hotelling, 1929) in which n (with n ≥ 2) boundedly rational players follow (noisy) myopic best-reply behavior. We show through numerical and mathematical analysis that such players spend almost all the time clustered together near the center, re-establishing Hotelling's " Principle of Minimum Differentiation " that had been discredited by equilibrium analyses. Thus, our analysis of the best-response dynamics shows that when considering e.g. market dynamics as well as their policy and welfare implications, it may be important to look beyond equilibrium analyses
BASE
International audience ; We study a linear location model (Hotelling, 1929) in which n (with n ≥ 2) boundedly rational players follow (noisy) myopic best-reply behavior. We show through numerical and mathematical analysis that such players spend almost all the time clustered together near the center, re-establishing Hotelling's " Principle of Minimum Differentiation " that had been discredited by equilibrium analyses. Thus, our analysis of the best-response dynamics shows that when considering e.g. market dynamics as well as their policy and welfare implications, it may be important to look beyond equilibrium analyses
BASE
International audience We study a linear location model (Hotelling, 1929) in which n (with n ≥ 2) boundedly rational players follow (noisy) myopic best-reply behavior. We show through numerical and mathematical analysis that such players spend almost all the time clustered together near the center, re-establishing Hotelling's " Principle of Minimum Differentiation " that had been discredited by equilibrium analyses. Thus, our analysis of the best-response dynamics shows that when considering e.g. market dynamics as well as their policy and welfare implications, it may be important to look beyond equilibrium analyses
BASE
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 113, Heft 487, S. 495-524
ISSN: 1468-0297
In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 25, Heft 3-4, S. 459-502
ISSN: 0165-1889
We study both theoretically and experimentally the set of Nash equilibria of a classical one-dimensional election game with two candidates. These candidates are interested in power and ideology, but their weights on these two motives are not necessarily identical. Apart from obtaining the well known median voter result and the two-sided policy differentiation outcome, the paper uncovers the existence of two new equilibrium configurations, called 'one-sided' and 'probabilistic' policy differentiation, respectively. Our analysis shows how these equilibrium configurations depend on the relative interests in power (resp., ideology) and the uncertainty about voters' preferences. The theoretical predictions are supported by the data collected from a laboratory experiment, as we observe convergence to the Nash equilibrium values at the aggregate as well as at the individual levels in all treatments, and the comparative statics effects across treatments are as predicted by the theory.
BASE
We study both theoretically and experimentally the complete set of Nash equilibria of a classical one-dimensional, majority rule election game with two candidates, who might be interested in power as well as in ideology, but not necessarily in the same way. Apart from obtaining the well known median voter result and the two-sided policy differentiation outcome, the paper uncovers the existence of two new equilibrium configurations, called 'one-sided' and 'probabilistic' policy differentiation, respectively. Our analysis shows how these equilibrium configurations depend on the relative interests in power (resp., ideology) and the uncertainty about voters' preferences. The theoretical predictions are supported by the data collected from a series of laboratory experiments, as we observe convergence to the Nash equilibrium values at the aggregate as well as the individual levels in all treatments, and the comparative statics effects across treatments are as predicted by the theory.
BASE
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 119, Heft 537, S. 826-854
ISSN: 1468-0297
In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Band 64, Heft 3-4, S. 316-336
Schelling (Schelling, T., 1969. Models of segregation. American Economic Review 59, 488–493; Schelling, T., 1971a. Dynamic models of segregation. Journal of Mathematical Sociology 1, 143–186; Schelling, T., 1971b. On the ecology of micromotives. The Public Interest 25, 61–98; Schelling, T., 1978. Micromotives and Macrobehavior. W.W. Norton and Company, New York) considered a model with individual agents who only care about the types of people living in their own local neighborhood. The spatial structure was represented by a one- or two-dimensional lattice. Schelling showed that an integrated society will generally unravel into a rather segregated one even though no individual agent strictly prefers this. We generalize this spatial proximity model to a proximity model of segregation, examining models with individual agents who interact 'locally' in a range of more general social network structures. The levels of segregation attained are in line with those reached in the lattice-based spatial proximity model.