Autor tematizira recepciju političke ekonomije u Hegelovoj Filozofiji prava. Ta je recepcija bila presudna za razvoj Hegelove pravno-političke filozofije i njenu zrelu formulaciju, ali je istovremeno njome posredovan i Hegelov odnos prema modernom prirodnom pravu i ugovornoj političkoj teoriji. Oslanjajući se na Strpićeve nalaze, autor pokazuje kako je mjestom realizacije ugovornog modela države Hegel smatrao građansko društvo. Zakonitosti imanentne modernoj tržišnoj ekonomiji, koje je "otkrila" politička ekonomija, prema Hegelovu sudu čine izlišnim ugovornu konstituciju države, ali i predstavljaju unutarnju mjeru kritike ugovorne teorije. To međutim ne znači da Hegel prihvaća model društva klasične političke ekonomije niti njeno razumijevanje odnosa države i društva. On dovodi u pitanje prije svega njenu središnju pretpostavku o sposobnosti tržišta za samoregulaciju, zbog čega smatra nužnom državnu regulaciju tržišta. U posljednjoj analizi pokazuje se kako je "općenitost" građanskog društva utemeljena u "općenitosti" političke države, koja predstavlja viši stupanj ozbiljenja čovjekove slobode.
The first part of the text presents the republican position of young Hegel. This position is developed primarily through a divergence from Christianity, which is, in Hegel's judgment, the spiritual pillar of political despotism and the main cause of German spiritual, social and political backwardness. According to Hegel, the main reason for the fatal influence of Christianity is its private character, the fact that it teaches man to despise this earthly life, tells him that he is unable to achieve moral perfection through his own efforts and turns him into an object of a transcendental power. In opposition to Christianity, Hegel puts forward the Greek popular religions, i.e. the antique republican orders as the only orders adequate to man's freedom, pointing them out also as models for his own time. The second part of the text shows how Hegel's giving up on his youthful republican-democratic ideals and his adherence to hereditary monarchy is a consequence of the appearance of the liberal moment in his political philosophy. Through acceptance of subjectivity as the supreme principle of the new age, Hegel realizes that a return to the substantial ethical unity of the Greek polis is impossible. At the same time, he sees in the constitutional monarchy of the hereditary type the only order adequate to modern conditions. Namely it preserves the autonomy of non-political spheres in the state, while simultaneously -- in the monarch who is not dependent on the will of those subject to his power -- the state unity is guaranteed as opposed to civil society as a space of interest plurality and socio-economic differences. Finally, the author strives to demonstrate how, in spite of Hegel's obvious opting for hereditary monarchy and rejection of the republic, his mature political philosophy also encompasses a republican dimension. This has to do with a contradiction between the republican form and the monarchic contents of the political state. Namely the latter is not (only) a machinery of power which serves as a counterbalance to civil society, but is defined as the sphere of true political community. It is however not shaped through the activity of individuals; their political subjectivity is embodied in the hereditary monarch. This contradiction, i.e. the republican essence of the political state, leads to the conclusion that political emancipation can be conceived as a natural and necessary consequence of civil emancipation also in the conceptual field of The Philosophy of Right. Adapted from the source document.
The text deals with Hegel's theory of political representation which is founded on the estate-corporative representation of major interests of civil society in the political state. Such a form of representation is contrary to the modern concept of representation; according to the latter, the object of representation is always the people as community of free and equal citizens which the representative is yet to shape into a unique subject capable of activity. In order to value adequately Hegel's theory of representation and its potential in contemporary representative democracies, the text begins by analyzing Hegel's idea of the constitution as a wider institutional mechanism of mediation between the social and political spheres. This is followed by an overview of Hegel's criticism of representative democracy, which he perceived as a form of representation inadequate for the modern state. Namely, in Hegel's judgment, representative democracy, with its starting point of the people as a community of free and equal citizens and its reduction of their political activity to voting in the elections, excludes representation of particular social interests and true participation of citizens in political affairs, which is why it results in a formalistic determination of the state. The basic insight that enables Hegel to overcome those contradictions of representative democracy is the insight regarding modern civil society as the locus of historical emancipation of man. Thus precisely the "estates" -- formations resulting from the division of labour -- and "corporations" -- interest associations of individuals -- become the instrument of mediation between the social and political spheres in The Philosophy of Right. This very insight, however, is the core problem in Hegel's theory of representation, since it makes Hegel overlook entirely the political potential of democratic establishment of state authority. Still, Hegel's "interest" representation is not inapplicable to contemporary representative democracies -- indeed, it is a necessary functional corrective to the modern concept of representation, the element which equally belongs to the reality of the modern state. The final part of the text strives to show that it plays such a role precisely if observed from the viewpoint of Hegel's teachings on the constitution. In Hegel, namely, the estate assembly does not occupy the place which, in modern representative systems, belongs to the parliament -- in Hegel's constitutional model, that place is occupied by the monarch -- but is instead conceived as a mediatory organ positioned between the supreme state authority and the people. In other words, the estate assembly is the second instance of representation in which the plurality of civil society and the subjective freedom of individuals come into political prominence. Adapted from the source document.
The author describes the stages of creation of fragments of which the text on constitution is composed, & points to the historical events which directly influenced Hegel's work on the text. He further clarifies the criteria of selection of fragments for the Croatian translation & the manner in which they have been connected, i.e., in which the text has been organized. Finally, the author sets forth the characteristics of the Croatian translation. Adapted from the source document.
The starting point in this article is Hegel's mature understanding of civil society as the birthplace of the modern meaning of the concept. Since this understanding is primarily the consequence of Hegel's coming to terms with political economy, the author problematizes Hegel's first attempt at incorporating modern economic topics into ethical totality in the 1802 Article on Natural Law. It is shown how the fundamental paradox of the first variety of Hegel's science of the state is his effort to renew the classical natural law framework in circumstances of modern economic & political life. It is for this reason that Hegel fails to see the full extent of the emancipatory potential & the specifically modern character of the system of economic & private-legal interdependence of individuals, thus, on the one hand, interpreting these as the consequence of the disintegration of antique ethical life while, on the other hand, in the construction of ethical totality, placing its members in the estate of the unfree. It is precisely due to this historical point of origin of these systems & the ways they incorporate into ethical totality that the article on natural law, concludes the author, cannot be seen as the place where Hegel finally formulated his theory of civil society. Adapted from the source document.
The author sees Schmitt's understanding of the political as a division into adversary groups that implies the possibility of physical liquidations of people, based on the conditioning of the political by the taxonomy of liberal thought, whose most consistent manifestation is the age of technology of the 20th century. According to Schmitt, contemporary liberalism understood as the age of technology represents an attempt at eliminating all the contentious issues of human survival through the faith in unlimited technological progress i.e. enabling communication by avoiding the issue of correctness at all cost. Based on Strauss' criticism of Schmitt, the author argues that Schmitt's concept of the political can be understood as the first step in the renunciation of such communication by revealing its disguised politicalness i.e. as a warning that avoiding the issue of correctness is the most dangerous response to it. In that case, however, the political as understood by Schmitt, by its logic aims to be eventually overcome, since its rationale beyond the age of technology lies exclusively in opening the space for asking the pertinent questions on the conditions & the goals of the survival of the human race. In the second part of the paper the author looks into the possibility that Schmitt's concept of the political, with Derrida's help, can be analyzed by using the concept of amity as its starting point. The enemy would be a figure of laying oneself open to death in the other, by which a friendly relationship is freed from its natural foundations & fraternization, retaining in amity a moment of a thoughtful decision for the other & preventing its degradation into a mere technique of cultivating friendship. References. Adapted from the source document.
