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Abstract.  Extensive decentralization and devolution efforts among industrialized nations throughout the 1980s and 1990s call for a closer look at the effect these trends have on public policy. This article investigates the impact of these trends on the environmental performance of industrialized countries. There are two competing hypotheses as to how federalism and other multilevel governance structures affect the environmental performance of countries. The first stresses that the resulting institutional fragmentation and regulatory unpredictability is detrimental to the protection of the environment. An alternative hypothesis emphasizes that multilevel systems fare better regarding environmental performance because they can effectively respond to local needs and encourage innovation at the sub‐national level. Based on OECD air pollution data, the study finds that multilevel structures affect the way in which important determinants of environmental performance work. Thus, corporatist accommodation structures, which are known to enhance environmental policy, do so primarily in multi‐tiered systems. A high level of economic development, on the other hand, which has also been shown to contribute to environmental performance, does so mainly in countries that are characterized by weak multilevel structures. The article discusses theoretical and practical implications of these findings.

Examines government induced problems of democracy through deliberative and participatory criticisms; finds criticisms are relevant, but not entirely justified; based on Swiss drug policy developed through cooperation of public and private organizations.

The article examines the horizontal and vertical fiscal relations as explanatory factors of the interaction dynamics between levels of government in Switzerland. It presents the intergovernmental financial relations in Switzerland, comparing them to those in other federal countries and outlining the current reforms of the equalization system and the distribution of tasks. The author analyzes the effect the fiscal relations have on the intergovernmental interaction dynamics and discusses the potential implications of the current reforms for Swiss federalism. She demonstrates that the interaction dynamics that result from the financial relations are characterized by compensation, multilevel coordination and more rarely by unilateralism. The transformation of the financial relations that result from the current reforms, in particular the weakening of existing coordination structures, may lead to increased unilateralism and thus reduce the mediative capacity of Swiss federalism. Yet, the reform process also shows how durable the complex coordination structures are, which should be eliminated by the reforms.

AbstractThe inconsistent policy outcomes, the increasing cantonal veto‐power and the general lack of central governance capacity are the main criticisms addressed when discussing Swiss federalism. This article examines the variables that are likely to modify the federal configuration in order to provide conclusions about the necessity of institutional reforms of federalism. It argues that the belief in the necessity for institutional reforms is derived from a purely institutionalist approach to Swiss federalism which tends to neglect important explanatory factors, e.g. the strategic interaction of decision makers. Consequently, it seems more promising to change the dominant strategies of the decision makers and the implementing authorities. Thus, the federal government could make it profitable for the cantons to rely on the center for assistance in order to gain control over the policy outcomes; and the cantons' veto‐position could be tempered by a more systematic integration of cantons as institutionalized corporate actors.

"Die Autoren gehen der Frage nach, ob föderative Strukturen dem umweltpolitischen Fortschritt dienlich oder hinderlich sind. Während qualitative Ländervergleiche auf die Relevanz föderativer Strukturen hinweisen, zeigen makro-quantitative Analysen keinen systematischen Auswirkungen föderativer Strukturen auf die Umweltperformanz. Der Betrag ergänzt diese Ergebnisse, indem er föderative Strukturen mehrdimensional definiert und deren Einfluss im Kontext anderer Erklärungsfaktoren betrachtet. Basierend auf OECD-Umweltdaten vergleichen die Autoren die Umweltperformanz hoch industrialisierter Länder gemessen an einem Index bestehend aus mehreren Performanzindikatoren. Die Autoren führen den ambivalenten Zusammenhang zwischen föderativen Strukturen und Umweltperformanz darauf zurück, dass die föderative Struktur eines Landes eine bedeutende intervenierende Einflussgröße ist, welche Akteurskonstellationen beeinflusst. Es zeigt sich, dass in von Mehrebenenstrukturen geprägten Ländern, wo der Staat in seiner Handlungsfähigkeit beschränkt ist, korporative Akteure eine zentrale Rolle zu Gunsten der Umwelt spielen." (Autorenreferat)