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This book, with the title Coalition rule - bloc rule - multiple rule, deals with the development of the forms of government that have been put into practice in Swedish municipalities during the period 1952-2002. Forms of government refer to how the power, in the form of chairmanship of local administrations, has been distributed between the majority and minority in the different municipal councils. Two levels are involved in this study. First a national investigation, which for the main part of the period is done in the form of a total survey. Second, more detailed case studies applicable to the development in the county of Kronoberg, Småland. As the title indicates the development of the forms of government in Swedish municipalities can be classified into three main phases. The first phase, coalition rule, means that the majority and the minority shared chairmanships of local administrations. This was valid at the time of the starting-point of the study and continued until the beginning of the 1970s. The second phase, bloc rule, was seriously modelled during the first half of the 1970s and implied that one of the traditional political blocs had all the chairmanships in a municipality. The third and last phase, multiple rule, can be said to have started in the mid 1990s. This phase was characterised by softened bloc politics, among other things as a consequence of the fact that the Green Party and various local parties had the position as the balance of power in considerably more municipalities. The theoretical framework of the study is composed by the concepts of conflict and consensus, political culture, practice, hegemony and coalition formation. These five elements seem to be interrelated, and they should serve as suitable instruments of analysis. This should make the empirical results more possible to generalise. Conflict and consensus can be connected to the political culture by the fact that the political culture in a municipality can be characterised by either conflict or consensus. The political culture can then lead to a certain practice. For example, under a long succession of terms of office, a system is applied with as far-reaching majority marks as the law allows, where one of the traditional political blocs always is in power in the municipality. There is also an ambition to develop the theoretical insights better, in particular in two cases. First, there is an effort to formulate ideal models of municipal politics on the basis of the conception of hegemony. Second, there is an attempt to integrate the human factor in the theories of coalition formation.

The primary aim of this study is to provide a deeper and more complete understanding of why the great municipal amalgamation (storkommunreformen) during the 1940s became the political solution to the problem that the Government believed many of Sweden's municipalities had in satisfactorily providing for a local welfare society. The study also describes the results of this large-scale reorganization process. The events examined include the political decision-making process at the national level that took place during 1939-1949, as well as the regional/local realization of these decisions during 1946-1952. The parliamentary treatment of the municipal division issue should be viewed as a good example of what researchers have termed a Swedish decision-making model. One clear manifestation of this was the fact that the national commission that investigated the question primarily formulated the principles for the reform. The committee's proposal received strong endorsements in the reports from the reviewers of the proposal. The government authorities and many of the municipalities felt that a new division of municipalities was justified. Opposition that did occur came mostly from rural municipalities with small populations. Many of these municipalities believed that the present municipal divisions functioned well as they were. Of those municipalities that were affected by amalgamation, 39 percent of them did not agree with the decision. The majority of these could agree to merge with other municipalities, but not with the municipalities stipulated by the authorities. Considering the fact that the then current divisions were based on a long tradition, demands for retaining independence could have been greater. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that 66 percent of all larger municipalities were formed using some level of force. This still indicated a relatively widely distributed opposition to the amalgamation decisions, however.

Arguments invoking increased functional efficiency have had a profound impact on local government reforms in advanced democracies during the past 60 years. Consequently, most mature democracies have implemented municipal amalgamation reforms, often through top-down coercion. In this article, we demonstrate how far central governments have been willing to go, in terms of coercion, by providing an in-depth historical account of Swedish municipal amalgamations between 1952 and 1974. Debates on amalgamation reforms have typically revolved around pros and cons of mergers. But very few discussions have addressed the more fundamental moral problem of enforcing amalgamations through coercion. Often, large-scale mergers are carried through against the expressed will of municipalities who wish to remain self-governing. In this article, we present a normative defense of strong local self-government, based partly on values of individual autonomy, and partly on group-based human rights, and we show how coerced amalgamations are at odds with these values.

A remarkable reform in modern Swedish political history was the transformation of the local government structure between 1952 and 1974. In a mere 22 years, the number of municipalities was reduced from 2,498 to 277. This study aims to answer how such large-scale reforms could come about politically, particularly since much of the literature on institutions and political reform asserts that carrying out large-scale political change should be a difficult task. Two opposing stories of institutional change are presented: evolutionary accounts, which see the amalgamations as rational adaptations to changing circumstances, are contrasted with a social conflict perspective, which explains amalgamations in terms of their distributional consequences. By investigating the processes leading up to this vast restructuring of Swedish local political geography, we demonstrate that an understanding of these reforms as rational adaptations to changing circumstances, made on the basis of consensus among leading political actors, is not accurate. The reforms were not as uncontroversial and non-conflictual as they often have been portrayed. Our results weaken the evolutionary approach to institutional change, whilst supporting the social conflict perspective. ; article; 2018-09-26T08:31:33.473+02:00

Arguments invoking increased functional efficiency have had a profound impact on local government reforms in advanced democracies during the past 60 years. Consequently, most mature democracies have implemented municipal amalgamation reforms, often through top-down coercion. In this article, we demonstrate how far central governments have been willing to go, in terms of coercion, by providing an in-depth historical account of Swedish municipal amalgamations between 1952 and 1974. Debates on amalgamation reforms have typically revolved around pros and cons of mergers. But very few discussions have addressed the more fundamental moral problem of enforcing amalgamations through coercion. Often, large-scale mergers are carried through against the expressed will of municipalities who wish to remain self-governing. In this article, we present a normative defense of strong local self-government, based partly on values of individual autonomy, and partly on group-based human rights, and we show how coerced amalgamations are at odds with these values.

Arguments invoking increased functional efficiency have had a profound impact on local government reforms in advanced democracies during the past 60 years. Consequently, most mature democracies have implemented municipal amalgamation reforms, often through top-down coercion. In this article, we demonstrate how far central governments have been willing to go, in terms of coercion, by providing an in-depth historical account of Swedish municipal amalgamations between 1952 and 1974. Debates on amalgamation reforms have typically revolved around pros and cons of mergers. But very few discussions have addressed the more fundamental moral problem of enforcing amalgamations through coercion. Often, large-scale mergers are carried through against the expressed will of municipalities who wish to remain self-governing. In this article, we present a normative defense of strong local self-government, based partly on values of individual autonomy, and partly on group-based human rights, and we show how coerced amalgamations are at odds with these values.

Under perioden 1952–1974 genomfördes ett antal omvälvande förändringar av den svenska kommunstrukturen. På 22 år gick Sverige från 2 498 till 278 kommuner. Hur blir sådana omfattande reformer möjliga? Vi besvarar denna fråga genom att analysera det politiska spelet bakom reformerna. Vi undersöker (a) de huvudsakliga argumenten för kommunsammanläggningarna, (b) grad av konsensus bakom besluten, (c) om, och i sådant fall vilka alternativ till reformerna som presenterades under de debatter som föregick dem, samt slutligen (d) hur man politiskt lyckades genomdriva dessa reformer. Vi ställer två olika förklaringsmodeller mot varandra; evolutionära förklaringar, som betraktar sammanläggningarna som rationella tillpassningar till förändrade omvärldsförhållanden, ställs mot ett socialt konfliktperspektiv som förklarar sammanläggningarna utifrån deras fördelningseffekter. Vi argumenterar för att vår analys av de svenska kommunsammanläggningarna ger stöd åt det sociala konfliktperspektivet.

During 1952–1974 the Swedish municipal structure was radically reformed. In 22 years the number of municipalities was reduced from 2 498 to 278. What makes such large-scale reforms possible? We answer this question by analyzing the politics behind the amalgamation reforms. We investigate (a) the main arguments for the amalgamations, (b) the degree of consensus behind the decisions, (c) if any alternatives were presented in the debates leading up to the reforms, and finally (d) how it was politically possible to push through these reforms. Two different models of explanation are put to the test; evolutionary accounts, which see the amalgamations as rational adaptations to changing social and economic circumstances are contrasted with a social conflict perspective, which explains the amalgamations in terms of their distributional consequences. We argue that an analysis of Sweden's municipal amalgamation reforms supports the social conflict perspective.