Suchergebnisse

Akcesja do Unii Europejskiej dokonana na podstawie art. 90 ust. 1 Konstytucji RP była w sferze wartości zgodna z celem tego przepisu i spełniała warunki jego zastosowania. Także później, w okresie członkostwa w Unii Europejskiej, polska praktyka ustrojowa nie odbiegała od unijnych standardów aksjologicznych. Sposób rozumienia demokratycznego państwa prawnego, o którym mowa w art. 2 Konstytucji, był bowiem spójny z treścią wartości wspólnych państwom członkowskim, stanowiących zgodnie z art. 2 TUE ustrojową podstawę Unii. Istotą systemu tych wspólnych wartości jest to, by realizowanie przez organy władzy publicznej woli obywateli wyrażonej w wolnych wyborach następowało z poszanowaniem zasad państwa prawnego, na które składają się przede wszystkim: podział władzy, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem niezależności sądów i niezawisłości sędziów, pluralizm polityczny, ochrona praw jednostki, respektowanie praw mniejszości. Nieprzestrzeganie wartości, o których mowa w art. 2 Konstytucji oraz w art. 2 TUE, podważyłoby cel i treść art. 90 ust. 1 Konstytucji, a w świetle wiążącego RP prawa unijnego – mogłoby narazić Polskę na objęcie jej mechanizmem kontroli przewidzianym w art. 7 TUE.

Akcesja do Unii Europejskiej dokonana na podstawie art. 90 ust. 1 Konstytucji RP była w sferze wartości zgodna z celem tego przepisu i spełniała warunki jego zastosowania. Także później, w okresie członkostwa w Unii Europejskiej, polska praktyka ustrojowa nie odbiegała od unijnych standardów aksjologicznych. Sposób rozumienia demokratycznego państwa prawnego, o którym mowa w art. 2 Konstytucji, był bowiem spójny z treścią wartości wspólnych państwom członkowskim, stanowiących zgodnie z art. 2 TUE ustrojową podstawę Unii. Istotą systemu tych wspólnych wartości jest to, by realizowanie przez organy władzy publicznej woli obywateli wyrażonej w wolnych wyborach następowało z poszanowaniem zasad państwa prawnego, na które składają się przede wszystkim: podział władzy, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem niezależności sądów i niezawisłości sędziów, pluralizm polityczny, ochrona praw jednostki, respektowanie praw mniejszości. Nieprzestrzeganie wartości, o których mowa w art. 2 Konstytucji oraz w art. 2 TUE, podważyłoby cel i treść art. 90 ust. 1 Konstytucji, a w świetle wiążącego RP prawa unijnego – mogłoby narazić Polskę na objęcie jej mechanizmem kontroli przewidzianym w art. 7 TUE. ; In the field of values, the accession to the European Union carried out pursuant to Article 90(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland was in line with the purpose of this article and met the conditions for its application. Also later, already during membership in the European Union, Polish political practice did not differ from EU axiological standards. The understanding of a democratic state governed by the rule of law as referred to in Article 2 of the Constitution was consistent with the content of values common to the Member States, which, in accordance with Article 2 of the TEU, constituted the political foundation of the Union. The essence of the system of these common values is that the fulfilment by public authorities of the citizens' will expressed in free elections is carried out with respect for the principles of the rule of law. These principles include mainly: the separation of powers, with particular regard to the independence of courts and the independence of judges, political pluralism, protection of individual rights and respect for minority rights. Failure to observe the values referred to in Article 2 of the Constitution and Article 2 of the TEU would undermine the purpose and content of Article 90(1) of the Constitution. According to the Constitution, and in the light of EU law binding for Poland, it could expose Poland to the control mechanism provided for in Article 7 TEU.

AbstractAccording to the PCCP thesis, the probability of a conditional A → C is the conditional probability P(C|A). This claim is undermined by Lewis' triviality results, which purport to show that apart from trivial cases, PCCP is not true. In the present article we show that the only rational, "Dutch Book-resistant" extension of the agent's beliefs concerning non-conditional sentences A and C to the conditional A → C is by assuming that P(A → C) = P(C|A) (i.e., in accord with PCCP). In other cases a diachronic Dutch Book against the agent can be constructed. There is a tension between our findings and Lewis' results, which needs to be explained. Therefore, we present a probability space which corresponds in a natural way to the diachronic Dutch Book—and which allows the conditional A → C to be interpreted as an event in a mathematically sound way. It also allows to formalize the notion of conditionalizing A → C on ¬C which plays a crucial role in Lewis' proof. Our conclusion is that Lewis' proof is circular, so it cannot be considered to be a sound argument against PCCP.

AbstractIt is a well-known fact that mathematics plays a crucial role in physics; in fact, it is virtually impossible to imagine contemporary physics without it. But it is questionable whether mathematical concepts could ever play such a role in psychology or philosophy. In this paper, we set out to examine a rather unobvious example of the application of topology, in the form of the theory of persons proposed by Kurt Lewin in his Principles of Topological Psychology. Our aim is to show that this branch of mathematics can furnish a natural conceptual system for Gestalt psychology, in that it provides effective tools for describing global qualitative aspects of the latter's object of investigation. We distinguish three possible ways in which mathematics can contribute to this: explanation, explication (construed in the spirit of Carnap) and metaphor. We hold that all three of these can be usefully characterized as throwing light on their subject matter, and argue that in each case this contrasts with the role of explanations in physics. Mathematics itself, we argue, provides something different from such explanations when applied in the field of psychology, and this is nevertheless still cognitively fruitful.

The socio-political situation in Central Europe in the years after the fall of communism shows a sharp break from that system, but the region is not yet characterized by fully-formed and mature liberal democracies. These countries are still undergoing a phase of transition. At the heart of non-military security issues in Central Europe are problems that are new for these societies, and this novelty makes the problems especially challenging. There must be fostered among national populations a more sophisticated understanding of the free-market economy and of democratic principles. Particularly significant is the search for identity which is taking place on many levels – ethnic, cultural, religious and historical among others. This experience is important not only for Central European countries; it is also important for the European Union, whose members in 2004 they will become. This challenge is part of understanding the factors influencing the development of a democratic culture.

Unilateral climate policy can be detrimental to global climate protection. Our objective is to provide insight into such a policy, to quantify the risk of carbon leakage, and to investigate the effects related to potential anti-leakage measures. We analyze existing definitions of carbon leakage and propose an alternative, rigorous one, which is different in three respects. The definition is then tested using computable general equilibrium analysis of the global economy and decomposition analysis. We identify a list of parameters that affect not only the magnitude but also the sign of the carbon leakage rate. Manipulating elasticities of substitution suggests that carbon leakage can be either positive or negative. Computable general equilibrium models, which are widely applied, including by the European Commission in this area, should be transparent, and their assumptions call for careful validation. We find that emission limits are properly distributed between sectors covered by the European Union Emissions Trading System and other sectors for the first commitment period (ended in 2012) but not for the second one (ending in 2020), where the target for the non-trading sectors should be reduced relative to the target for the trading sectors in order to equlize marginal abatement costs.

Unilateral climate policy by the EU can be detrimental for global climate protection. Our purpose is to provide an economic analysis of this policy, to quantify the risk of carbon leakage, and to investigate economic effects related to the potential anti-leakage policy measures. We analyze existing definitions of carbon leakage and propose a new rigorous one. This is then tested using computable general equilibrium analysis for unilateral carbon dioxide abatement programs in the European Union in 2020, adopted under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (8%, 20% and 30% emission reduction relative to 1990). Our model of the global economy is disaggregated into three regions (the EU, the rest of the Annex I and non-Annex I countries). The analysis includes a decomposition of change in carbon emission using Logarithmic Mean Divista Index. While some anti-leakage measures (such as border tax adjustment on imports) reduce carbon leakage significantly, some of them are less effective. We found that output-based allocation of free emission permits to energy-intensive and trade exposed sectors reduce the leakage rate slightly, and a clean development mechanism -- depending how it is defined -- can either remove or increase carbon leakage. The results crucially depend on technical assumptions adopted in such models. We identified a list of parameters (like intra-import and Armington elasticities) which affect not only the magnitude but also the sign of carbon leakage rate. Manipulating with elasticities of substitution in production function suggests that in reaction to the unilateral action of the EU, the other regions may both increase or decrease their carbon emissions. Even though we are positive about computable general equilibrium models? application in this policy area, their policy simulations cannot be directly treated as policy recommendations without a careful validation of their assumptions.