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The thesis of the article is the claim that the democratic constitution should contain elements that are relatively constant, necessary to preserve its identity. As an example of such an element, I point to the principle of autonomy contained implicitly in Article 30 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, which I interpret from the perspective of Kant's theory. In this approach, the principle of autonomy is a kind of "fundamental constitutional essentials", and thus defines the importance of two types of "constitutional essentials": (a) the political system and the legislative process, and (b) the constitutional system of rights. Kant's interpretation of this principle emphasizes its importance not only in the shade to the content of sub-constitutional legal norms (prohibition of instrumentalization), but also the form of their establishment (duty of justification). Violation of constitutional legislative procedures would also be violation the principle of political autonomy of citizens. ; Tezą artykułu jest twierdzenie, że demokratyczna konstytucja powinna zawierać elementy względnie stałe znaczeniowo, niezbędne dla zachowania jej tożsamości. Jako przykład takiego elementu wskazuję zasadę autonomii zawartą implicite w artykule 30 Konstytucji Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, który intepretuję z perspektywy teorii Kantowskiej. W takim ujęciu zasada autonomii stanowi swoiste "fundamentalne constitutional essentials", a więc określa znaczenie dwóch rodzajów "constitutional essentials": (a) politycznego ustroju i procesu prawodawczego oraz (b) systemu konstytucyjnych praw. Kantowska interpretacja zasady autonomii podkreśla jej wagę nie tylko w odcieniu do treści pod-konstytucyjnych norm prawnych (zakaz instrumentalizacji), ale też formy ich ustanowienia (nakaz uzasadnienia). Naruszenie konstytucyjnych procedur prawodawczych stanowiłoby w takim razie naruszenie zasady autonomii politycznej obywateli.

Tezą artykułu jest twierdzenie, że demokratyczna konstytucja powinna zawierać elementy względnie stałe znaczeniowo, niezbędne dla zachowania jej tożsamości. Jako przykład takiego elementu wskazuję zasadę autonomii zawartą implicite w artykule 30 Konstytucji Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, który intepretuję z perspektywy teorii Kantowskiej. W takim ujęciu zasada autonomii stanowi swoiste "fundamentalne constitutional essentials", a więc określa znaczenie dwóch rodzajów "constitutional essentials": (a) politycznego ustroju i procesu prawodawczego oraz (b) systemu konstytucyjnych praw. Kantowska interpretacja zasady autonomii podkreśla jej wagę nie tylko w odcieniu do treści pod-konstytucyjnych norm prawnych (zakaz instrumentalizacji), ale też formy ich ustanowienia (nakaz uzasadnienia). Naruszenie konstytucyjnych procedur prawodawczych stanowiłoby w takim razie naruszenie zasady autonomii politycznej obywateli. ; The thesis of the article is the claim that the democratic constitution should contain elements that are relatively constant, necessary to preserve its identity. As an example of such an element, I point to the principle of autonomy contained implicitly in Article 30 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, which I interpret from the perspective of Kant's theory. In this approach, the principle of autonomy is a kind of "fundamental constitutional essentials", and thus defines the importance of two types of "constitutional essentials": (a) the political system and the legislative process, and (b) the constitutional system of rights. Kant's interpretation of this principle emphasizes its importance not only in the shade to the content of sub-constitutional legal norms (prohibition of instrumentalization), but also the form of their establishment (duty of justification). Violation of constitutional legislative procedures would also be violation the principle of political autonomy of citizens.

The purpose of this article is to attempt to answer the question whether the combination of liberal constitutionalism and democracy is accidental, or whether it is possible to observe an important connection between the two elements. In the first part I discuss the so-called democratic paradox resulting from the tension between the principle of democratic self-determination and liberal limitations connected with the rule of law and the guarantees of the rights of an individual. Indeed, modern democracy is a mixed system consisting of democratic procedures contained in the constitutional framework of the representative system. Part two of the article deals with the tension between radically understood democracy and constitutionalism. From the point of view of democracy as such, any – also constitutional – limitation of the democratic will is seen as undemocratic. Is constitutionalism therefore irreconcilable with democracy? In the third part I point to such an understanding of constitutional liberalism as emphasises the role of civil rights as constitutive elements of the democratic system. In this approach, liberal constitutionalism is a form of reinforcement of civic subjectivity. Liberal constitutional rights are to facilitate democratic participation and the protection of pluralism. Thus, an affirmation of pluralism leads to perceiving liberal constitutionalism as being closely related to democracy.

The subject of the article is the issue of the political nature of the constitution and its scientific description from the point of view of pure Kelsen's theory of law. We propose in it the thesis that although politics is not an object of legal knowledge, it is a necessary condition of the ontology of constitution. According to this theory, the cognition and description of the constitution (metaphorically speaking: its epistemology) relate to the content of valid norms, while its ontology consists of two elements: legal authorization and political will. The ontology of the constitution has a two-fold character: first, its creation and effectiveness is based primarily on the will of the constitution's creator and on the will of entities applying the constitution (political aspect); secondly, its objectively validity presupposes that the creator of the constitution has a normative authorization to establish it (legal aspect). The inclusion by pure theory of law of the political at the ontological level is concomitant with its complete removal from the epistemological field. the consequence of such a cleansing of the cognitive field is, firstly, the dependence of the description on the condition of efficacy, i.e. ultimately on the acts of will of the subjects performing the functions of state organs, and, secondly, the 'defencelessness' in the event that the legal researcher finds a content incompatibility between the constitution and the acts of its application. ; The subject of the article is the issue of the political nature of the constitution and its scientific description from the point of view of pure Kelsen's theory of law. We propose in it the thesis that although politics is not an object of legal knowledge, it is a necessary condition of the ontology of constitution. According to this theory, the cognition and description of the constitution (metaphorically speaking: its epistemology) relate to the content of valid norms, while its ontology consists of two elements: legal authorization and political will. The ontology of the constitution has a two-fold character: first, its creation and effectiveness is based primarily on the will of the constitution's creator and on the will of entities applying the constitution (political aspect); secondly, its objectively validity presupposes that the creator of the constitution has a normative authorization to establish it (legal aspect). The inclusion by pure theory of law of the political at the ontological level is concomitant with its complete removal from the epistemological field. the consequence of such a cleansing of the cognitive field is, firstly, the dependence of the description on the condition of efficacy, i.e. ultimately on the acts of will of the subjects performing the functions of state organs, and, secondly, the 'defencelessness' in the event that the legal researcher finds a content incompatibility between the constitution and the acts of its application. ; Przedmiotem artykułu jest zagadnienie polityczności konstytucji i jej naukowego opisu z punktu widzenia czystej Kelsenowskiej teorii prawa. Proponujemy w nim tezę, że choć polityczność nie jest przedmiotem poznania prawniczego, to jest ona koniecznym warunkiem ontologii konstytucji. Zgodnie z tą teorią poznanie i opis konstytucji (metaforycznie mówiąc: jej epistemologia) odnoszą się do treści obowiązujących norm, jej ontologia zaś składa się z dwóch elementów: upoważnienia prawnego i woli politycznej. Ontologia konstytucji ma dwojaki charakter: po pierwsze, jej powstanie i skuteczność opierają się przede wszystkim na woli twórcy konstytucji oraz na woli podmiotów stosujących konstytucję (aspekt polityczny); po drugie, jej obiektywnie obowiązująca ważność zakłada posiadanie przez twórcę konstytucji normatywnego upoważnienia do jej ustanowienia (aspekt prawny). Uwzględnienie przez czystą teorię prawa tego, co polityczne na poziomie ontologicznym, jest równoczesne z całkowitym usunięciem go z pola epistemologicznego. Konsekwencją takiego oczyszczenia pola poznawczego jest, po pierwsze, uzależnienie opisu od warunku skuteczności, czyli ostatecznie od aktów woli podmiotów wykonujących funkcje organów państwowych, a po drugie, "bezbronność" w przypadku stwierdzenia przez badacza prawa niezgodności treściowej między konstytucją a aktami jej stosowania.

The subject of the article is the issue of the political nature of the constitution and its scientific description from the point of view of pure Kelsen's theory of law. We propose in it the thesis that although politics is not an object of legal knowledge, it is a necessary condition of the ontology of constitution. According to this theory, the cognition and description of the constitution (metaphorically speaking: its epistemology) relate to the content of valid norms, while its ontology consists of two elements: legal authorization and political will. The ontology of the constitution has a two-fold character: first, its creation and effectiveness is based primarily on the will of the constitution's creator and on the will of entities applying the constitution (political aspect); secondly, its objectively validity presupposes that the creator of the constitution has a normative authorization to establish it (legal aspect). The inclusion by pure theory of law of the political at the ontological level is concomitant with its complete removal from the epistemological field. the consequence of such a cleansing of the cognitive field is, firstly, the dependence of the description on the condition of efficacy, i.e. ultimately on the acts of will of the subjects performing the functions of state organs, and, secondly, the 'defencelessness' in the event that the legal researcher finds a content incompatibility between the constitution and the acts of its application. ; The subject of the article is the issue of the political nature of the constitution and its scientific description from the point of view of pure Kelsen's theory of law. We propose in it the thesis that although politics is not an object of legal knowledge, it is a necessary condition of the ontology of constitution. According to this theory, the cognition and description of the constitution (metaphorically speaking: its epistemology) relate to the content of valid norms, while its ontology consists of two elements: legal authorization and political will. The ontology of the constitution has a two-fold character: first, its creation and effectiveness is based primarily on the will of the constitution's creator and on the will of entities applying the constitution (political aspect); secondly, its objectively validity presupposes that the creator of the constitution has a normative authorization to establish it (legal aspect). The inclusion by pure theory of law of the political at the ontological level is concomitant with its complete removal from the epistemological field. the consequence of such a cleansing of the cognitive field is, firstly, the dependence of the description on the condition of efficacy, i.e. ultimately on the acts of will of the subjects performing the functions of state organs, and, secondly, the 'defencelessness' in the event that the legal researcher finds a content incompatibility between the constitution and the acts of its application. ; Przedmiotem artykułu jest zagadnienie polityczności konstytucji i jej naukowego opisu z punktu widzenia czystej Kelsenowskiej teorii prawa. Proponujemy w nim tezę, że choć polityczność nie jest przedmiotem poznania prawniczego, to jest ona koniecznym warunkiem ontologii konstytucji. Zgodnie z tą teorią poznanie i opis konstytucji (metaforycznie mówiąc: jej epistemologia) odnoszą się do treści obowiązujących norm, jej ontologia zaś składa się z dwóch elementów: upoważnienia prawnego i woli politycznej. Ontologia konstytucji ma dwojaki charakter: po pierwsze, jej powstanie i skuteczność opierają się przede wszystkim na woli twórcy konstytucji oraz na woli podmiotów stosujących konstytucję (aspekt polityczny); po drugie, jej obiektywnie obowiązująca ważność zakłada posiadanie przez twórcę konstytucji normatywnego upoważnienia do jej ustanowienia (aspekt prawny). Uwzględnienie przez czystą teorię prawa tego, co polityczne na poziomie ontologicznym, jest równoczesne z całkowitym usunięciem go z pola epistemologicznego. Konsekwencją takiego oczyszczenia pola poznawczego jest, po pierwsze, uzależnienie opisu od warunku skuteczności, czyli ostatecznie od aktów woli podmiotów wykonujących funkcje organów państwowych, a po drugie, "bezbronność" w przypadku stwierdzenia przez badacza prawa niezgodności treściowej między konstytucją a aktami jej stosowania.

In the presented article we develop the thesis that constitutional courts may be treated as one of the key elements guaranteeing the proper functioning of representative democracy if they secure the democratic "chain of delegation". Following the theory of Hans Kelsen, we employ a normative concept giving the answer to how a constitutional court should act to fulfil such a role. According to Kelsen's perspective, the main threat to representative democracy is the "alternative legislative procedure", a non-constitutional form of legislation based solely on the political will and in consequence deconstructing the constitutional chain of delegation. The guarantee of constitutionality means the restoration of an equal representation in the legislative procedure based on the majorityminority rule. As the guardian of the democratic legislative procedure, the constitutional court should be a ground for the "virtual representation" of all the parties to a democratic dispute. In result it prevents the transformation of representative democracy into majority democracy.

In the presented article we develop the thesis that constitutional courts may be treated as one of the key elements guaranteeing the proper functioning of representative democracy if they secure the democratic "chain of delegation". Following the theory of Hans Kelsen, we employ a normative concept giving the answer to how a constitutional court should act to fulfil such a role. According to Kelsen's perspective, the main threat to representative democracy is the "alternative legislative procedure", a non-constitutional form of legislation based solely on the political will and in consequence deconstructing the constitutional chain of delegation. The guarantee of constitutionality means the restoration of an equal representation in the legislative procedure based on the majorityminority rule. As the guardian of the democratic legislative procedure, the constitutional court should be a ground for the "virtual representation" of all the parties to a democratic dispute. In result it prevents the transformation of representative democracy into majority democracy.

The paper is discussing the concept of shared sovereignty, coined by Jürgen Habermas, along with his theory of citizenship of the European Union. In particular, the Author of the paper makes reference to Habermas' model of EU citizenship in the light of the current legislation, policy and practice. The reference is made in an attempt to release whether the current shape, or condition, of European citizenship corresponds to its conceptual content and to clarify the general direction for the change as it could be fully implemented. All those issues are mentioned with a view to answer a very fundamental question, namely how to ensure the democratic legitimacy of the European Union? W swojej koncepcji dzielonej suwerenności ludu J. Habermas, nawiązując niejako do filozofii I. Kanta, próbuje odpowiedzieć na zasadnicze pytanie: jaki kształt musiałoby przybrać obywatelstwo Unii Europejskiej, aby jednostki mogły same siebie postrzegać jako obywateli UE? Niniejszy artykuł stanowi próbę odniesienia przyjętego przez J. Habermasa abstrakcyjnego modelu obywatelstwa UE do obowiązujących uregulowań prawnych oraz praktyki politycznej. Analiza przyjętego przez J. Habermasa modelu obywatelstwa UE posłuży również ukazaniu, na ile obecny kształt obywatelstwa unijnego odpowiada jego konceptualnej treści, a także w jakim kierunku muszą podążać zmiany, aby w pełni ją zrealizować. Wszystkie wymienione powyżej zagadnienia spaja fundamentalne pytanie: jak zapewnić Unii Europejskiej demokratyczną legitymizację?

Democratic politics creates a specific 'chain of representation'. According to Article 104 of the Polish Constitution, the MPs are the representatives of the entire Nation. The understanding of the "entire Nation" allows to determine whether national identity is open and inclusive, or closed and exclusive. One can distinguish two ideal types of a nation: heterogeneous and homogeneous. The first type is connected to the universalist understanding of "constitutional essentials", the second to the particularistic one. In the paper, we pointed out the elements of heterogeneity in the text of Polish constitutions as well as the elements of homogeneity in the constitutional practice. Religion becomes an important factor influencing the interpretation and application of the constitution. The heterogeneous concept of the nation and the universalist "constitutional essentials" can be narrowed down in the political practice. The particularistic elements of the constitution and the homogenizing tendencies present in the application of the constitution might lead to polarization. In such a case, there would be a radical reinterpretation of the entire chain of delegation.

Poland has been in a phase of change since 2015. The constitutional system of the Third Republic is being restructured. The Judiciary, media, schools and universities are the main focus of attention. This restructure is being celebrated by the government as a renewal of the Polish state, but is being branded by the opposition as the destruction of the Polish Republic in favour of an illiberal democracy. In this already very difficult situation, Poland was confronted with the major challenges posed by a pandemic. What effects will the crisis have on the restructuring of the constitutional system? At present, it seems that the pandemic is acting as a catalyst for those changes. This book aims to provide an informed commentary on those developments and what they mean for the Third Polish Republic.