Suchergebnisse

What are the implications of the trend toward granting central bank independence for partisan theories of the macroeconomy? The conventional view is that parties of the Left and Right strive to achieve distinctive macroeconomic outcomes when in government. However, when faced with an independent central bank, parties of the Left may prove unable to produce their preferred partisan outcomes, whereas Right parties may be privileged in their ability to pursue their goals. Moreover, granting the central bank independence can be expected to have differing effects depending on whether Left or Right parties prevail in government. These issues are explored with a pooled time-series model of inflation and unemployment in 16 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development countries from 1961 through 1991. The results support the claim that the effects of partisan government and central bank organization are mutually contingent. The pattern of results anticipated by partisan theory only arises where central banks are under political control, whereas when central banks are independent, Left governments are disadvantaged and Right governments privileged in their ability to achieve their partisan goals. On the other hand, the effects of central bank independence also depend on the partisanship of government, casting doubt on the claim that an independent central bank always provides a "free lunch" of lower inflation with no attendant costs in terms of increased unemployment.

Explanations for the international spread of financial market liberalization have emphasized either "top-down" mechanisms (globalization, pressure from international organizations and the United States) or "bottom-up" mechanisms focusing on domestic coalitions (derived from configurations of economic interests). In contrast to these broadly structural approaches that deemphasize the choices of individuals, this article focuses on the micro-mechanisms of diffusion by emphasizing the incentives facing office-seeking leaders. It argues that politically insecure leaders are potent agents of diffusion because they are particularly likely to "learn" the lessons of financial market reformand emulate the liberalizing practices of others for two reasons. First, the hefty economic boom often associated with financial liberalization provides a tempting way to buttress their near-term grip on power. As they observe other nations in their region experiencing a boom, leaders fearful of losing office will jump on the liberalization bandwagon, accelerating regional reform cascades. Second, insecure governments may be particularly susceptible to pressure from international organizations: They have motivated biases to believe the efficiency claims of liberalizers and strong reasons to seek approval for their policies.

Explanations for the international spread of financial market liberalization have emphasized either "top-down" mechanisms (globalization, pressure from international organizations, & the US) or "bottom-up" mechanisms focusing on domestic coalitions (derived from configurations of economic interests). In contrast to these broadly structural approaches that de-emphasize the choices of individuals, this article focuses on the micro-mechanisms of diffusion by emphasizing the incentives facing office-seeking leaders. It argues that politically insecure leaders are potent agents of diffusion because they are particularly likely to "learn" the lessons of financial market reform & emulate the liberalizing practices of others for two reasons. First, the hefty economic boom often associated with financial liberalization provides a tempting way to buttress their near-term grip on power. As they observe other nations in their region experiencing a boom, leaders fearful of losing office will jump on the liberalization bandwagon, accelerating regional reform cascades. Second, insecure governments may be particularly susceptible to pressure from international organizations: They have motivated biases to believe the efficiency claims of liberalizers & strong reasons to seek approval for their policies. 3 Tables, 40 References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright 2005 The American Academy of Political and Social Science.]

What accounts for the apparent breakdown of the positive relationship between powerful trade union organizations and macroeconomic performance? Is corporatism a relic of a different age, a luxury of the long postwar boom? Although the authors answer the latter question in the negative, they do contend that existing arguments about the macroeconomic consequences of corporatism should be significantly modified to take into account the impact of the growth of public sector unions on the relationship between institutional structure of labor movements and economic outcomes. The deteriorating performance commonly attributed to corporatism in the 1980s was limited to countries in which unions in the public sector and other sectors not exposed to international competition increasingly dominated national labor movements. Encompassing trade union movements can still generate wage restraint, but only where the union movement is dominated by unions in the exposed sector that are subject to the constraints posed by international market competition.