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The trend in transfers of major conventional arms, as measured by the SIPRI trend-indicator value, is apparently changing from a downward trend since 1997 to a more or less stable trend for 2000-2002 to a slightly upward trend in 2003-2004. Financial data from national export reports show a more or less similar change. However, it is too early to judge if this is really a trend or only a matter of annual fluctuations. Russia established itself as the main supplier of major conventional weapons for the five-year period 2000-2004, replacing the USA which was the main supplier for many years. However, even Russian officials expect a decline in Russian sales in the near future since Russian equipment is mainly based on old technology and Russian military research and development is lagging far behind. Together, France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the USA made up 81% of all deliveries in 2000-2004. The combined deliveries of all 25 EU states to non-EU states made up some 19% of all deliveries in 2000-2004, making the EU the third largest exporter. China and India were the two main recipients of major conventional weapons in 2004. China is almost completely dependent on Russia for its arms imports, but its relationship is changing from a recipient of complete weapons to a recipient of components and technology to be used in Chinese weapon platforms. There are indications that China is anxious to gain access to other than Russian technology, partly because that technology is becoming outdated. India is also a major Russian client, but here Russia faces strong competition from France, the UK and other European suppliers, as well as from Israel and most recently from the USA. EU-US relations became strained in 2004 over the issue of technology transfers. The USA has been reluctant to share technology with close European allies even in joint ventures such as the F-35 JSF combat aircraft. The EU's plans to lift its arms embargo against China further strained relations. The non-binding and loosely drafted embargo was established in 1989 in reaction to Chinese human rights abuses. Today, many EU governments consider the embargo outdated and a barrier to improving Chinese-EU relations. The embargo has not stopped several European countries from supplying military technology to China, and most EU member states have argued that lifting the embargo would not mean increases in arms sales. Many EU governments feel that there should still be clear and strong limitations on the arms trade with China, either by keeping the embargo or by improving the 1998 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. The USA strongly opposes lifting the embargo in order to prevent a Chinese military build-up and has threatened the EU with sanctions if the embargo is lifted. Public transparency in arms transfers increased again slightly, mainly in the EU where several countries improved their reporting and where 10 new EU members are now obliged to report under the EU Code of Conduct. At the international level, man-portable air defense systems and light artillery were added to the UN Register of Conventional Arms. Adapted from the source document.

The global downward trend in international transfers of major weapons was reversed in 2003. Since then there has been an increase in the volume of major arms transfers as reflected in the SIPRI trend-indicator value. The change is also reflected in the financial values of global arms exports according to national reporting, which is estimated at $44-53 billion, or 0.5-0.6% of world trade, in 2004, the most recent year for which data are available. The five largest suppliers in the period 2001-2005 were Russia, the USA, France, Germany and the UK, in order according to the SIPRI trend-indicator value. The combined exports from EU member states made it the third largest exporter of major conventional weapons. Russia and the USA each accounted for roughly 30% of global deliveries of major weapons. In 2005 the five largest suppliers accounted for over 80% of total deliveries. In the period 2001-2005, 43% of Russia's deliveries went to China and 25% to India. China and India have become important to arms exporters because both are in a position to become economic powers and leaders in technology applications. The USA's relations with India are today labelled 'strategic', and the US policy is to keep India and Japan strong in order to offset China's rising regional influence. While the present volume of US transfers of major weapons to India is low, the USA seems prepared to offer the country advanced weaponry, including technology transfers and co-development of weapons. The four largest recipients of US exports in 2001-2005 were Greece, Israel, the UK and Egypt, in that order. The search for new markets and the drive to maintain existing markets sharpen international competition. In some cases this supports commercial pragmatism in national implementations of export policy; that is, markets that are not subject to international embargoes are regarded as open markets. In parallel, there is evidence of political fatigue in some governments with regard to their commitment to transparency and the UN arms export reporting mechanism, the UNROCA. The UNROCA showed large discrepancies in reported data between exports and imports, and the criteria that different countries used to decide which weapons to report and how a 'transfer' is defined remain at variance. Transparency will suffer if a tendency for commercial pragmatism in national arms export policy spreads and reduces political willingness to report on national arms exports. At the same time, it remains difficult to interpret the data that are actually being reported. Adapted from the source document.

The downward trend in major arms transfers as measured by the SIPRI trend-indicator value appears to have been reversed. In both 2001 and 2003 there were clear increases in the volumes of major weapons delivered. Russia and the USA remain the major suppliers. Their main recipients were China and India (in the case of Russia) and Taiwan, Egypt, the UK, Greece, Turkey and Japan (in the case of the USA). A continued increase in US arms transfers will influence the global trend. However, domestic factors indicate that the level of Russian arms transfers is unlikely to remain high for very much longer. The future is uncertain for the other major suppliers because of international competition and remaining uncertainty about the future potential of European development and production. The relatively small suppliers of today could achieve short-term importance, as illustrated by Canada and Uzbekistan. Events in Iraq in 2003 do not seem to have had a strong immediate impact on orders for or deliveries of major weapons. They seem instead to have supported decisions already made as a result of the war in Afghanistan. The operation in Iraq may have been carried out at a technical level beyond what most countries regard as relevant to their own defense policy or military strategy. That said, there are likely to be orders for new weapons such as precision-guided 'beyond visual range' missiles, ABM defense systems, UAVs and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). Since the war in Afghanistan MANPADS have been high on the international control agenda, but they may be in demand because they were among the more effective weapons in Afghanistan and Iraq. (1) Appendices 12A and 12B provide data on the transfers of major conventional weapons. (2) Appendix 12C explains the sources and methods for the data collection. (3) Appendix 12D, by Siemon T. Wezeman, discusses the suppliers of ballistic missiles. The proliferation of ballistic missiles has been viewed by Western countries as a problem for over 20 years. Several of the major and most problematic suppliers and recipients, such as China, Iran, North Korea and Syria, are among the most secretive countries in the world. Most reports of their activities are based on Israeli, United States or other Western intelligence sources and are virtually impossible to verify. North Korean export-related income is very limited and arms sales provide an important part of it. Most North Korean weapons are outdated and uncompetitive, but the country has found a niche-market for its ballistic missiles. Giving up such exports, which are not illegal, would be a large economic sacrifice. Companies and persons from former Soviet republics are trading their products and knowledge for commercial reasons, but generally without state involvement or permission. Other exporters' reasons may be more political. Chinese technology exports to Pakistan are more related to supporting an ally, as are US exports to the United Kingdom. There may be steps in the direction of the development of very accurate ballistic missiles that could use conventional warheads more effectively. New navigation systems may dramatically improve accuracy without adding exceptional additional costs. GPS technology is widespread and other systems not dependent on signals from foreign satellites are also possible. However, the main urgency in the debate about missile proliferation arises from those missiles intended to deliver warheads armed with biological, chemical or nuclear payloads, especially nuclear warheads. There has been some success in limiting the number of suppliers of ballistic missiles and related technology. This is partly linked to the fact that ballistic missiles -- especially when they have ranges of over 1500 km, when problems of multiple stages and warhead re-entry are encountered -- are fairly complicated systems which often require foreign help. That many of the key technologies required for ballistic missiles (e.g., fuel, warhead re-entry vehicles and engines) are quite distinct has also helped to control proliferation. Importantly, some of the uncertainty about ballistic missile programs, transfers and links between countries may soon be reduced. The 'war on terrorism' has increased controls on financial transactions and on the transfer and transportation of weapons and related materials. Revelations about and Western access to the Libyan and Iraqi ballistic missile programs will increase understanding of the sources and mechanisms of ballistic missile proliferation. This may lead to improved controls and regulations, further limiting proliferation. Adapted from the source document.

Since 2005 there has been an upward trend in deliveries of major conventional arms. The annual average for 2004-2008 was 21 per cent higher than for 2000-2004. Almost 80 per cent of the volume of exports for the period 2004-2008 was accounted for by the five largest suppliers-the United States, Russia, Germany, France & the United Kingdom. China remained the single largest recipient for the period 2004-2008 but imports decreased significantly in the past two years. Deliveries to Asia & the Middle East increased. The negative impact of small volumes of arms deliveries was highlighted by the case of the renewed civil war in Sri Lanka. Adapted from the source document.

While there has been an increased focus on transfers of small arms & light weapons, it is necessary to research transfers of both small arms & major weapons to understand the role of arms in major conflicts. Arms transfers to five countries in conflict -- Afghanistan, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, & Sri Lanka -- in different regions are described. Most governments involved in conflicts in these regions have access to a wide range of suppliers, but fewer suppliers are willing to supply rebel forces. While supplier motives range from economic to foreign policy or humanitarian intervention, the arms that are supplied are often used in ways that are unintended by the supplier. Adapted from the source document.

The volume of international transfers of major conventional weapons grew by 17 per cent between 2003-2007 and 2008-12. The five largest suppliers in 2008-12 -- the United States, Russia, Germany, France and China -- accounted for 75 per cent of the volume of exports. This is the first time since the end of the cold war that China has ranked among the five largest arms exporters, which had consisted solely of the USA and European states. China may represent the vanguard of an increase in the significance of Asian suppliers in the international arms trade, as South Korea is an emerging arms supplier and Japan and Singapore have potential to become major suppliers. Other significant changes in 2008-12 include the absence from the top five suppliers of the United Kingdom for the first five-year period since 1950; the departure of the Netherlands from the 10 largest suppliers; and the ranking of Ukraine as the ninth largest supplier. One of the consequences of the impact of the financial crisis in the USA and Europe has been the additional pressure to seek new export markets. This has led the USA and European states to streamline bureaucratic procedures and to be more willing to engage in licensed production, technology transfer and cooperative production arrangements. While SIPRI data on international arms transfers does not represent their financial value, a number of states also publish figures on the financial value of their arms exports. Based on national data, SIPRI estimates that the total value of the global arms trade in 2011 was at least $43 billion. Adapted from the source document.

The volume of international transfers of major conventional weapons grew by 24 per cent between 2002-2006 and 2007-11. The five largest suppliers in 2007-11 -- the USA, Russia, Germany, France and the UK -- accounted for three-quarters of the volume of exports. Outside the five largest arms suppliers, China and Spain recorded significant increases in the volume of deliveries during 2007-11. While China's exports are likely to continue to grow, Spain's order book for ships -- which account for the bulk of its exports -- indicates that it will not maintain its volume of exports. States in Asia and Oceania received nearly half of all imports of major conventional weapons in 2007-11. Moreover, the five largest recipients of major conventional weapons -- India, South Korea, Pakistan, China and Singapore -- were all located in the region. Major importers are taking advantage of the competitive arms market to seek attractive deals in terms of financing, offset arrangements and the transfer of technology. India, which received 10 per cent of all imports in 2007-11, is likely to remain the largest recipient of major conventional weapons in the coming years. Adapted from the source document.

The volume of international transfers of major conventional weapons in 2006-10 was 24 per cent higher than in 2001-2005, continuing the upward trend. The United States and Russia were the largest exporters of major conventional weapons in 2006-10, accounting for 53 per cent of the volume of exports. Countries in Asia were their largest recipients. Economic and foreign policy considerations continued to play a central role in their respective decisions on arms exports. The US Administration has made proposals to reform its export controls to prevent arms and technology from reaching adversaries and to better facilitate transfers to allies. Russia's decision in 2010 to cancel the delivery of S-300 air defence systems to Iran is significant for its reputation as a 'reliable' supplier. The major recipient region in 2006-10 was Asia and Oceania (accounting for 43 per cent of imports of major conventional weapons), followed by Europe (21 per cent) and the Middle East (17 per cent). India was the largest recipient of major conventional weapons in 2006-10, pushing China into second place. South Korea (6 per cent), Pakistan (5 per cent) and Greece (4 per cent) were the other largest recipients. Although India and Pakistan have both imported large quantities of weapons to counter external security threats, internal security challenges are currently the most pressing issue for Pakistan and also a source of much concern in India. India is the target of intense supplier competition for billion-dollar deals, in particular for combat aircraft and submarines. Pakistan relies on US military aid and Chinese soft loans for most of its acquisitions. Both countries are likely to remain major recipients in the coming years. Member states of the European Union are obliged to apply criteria relating to conflict prevention when making decisions on export licence applications. A framework has been elaborated for EU members to harmonize interpretation of these criteria, along with those applying to human rights and economic development. However, during 2006-10 divisions among EU member states on the interpretation of criteria relating to conflict prevention have been particularly evident with regard to Israel, Georgia and Russia. Differences between EU members relate in large part to the long-standing arms trade and security ties with certain states, as well as national security and economic interests more generally. Adapted from the source document.

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