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AbstractExisting theories struggle when political engagement is an end in itself. To explain intrinsically motivated engagement in politics, this study synthesizes psychological theories to deduce a need-based theory of political motivation. It posits that intrinsic political motivation has roots in seemingly apolitical processes of need satisfaction that are universal and deeply ingrained in the human psyche. However, in a high-powered survey experiment, 14 of 15 preregistered analytical tests did not yield the expected evidence for the basic tenet that previous need-related experiences with politics affect the quality and quantity of future activities in the political domain. Showcasing a stepwise approach to engage with null results in hypothesis-driven research, post hoc analyses solidify the null findings, which call into question the validity of the presented theory and the previous evidence on which it was built. This study thus enhances our understanding of what does and does not underlie intrinsic motivation for political engagement.

Scholars mainly studied the formation of political parties on the macro-level, but to explain the conditions of successful party establishment we need to understand the motivational underpinnings of voting for a new party on the individual level. Using cross-national voter surveys and long-term panel data from Germany (2005-2013) and the Netherlands (1998-2002), this study contrasts the implicit assumptions about voter behaviour of equilibrium- and protest-based theories on party emergence. Although proximity to a new party matters, the findings do not support the equilibrium perspective's tenet that new parties gain votes from citizens whose views were not represented in the preceding election. Moreover, political discontent was found a fertile soil for new parties to gain electoral support, but the relationship between discontent and voting is more complex than theoretically suggested. These findings on individual voter behaviour may inform further theoretical work on the successful establishment of new political parties.

Witnessing the ongoing "credibility revolutions" in other disciplines, also political science should engage in meta-scientific introspection. Theoretically, this commentary describes why scientists in academia's current incentive system work against their self-interest if they prioritize research credibility. Empirically, a comprehensive review of meta-scientific research with a focus on quantitative political science demonstrates that threats to the credibility of political science findings are systematic and real. Yet, the review also shows the discipline's recent progress toward more credible research. The commentary proposes specific institutional changes to better align individual researcher rationality with the collective good of verifiable, robust, and valid scientific results.

AbstractOrdinary citizens can serve as a critical defence against democratic backsliding. But beneath the surface, citizens' commitment to democracy is sometimes fragile, with crises exacerbating existing anxieties. We introduce 'democratic persuasion' as an actionable intervention to foster the resilience of citizens' commitment to liberal democracy. 'Democratic persuasion' seizes the opportunity of communicating with wavering democrats. 'Democratic persuasion' entails actively making the case for democracy and discussing democracy's inherent trade‐offs while engaging existing doubts and misperceptions. Amid the COVID‐19 pandemic, which stirred frustrations with democracy and highlighted democratic trade‐offs, we invited citizens via Facebook to participate in one of sixteen Zoom town halls to engage in discussions on pandemic politics with members of German state and federal parliaments. Each representative hosted two town halls, with random assignment to a condition of 'democratic persuasion' in one of the two town hall meetings. The field experiment yielded mixed results, demonstrating significant effects on some indicators of democratic commitment but not on others. This study contributes to the nascent body of research aimed at reinforcing the societal pillars of liberal democracies.

AbstractHow can political elites strengthen citizen commitment to democratic norms when democracy is under imminent assault? We report results from a pre-registered survey experiment on the persuasive effects of actual speeches given by prominent Republican politicians (Schwarzenegger, McConnell) shortly after the January 2020 insurrection at the U.S. capitol. Although both speeches were widely considered effective at the time, in a survey experiment among Republican voters, we find no impact of one-time exposure to these speeches on the endorsement of democracy, the acceptance of election losses, the rejection of political violence, or the relevance of democratic norms in hypothetical vote choices.

AbstractAre populist citizens a threat to democracy? Some philosophers view populism and democracy as irreconcilable conceptions of governing. Another line of thought describes populism as useful democratic corrective. Drawing on nationally representative surveys from four European countries, this study investigates how European populist citizens think about democracy. Descriptive analyses reveal that populist worldviews only weakly predict how people think about democracy. On average, populist and non‐populist citizens aspire to similar kinds of political systems and both endorse liberal‐democratic institutions. Yet, populists and non‐populists differ in the degree to which they hold inconsistent beliefs. Citizens with populist outlook more frequently express contradictory demands that political institutions cannot possibly deliver. Based on these findings, we conclude that most populist citizens do not pursue an elaborate anti‐democratic conception of governing. Rather, the widespread dissatisfaction among populists may create an indeterminate openness for institutional change that political elites could steer in different directions.

In times of rising partisan polarization and increasing disenchantment with political elites, everyday political talk could constitute an important venue for citizen deliberation. Everyday political discussions offer ordinary people opportunities to strengthen deliberative skills, form considered preferences ,and hone political identities in relation to others. However, informal political discussions seldom follow the norms of formal deliberative fora, calling into question how often such everyday talk really enables democratic deliberation in the broader public. The answer is essential to assess the deliberative potential of everyday political talk and thus to understand its role in the deliberative system. Focusing on the democratic and deliberative standards of reason-giving, mutual respect, equality, and inclusion, we develop a multi-step model of democratic deliberation in everyday political talk, in which the potential for democratic deliberation depends on the presence of all four core standards. As individuals' propensity for democratic deliberation is likely to vary with their level of political involvement, both in terms of how much they care about politics and how strongly they identify with political groups, we consider both dimensions when modeling democratic deliberation in individuals' everyday political discussions. We test all steps of the model with data from a large panel survey tracing the informal political discussion networks of 18,079 German voters during the year leading up to the national elections in 2017. Our findings indicate that everyday political talk is more deliberative than expected, as the three core standards of democratic deliberation we can measure are largely upheld in people's political exchanges.

In times of rising partisan polarization and increasing disenchantment with political elites, everyday political talk could constitute an important venue for citizen deliberation. Everyday political discussions offer ordinary people opportunities to strengthen deliberative skills, form considered preferences ,and hone political identities in relation to others. However, informal political discussions seldom follow the norms of formal deliberative fora, calling into question how often such everyday talk really enables democratic deliberation in the broader public. The answer is essential to assess the deliberative potential of everyday political talk and thus to understand its role in the deliberative system. Focusing on the democratic and deliberative standards of reason-giving, mutual respect, equality, and inclusion, we develop a multi-step model of democratic deliberation in everyday political talk, in which the potential for democratic deliberation depends on the presence of all four core standards. As individuals' propensity for democratic deliberation is likely to vary with their level of political involvement, both in terms of how much they care about politics and how strongly they identify with political groups, we consider both dimensions when modeling democratic deliberation in individuals' everyday political discussions. We test all steps of the model with data from a large panel survey tracing the informal political discussion networks of 18,079 German voters during the year leading up to the national elections in 2017. Our findings indicate that everyday political talk is more deliberative than expected, as the three core standards of democratic deliberation we can measure are largely upheld in people's political exchanges.

AbstractDemocracies without democrats are not sustainable. Yet, recent studies have argued that Western citizens are turning their backs on the system of self-governance, thereby eroding the societal foundations of consolidated democracies. This study contributes to discussions about citizen support of democracy by (1) analyzing new cross-national survey data in 18 European countries that facilitate assessments of the temporal and geographical generalizability of previous findings, (2) disentangling age, cohort and period effects, thereby aligning the analytical methods with the theoretical arguments and (3) transparently reporting all evidence derived from pre-registered analyses to avoid cherry-picked findings. The findings show that citizens of consolidated democracies continue to endorse self-governance. Yet in some (but not all) countries, there is evidence of a growing number of 'democrats in name only', particularly among the young generation. These findings suggest a second phase in research on democratic fatigue that broadens the analytical scope for the multi-faceted nature of democratic support.

Multidimensional concepts are non-compensatory when higher values on one component cannot offset lower values on another. Thinking of the components of a multidimensional phenomenon as non-compensatory rather than substitutable can have wide-ranging implications, both conceptually and empirically. To demonstrate this point, we focus on populist attitudes that feature prominently in contemporary debates about liberal democracy. Given similar established public opinion constructs, the conceptual value of populist attitudes hinges on its unique specification as an attitudinal syndrome, which is characterized by the concurrent presence of its non-compensatory concept subdimensions. Yet this concept attribute is rarely considered in existing empirical research. We propose operationalization strategies that seek to take the distinct properties of non-compensatory multidimensional concepts seriously. Evidence on five populism scales in 12 countries reveals the presence and consequences of measurement-concept inconsistencies. Importantly, in some cases, using conceptually sound operationalization strategies upsets previous findings on the substantive role of populist attitudes.

A stable democratic society is unthinkable if its citizens oppose the principles of self-governance. Yet, recent studies suggest that citizens of consolidated democracies increasingly turn their backs on this system of government. Nonetheless, the evidence is mixed and mainly focuses on attitudes toward democracy as a generic concept, while less is known about mass support for the liberal variant of democracy. This study contributes to this debate by 1) analyzing citizen attitudes toward core elements of liberal democracy in addition to direct measures of democratic support and 2) separating age, period, and cohort effects. We investigated the development of democracy-related attitudes in probability-based samples collected in Germany from 1982 through 2018. Although Germany's Eastern region can be considered a likely case of democratic deconsolidation, the analysis did not provide evidence for a decline in support of democracy as a generic concept or its fundamental principles in West or East Germany.