Suchergebnisse

Preface -- Contents -- List of Abbreviations and Acronyms -- List of Figures -- Chapter 1: Governing Internet Expression: An Introduction -- 1.1 Why Freedom of Expression? -- 1.2 A Bet and a Promise -- 1.3 Expression, Technology and Power -- 1.4 Speech, New Technology & Meaning -- 1.5 Expression, Technology and Power -- 1.6 The Global Default -- 1.7 Legitimacy Theatre and the Hidden Levers of Control -- 1.8 Unpacking Censorship to Understand Free Expression -- Bibliography

Abstract
What kinds of politics do export controls entail and whose rights do they enable? The following article will take a critical perspective on the governance challenges associated with export controls of dual-use technologies. After discussing challenges around transparency, the performance of human rights and export control havens, this article will then turn to looking at policy solutions, including audits, transparency and targeted international governance mechanisms. With conclusion, export controls continue to constitute an important policy tool to promote human rights and can be improved considerably to strengthen human rights further.

AbstractBetween public debates about 'hacking' elections, so‐called 'fake news' and online disinformation campaigns, it has become hard to imagine what free and fair elections in a digital environment could look like. This challenge is particularly pronounced for election observers who monitor free and fair elections. How should election observers fulfil this task when reliable data in online media campaigns are often not even available to media regulators? The following article provides a brief overview of existing challenges around online content regulation and how these apply to elections and election observation. It then considers where resources for digital electoral observation exist and how most effectively to build on these before, in conclusion, discussing next steps and potential opportunities to develop digital election observation further.

Automated decision making is becoming the norm across large parts of society, which raises interesting liability challenges when human control over technical systems becomes increasingly limited. This article defines "quasi‐automation" as inclusion of humans as a basic rubber‐stamping mechanism in an otherwise completely automated decision‐making system. Three cases of quasi‐automation are examined, where human agency in decision making is currently debatable: self‐driving cars, border searches based on passenger name records, and content moderation on social media. While there are specific regulatory mechanisms for purely automated decision making, these regulatory mechanisms do not apply if human beings are (rubber‐stamping) automated decisions. More broadly, most regulatory mechanisms follow a pattern of binary liability in attempting to regulate human or machine agency, rather than looking to regulate both. This results in regulatory gray areas where the regulatory mechanisms do not apply, harming human rights by preventing meaningful liability for socio‐technical decision making. The article concludes by proposing criteria to ensure meaningful agency when humans are included in automated decision‐making systems, and relates this to the ongoing debate on enabling human rights in Internet infrastructure.

This article provides an overview of Internet shutdowns in Pakistan, which have become an increasingly common phenomenon, with 41 occurring between 2012 and 2017. It argues that to understand how shutdowns became normalized in Pakistan, it is necessary to look at the specific dynamics of how the shutdowns take place. In doing so, the concept of communicative ruptures develops to better understand intentional government shutdowns of communications. The article argues that strategic prevention of mobilization is key for short-term shutdowns, whereas long-term shutdowns can be better explained by looking at disciplinary mechanisms and denying the existence of "others." The article then discusses Internet shutdowns in the wider context of authoritarian practices before concluding with the urgent need for further research on this topic, both in Pakistan and beyond.

Debates around appropriate regulation of Internet content have become increasingly common in liberal democracies, despite the fact that relatively little is known about the actual processes of Internet content regulation. The following article studies the institutional development of content regulatory institutions in the United Kingdom and Germany to explore this phenomenon. It will be argued that the divergent paths of Internet filtering in both countries can be understood by looking at the development of the relevant regulatory institutions. As most Internet filtering and content regulation is implemented through private actors, the article will explore the relationship between public and private actors in both countries in the evolving regulatory debate. In this context it can be argued that the ability of the UK and Germany to enforce their own policy goals depends primarily on the ability of the state to make credible regulatory and legislative threats towards private actors. In conclusion it is suggested that the coercion of private sector actors is a key regulatory practice not just in online content regulation but in the wider field of Internet governance. Adapted from the source document.

Debates around appropriate regulation of Internet content have become increasingly common in liberal democracies, despite the fact that relatively little is known about the actual processes of Internet content regulation. The following article studies the institutional development of content regulatory institutions in the United Kingdom and Germany to explore this phenomenon. It will be argued that the divergent paths of Internet filtering in both countries can be understood by looking at the development of the relevant regulatory institutions. As most Internet filtering and content regulation is implemented through private actors, the article will explore the relationship between public and private actors in both countries in the evolving regulatory debate. In this context it can be argued that the ability of the UK and Germany to enforce their own policy goals depends primarily on the ability of the state to make credible regulatory and legislative threats towards private actors. In conclusion it is suggested that the coercion of private sector actors is a key regulatory practice not just in online content regulation but in the wider field of Internet governance.

Accountability is considered a cornerstone of public administration and good governance. This study characterizes the relationship between the Dutch Intelligence and Secret Service ("AIVD") and citizens (represented by parliament, courts, and oversight boards) as a complex actor-forum relationship. We utilize different accountability principles of public administration found in international and Dutch instruments and academic literature to propose workable principles of accountability for the AIVD. These proposed principles of accountability can be summarized as acting within duty, explainability, necessity, proportionality, reporting and record keeping, redress, and continuous independent oversight. Similarly, there are some conditions to support the workability of accountability principles. These conditions may be characterized as productive actor-forum relationships, cooperation, flexibility, value alignment, and learning and improving opportunities.