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"The punishment of norm violators has fostered cooperation and thus helped small groups of early human hunters and gatherers to survive (Greene, 2014). The "moral punishment instinct" (van Prooijen, 2018) is a part of human nature, and punitive practices can be found in every society. At the same time, punitive practices vary enormously between societies and over time. In his social history of prison reform in the late 18th and early 19th century, Ignatieff (1978) traced how punishments directed at the body, such as whipping or public hanging, were replaced by solitary confinement as a new form of punishment directed at the mind. Although the "birth of the prison" (Foucault, 1977 (1975)) has been copied around the globe, large differences in its use remain. While growing prison populations in the United States of America, the United Kingdom and other liberal democracies point to more retributionist penal philosophies since the late 1960s (Garland, 2012), Japan has emphasized reintegrative shaming and restorative justice (Braithwaite, 1989) in its response to norm violations"--

'The Democratic Politics of Military Interventions' examines the impact of party politics in foreign and security policy.

According to a widely shared notion, foreign affairs are exempted from democratic politics, i.e. party-political divisions are overcome-and should be overcome-for the sake of a common national interest. This book shows that this is not the case. Examining votes in the US Congress and several European parliaments, the book demonstrates that contestation over foreign affairs is barely different from contestation over domestic politics. Analyses of a new collection of deployment votes, of party manifestos, and of expert survey data show that political parties differ systematically over foreign policy and military interventions in particular. The left/right divide is the best guide to the pattern of party-political contestation: support is weakest at the far left of the spectrum and increases as one moves along the left/right axis to green, social democratic, liberal and conservative parties; amongst parties of the far right, support is again weaker than amongst parties of the centre. An analysis of parliamentary debates in Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom about the interventions in Afghanistan and against Daesh in Iraq and Syria shows that political parties also differ systematically in how they frame the use of force abroad. For example, parties on the right tend to frame their country's participation in the US-led missions in terms of national security and national interests whereas parties on the left tend to engage in 'spiral model thinking', i.e. they critically reflect on the unintended consequences of the use of force in fuelling the conflicts with the Taliban and Daesh.

'Rogue states' have been high on the international security agenda for many years but their theoretical significance for International Relations has remained poorly understood. In contrast to the bulk of writings on 'rogue states' that address them merely as a policy challenge, this book focuses on what we can learn from deviance about the international system and international society. Building on three basic insights developed in social constructivism and critical theory, this volume brings together interdisciplinary insights into the study of 'rogue states', exploring the role of comity and decency in labelling of 'rogue states', the impact labelling has on behaviour, how to treat a 'rogue state', how 'rogue' status can be withdrawn and what part the role of international law has to play in this process. This unique and wide-ranging study will appeal to scholars of Sociology, Criminology, Political Science, International Relations and International Law

Das zusammenwachsende Europa und die Öffnung der Binnengrenzen bringen Touristen und Geschäftsleuten eine Reihe von Erleichterungen. Allerdings profitieren auch Organisierte Kriminalität und transnationaler Terrorismus von dem Verzicht auf Grenzkontrollen zwischen den EU-Staaten. Zur Erhöhung der inneren Sicherheit in einem Europa der offenen Grenzen wurde das Europäische Polizeiamt (Europol) ins Leben gerufen. Zwar hat es keine exekutiven Befugnisse wie die Ausstellung von Haftbefehlen oder Hausdurchsuchungen, denn dies soll weiterhin Aufgabe der nationalen Polizeikräfte sein. Doch Europol sammelt und analysiert Daten zu Straftätern, Verdächtigen, Tatzeugen und Kontaktpersonen im Bereich der grenzüberschreitenden Kriminalität. Damit trägt Europol zu effektiveren Strafverfolgung in den Mitgliedsstaaten bei. Gleichzeitig stellt die Speicherung und Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten bereits einen Eingriff in das Grundrecht der informationellen Selbstbestimmung dar. Für die nationalen Parlamente wird die Kontrolle der Polizei durch die Europäisierung der Polizeiarbeit erschwert. Zugleich fehlen dem Europäischen Parlament die Kompetenzen, das Kontrolldefizit der nationalen Parlamente auszugleichen. Somit findet die europäische Polizeikooperation weitgehend ohne parlamentarische Beteiligung statt. Eine ähnliche Lücke tut sich im Bereich der gerichtlichen Kontrolle auf. Die Zuständigkeiten der nationalen Gerichte sind eingeschränkt, ohne dass der Europäische Gerichtshof für den Schutz der Grundrechte verantwortlich gemacht worden ist. Der Entwurf für einen europäischen Verfassungsvertrag, der 2002/2003 ausgehandelt wurde, gibt sowohl dem Europäischen Parlament als auch dem Europäischen Gerichtshof dringend benötigte Befugnisse, um die Kontrolle der Kontrolleure zu verbessern. Allerdings droht die Ratifizierung an ganz anderen Streitpunkten – vor allem in Großbritannien – zu scheitern. Für diesen Fall empfiehlt Wolfgang Wagner, die unstrittigen Reformen im Bereich der Polizeikooperation zügig in europäisches Recht umzusetzen.