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Even though conspiracy theories are diverse, they are typically construed as a homogeneous phenomenon. Based on classic theorizations of conspiracy theories by Popper (1945; 2002) and Moscovici (1987), we propose to distinguish between belief in upward conspiracy theories (i.e. targeting relatively powerful groups) and downward conspiracy theories (i.e. targeting relatively powerless groups). The former are theorized as power‐challenging beliefs and the latter are theorized as being underpinned by conservative ideology. Across three studies conducted in Belgium (Total N = 2363), we show that these two types of conspiracy beliefs indeed relate differently to power‐challenging attitudes (i.e. political extremism, feelings of leadership breakdown) and conservative ideology. Specifically, upward conspiracy beliefs were characterized by a U‐shaped relationship with political orientation (i.e. an "extremism" bias), and a strong relationship with feelings of leadership breakdown. By contrast, downward conspiracy beliefs were strongly associated with conservative ideology. Both types of conspiracy beliefs were, however, positively correlated. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

International audience ; The aim of this research is to identify what social and psychological variables may attract people to a social protest movement, namely the Yellow Vests (YVs) in France, which originated in October 2018. This analysis, albeit correlational, may nevertheless give important hints to identify in an exploratory way what causal factors could lead people (a) to become a sympathizer of the movement and (b) to become a member of that movement, and what psychosocial consequences would derive from (a) and (b). Notably, the role of conspiracy beliefs and anomie will be scrutinized because of their role in fostering non-normative political violence. In this purpose, we analyzed the results of a poll conducted on a representative sample of the French population (N = 1760). This survey explored a range of respondents' attitudes towards social issues and towards the YVs movement. Our analyses showed that adherence to the YVs movement is mainly caused by socioeconomic factors (such as educational level, economic capital) and belonging to political extremes (far left and even more far right), relying on and probably increasing distrust toward authorities and unconventional beliefs (paranormal and conspiracist). Ultimately, adherence to the movement seems triggered by the objective factor of dependency on a car and endorsement of conspiracist beliefs; whereas, simple sympathy is related to a less irrational form of accusation of authorities, low subjective economic capital, and pessimism toward the future. YVs also more often use social media and Youtube, but less often use media websites and newspapers as their first source of information.

International audience ; The aim of this research is to identify what social and psychological variables may attract people to a social protest movement, namely the Yellow Vests (YVs) in France, which originated in October 2018. This analysis, albeit correlational, may nevertheless give important hints to identify in an exploratory way what causal factors could lead people (a) to become a sympathizer of the movement and (b) to become a member of that movement, and what psychosocial consequences would derive from (a) and (b). Notably, the role of conspiracy beliefs and anomie will be scrutinized because of their role in fostering non-normative political violence. In this purpose, we analyzed the results of a poll conducted on a representative sample of the French population (N = 1760). This survey explored a range of respondents' attitudes towards social issues and towards the YVs movement. Our analyses showed that adherence to the YVs movement is mainly caused by socioeconomic factors (such as educational level, economic capital) and belonging to political extremes (far left and even more far right), relying on and probably increasing distrust toward authorities and unconventional beliefs (paranormal and conspiracist). Ultimately, adherence to the movement seems triggered by the objective factor of dependency on a car and endorsement of conspiracist beliefs; whereas, simple sympathy is related to a less irrational form of accusation of authorities, low subjective economic capital, and pessimism toward the future. YVs also more often use social media and Youtube, but less often use media websites and newspapers as their first source of information.

The aim of this research is to identify what social and psychological variables may attract people to a social protest movement, namely the Yellow Vests (YVs) in France, which originated in October 2018. This analysis, albeit correlational, may nevertheless give important hints to identify in an exploratory way what causal factors could lead people (a) to become a sympathizer of the movement and (b) to become a member of that movement, and what psychosocial consequences would derive from (a) and (b). Notably, the role of conspiracy beliefs and anomie will be scrutinized because of their role in fostering non-normative political violence. In this purpose, we analyzed the results of a poll conducted on a representative sample of the French population (N = 1760). This survey explored a range of respondents' attitudes towards social issues and towards the YVs movement. Our analyses showed that adherence to the YVs movement is mainly caused by socio-economic factors (such as educational level, economic capital) and belonging to political extremes (far left and even more far right), relying on and probably increasing distrust toward authorities and unconventional beliefs (paranormal and conspiracist). Ultimately, adherence to the movement seems triggered by the objective factor of dependency on a car and endorsement of conspiracist beliefs; whereas, simple sympathy is related to a less irrational form of accusation of authorities, low subjective economic capital, and pessimism toward the future. YVs also more often use social media and Youtube, but less often use media websites and newspapers as their first source of information.

En décembre en 2019, le premier cas de COVID-19 est détecté en Chine. Le nombre de cas augmentant rapidement sur le plan international, l'OMS donne à la COVID-19 le statut de pandémie en mars 2020 et le Conseil Fédéral Suisse instaure un semi-confinement dès le 13 mars 2020. Dès lors, les services de santé suisses ont été contraints de se réorganiser et d'augmenter leur capacité pour prendre en charge les patient·e·s COVID-19. En parallèle, le gouvernement a émis des recommandations afin de protéger les personnes vulnérables et d'éviter la surcharge des hôpitaux. Ces recommandations sont basées sur le respect de règles de distanciation sociale et de gestes barrières (p.ex. : l'hygiène des mains et le port du masque), et ont été accompagnées de mesures exceptionnelles telles que la fermeture ponctuelle des restaurants, des commerces, des espaces culturels et sportifs, la généralisation du télétravail, etc. L'adhésion de la population à ces mesures, qui ont pu être parfois contraignantes, dépend des représentations et de la compréhension qu'elle a de la maladie : quelles sont ses origines, son mode de propagation, les stratégies efficaces pour s'en protéger, les enjeux sanitaires, etc. Connaître ces représentations et la façon dont la population appréhende la maladie et ses enjeux est dès lors crucial pour adapter la communication et les politiques publiques et, ainsi, lutter efficacement contre la propagation du virus. Dans ce but, nous avons réalisé une étude par questionnaire auprès d'un échantillon de la population adulte de trois cantons suisses : Genève, Vaud et Fribourg. Nous présentons, dans ce document, les principaux résultats en fonction de l'âge et du genre des répondant·e·s.

Depuis le printemps 2020, la Suisse fait face à la pandémie du COVID-19. Afin de continuer à limiter la propagation du virus, les recommandations sanitaires émises en 2020 basées sur le respect de la distanciation sociale et des gestes barrières (i.e. l'hygiène des mains et le port du masque) ont été maintenues en 2021, ainsi que certaines mesures exceptionnelles (i.e. fermeture des lieux de loisirs et de culture). La vaccination, disponible depuis le début d'année 2021 pour les personnes à risque et dans le courant du printemps 2021 pour tous les adultes, représente actuellement une des principales options pour lutter contre la pandémie à long terme. Dans un précédent numéro de cette série (1) nous avons présenté les résultats de la 1ère enquête réalisée entre juin et juillet 2020 sur les représentations et la compréhension de la population quant au COVID-19. Une seconde mesure a été réalisée en février 2021 afin de voir de quelle manière les représentations et la compréhension du public avaient évolué après une année de contexte pandémique. Connaître cette évolution est importante pour adapter la communication et les politiques publiques dans ce contexte inédit. Ce document présente une comparaison entre les deux éditions de l'enquête ainsi que d'autres résultats spécifiques à 2021.

Research suggests that belief in conspiracy theories (CT) stems from basic psychological mechanisms and is linked to other belief systems (e.g., religious beliefs). While previous research has extensively examined individual and contextual variables associated with CT beliefs, it has not yet investigated the role of culture. In the current research, we tested, based on a situated cultural cognition perspective, the extent to which culture predicts CT beliefs. Using Hofstede's model of cultural values, three nation‐level analyses of data from 25, 19, and 18 countries using different measures of CT beliefs (Study 1, N = 5323; Study 2a, N = 12,255; Study 2b, N = 30,994) revealed positive associations between masculinity, collectivism, and CT beliefs. A cross‐sectional study among U.S. citizens (Study 3, N = 350), using individual‐level measures of Hofstede's values, replicated these findings. A meta‐analysis of correlations across studies corroborated the presence of positive links between CT beliefs, collectivism, r = .31, 95% CI = [.15; .47], and masculinity, r = .39, 95% CI = [.18; .59]. Our results suggest that in addition to individual differences and contextual variables, cultural factors also play an important role in shaping CT beliefs.

People differ in their general tendency to endorse conspiracy theories (that is, conspiracy mentality). Previous research yielded inconsistent findings on the relationship between conspiracy mentality and political orientation, showing a greater conspiracy mentality either among the political right (a linear relation) or amongst both the left and right extremes (a curvilinear relation). We revisited this relationship across two studies spanning 26 countries (combined N = 104,253) and found overall evidence for both linear and quadratic relations, albeit small and heterogeneous across countries. We also observed stronger support for conspiracy mentality among voters of opposition parties (that is, those deprived of political control). Nonetheless, the quadratic effect of political orientation remained significant when adjusting for political control deprivation. We conclude that conspiracy mentality is associated with extreme left- and especially extreme right-wing beliefs, and that this non-linear relation may be strengthened by, but is not reducible to, deprivation of political control. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/inPress

People differ in their general tendency to endorse conspiracy theories (i.e., conspiracy mentality). Previous research yielded inconsistent findings on the relationship between conspiracy mentality and political orientation, showing a greater conspiracy mentality either among the political right (a linear relation), or among both the left and right extremes (a curvilinear relation). We revisited this relationship across two studies spanning 26 countries (combined N=104,253) and found overall evidence for both linear and quadratic relations, even though small and heterogeneous across countries. We also observed stronger support for conspiracy mentality among voters of opposition parties (i.e., those deprived of political control).Nonetheless, the quadratic effect of political orientation remained significant when adjusting for political control deprivation. We conclude that conspiracy mentality is associated with extreme left- and especially extreme right-wing beliefs, and that this non-linear relation may be strengthened by, but is not reducible to, deprivation of political control.

People differ in their general tendency to endorse conspiracy theories (i.e., conspiracy mentality). Previous research yielded inconsistent findings on the relationship between conspiracy mentality and political orientation, showing a greater conspiracy mentality either among the political right (a linear relation), or among both the left and right extremes (a curvilinear relation). We revisited this relationship across two studies spanning 26 countries (combined N=104,253) and found overall evidence for both linear and quadratic relations, even though small and heterogeneous across countries. We also observed stronger support for conspiracy mentality among voters of opposition parties (i.e., those deprived of political control). Nonetheless, the quadratic effect of political orientation remained significant when adjusting for political control deprivation. We conclude that conspiracy mentality is associated with extreme left- and especially extreme right-wing beliefs, and that this non-linear relation may be strengthened by, but is not reducible to, deprivation of political control.

People differ in their general tendency to endorse conspiracy theories (that is, conspiracy mentality). Previous research yielded inconsistent findings on the relationship between conspiracy mentality and political orientation, showing a greater conspiracy mentality either among the political right (a linear relation) or amongst both the left and right extremes (a curvilinear relation). We revisited this relationship across two studies spanning 26 countries (combined N = 104,253) and found overall evidence for both linear and quadratic relations, albeit small and heterogeneous across countries. We also observed stronger support for conspiracy mentality among voters of opposition parties (that is, those deprived of political control). Nonetheless, the quadratic effect of political orientation remained significant when adjusting for political control deprivation. We conclude that conspiracy mentality is associated with extreme left- and especially extreme right-wing beliefs, and that this non-linear relation may be strengthened by, but is not reducible to, deprivation of political control. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion

Research suggests that belief in conspiracy theories (CT) stems from basic psychological mechanisms and is linked to other belief systems (e.g. religious beliefs). While previous research has extensively examined individual and contextual variables associated with CT beliefs, it has not yet investigated the role of culture. In the current research, we tested, based on a situated cultural cognition perspective, the extent to which culture predicts CT beliefs. Using Hofstede's model of cultural values, three nation-level analyses of data from 25, 19 and 18 countries using different measures of CT beliefs (Study 1, N = 5,323; Study 2a, N = 12,255; Study 2b, N = 30,994) revealed positive associations between Masculinity, Collectivism and CT beliefs. A cross-sectional study among US citizens (Study 3, N = 350), using individual-level measures of Hofstede's values, replicated these findings. A meta-analysis of correlations across studies corroborated the presence of positive links between CT beliefs, Collectivism, r = .31, 95%CI = [.15; 47] and Masculinity, r = .39, 95%CI = [.18; 59]. Our results suggest that in addition to individual-differences and contextual variables, cultural factors also play an important role in shaping CT beliefs. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published