Suchergebnisse

This article argues that traditional Westphalian powers are increasingly pressured to move beyond Westphalia towards institutionalization of security cooperation and a broader definition of referent objects of security. Focusing on the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), it notes that the Alliance is severely torn between traditional constructions of 'the self' and a need for change. Exploring how NATO handles this dilemma, the article examines how the Alliance articulated its constitutive story during the strategic concept process of 2009–10. Four roles are crystallized from the reading of the narrative: the fire-fighter, the watchdog, the good neighbour and the seminar leader. It is argued that NATO will be able to meet the exigencies of the post-Westphalian world more or less effectively depending on how it develops in each of these roles. The article concludes that NATO largely remains Westphalian in its four roles, but the launching of the seminar leader role indicates that it may be preparing a farewell to Westphalia. NATO is a composite actor and tensions between academic, global reformist and traditionalist regional story-lines will prevail. Nevertheless, the globalized threat environment is likely eventually to force NATO to fully recognize the need for a more post-Westphalian approach to security.

International Relations (IR) scholars have theorized the significance of communication and messaging across state borders, using notions such as soft power, sharp power, propaganda and illiberal communication. This study contributes to this body of research by investigating narrative persuasiveness by way of a large-scale experimental exploration of narrative reception. The projection of strategic narratives has become a central feature of modern influencing across borders. Despite the existence of a growing literature on the potentially harmful effects of such narratives, however, their persuasiveness remains under-researched. This article seeks to help fill this gap by asking what might induce people in Sweden to side with strategic narratives projected by Sputnik, the Russian state-funded news media platform. The article puts a central component of Walter Fisher's classic narrative paradigm to the test: the notions of narrative probability (consistency and coherence) and fidelity (previous life experience). In a rare large-scale survey experiment ( N = 2,032), three narratives from Sputnik were presented to respondents to establish the potential perceived narrative probability and fidelity. Contrary to Fisher's argument and some previous works on strategic narratives, the results show that people can be persuaded by a narrative without having personal experience of the topic, and despite regarding the text as incoherent. This indicates that information influence projected through strategic narratives can be effective regardless of the form of the message and even when introducing unfamiliar ideas. This is an interesting addition to findings in previous studies that source awareness does not negatively affect the effectiveness of strategic narratives. The article ends by highlighting contributions to previous research on persuasion and by suggesting avenues ahead.

New information technologies and media consumption patterns have enabled aggressive practices that are qualitatively different from old-style propaganda. Actors no longer rely on secrecy, but can openly make use of social media and media outlets in foreign languages to destabilize other states and societies from within. Strategic narratives have become a key means in this endeavour. To expose the discursive (harmful) capacity of strategic narratives, the article suggests detailed analysis based on a narrative ontology. The analytical framework is applied in an exploratory case study of the Russian state-sponsored broadcasting company Sputnik's strategic narrative about Sweden from 2014 to 2018. In addition to unmasking Sputnik's strategic narrative, the article fills a gap in previous research in particular by exposing three antagonistic narrative strategies labelled 'suppression', 'destruction' and 'direction'. These strategies reflect general driving forces in the security sphere and can inspire and structure future research into antagonistic strategic narration.

AbstractScholars have characterized the EU as a normative power whose greatest asset is to be able to shape conceptions of what is 'normal' in international affairs. Scholars have argued that a normative power has to meet certain discursive standards; representing others in a non‐antagonistic, humble way. We question whether the EU can live up to this ideal when defending itself against Russian strategic communication. The empirical enquiry establishes that while the EU High Commissioner communicates in line with the stipulated standards, the newly established East Stratcom Taskforce and its publication 'Disinformation Digest' diverges from this ideal. The establishment of the Taskforce has led to the EU losing reflexivity and normative power. The article concludes that while Diez' and Manners' standards are utopian in the contemporary communicative climate, they remain useful as guiding rules that can help normative powers 'watch their language' and avoid doing unnecessary harm.