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Frontmatter -- Contents -- Tables -- Preface -- INTRODUCTION -- 1. The Problem -- PART I. OUTCOMES, COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND STRUCTURAL CORRELATES -- 2. Outcomes of the Process of Incorporation -- 3. A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Collective Political Action -- 4. Three Cases: Disraelian Britain, Bismarckian Germany, and Peronist Argentina -- 5. Structural Correlates of Outcomes -- PART II. STRUCTURAL PROPERTIES AND FORMS OF POLITICAL ACTION -- 6. Structural Properties -- 7. Structural Properties in Classical Revolutionary Theories -- 8. Two Studies of the Argentine Working Class -- 9. Structural Modernization and Forms of Political Action: A Diachronic View -- 10. The Effects of Integration and Centrality -- 11. The Effects of Deprivation and Marginalization -- CONCLUSION -- 12. The Working Class and the Legitimacy of Capitalism -- Appendix -- Notes -- Index

Carlos Waisman has pinpointed the specific beliefs that led the Peronists unwittingly to transform their country from a relatively prosperous land of recent settlement, like Australia and Canada, to an impoverished and underdeveloped society resembling the rest of Latin America. Originally published in 1987. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while present

In a large parte of Western and Central Europe, political parties characterized as «populists» are, or are becoming, major competitors for government power. Given this situation, the article intends, on the one hand, to propose a typology of populist institutional regimes or programs, with emphasis on the common properties of the different types. On the other hand, discuss their generative contexts, and propose two propositions: i) that it is very likely that the configuration of factors conducive to populism will become stable in the North and remain recurrent in the South; and, ii) that the probability of more or less permanent institutionalization of these regimes is greater in the South than in the North, due to the differential robustness of the republican political institutions. Ultimately, both capitalism and democratic political institutions will suffer of strong pressures. As a result, together with innovative forms of open market economy and republican democracy, new kinds of state capitalism and elective authoritarianism will be instituzionalized in many countries. If this hypothesis is correct, populist regimes will therefore be only transitional. ; En gran parte de Europa Occidental y Central, partidos políticos caracterizados como "populistas" son, o están pasando a ser, competidores principales por el poder. Ante esta situación el artículo pretende, por un lado, proponer una tipología de regímenes o programas institucionales populistas, con énfasis en las propiedades comunes de los distintos tipos. Por otro lado, discutir sus contextos generativos y plantear dos proposiciones: i) que es muy probable que la configuración de factores conducentes al populismo se convierta en estable en el Norte y sigan siendo recurrente en el Sur; y ii) que la probabilidad de institucionalización más o menos permanente de estos regímenes sea mayor en el Sur que en el Norte, por la robustez diferencial de las instituciones políticas republicanas. En definitiva, tanto el capitalismo como las instituciones políticas democráticas estarán sujetos a fortísimas presiones, dando como resultado que, junto con formas novedosas de economía abierta de mercado y de democracia republicana, se institucionalicen en muchos países variedades del capitalismo de estado y el autoritarismo electivo. Si esta hipótesis es correcta, los regímenes populistas serán, por lo tanto, solo transicionales. ; In a large parte of Western and Central Europe, political parties characterized as «populists» are, or are becoming, major competitors for government power. Given this situation, the article intends, on the one hand, to propose a typology of populist institutional regimes or programs, with emphasis on the common properties of the different types. On the other hand, discuss their generative contexts, and propose two propositions: i) that it is very likely that the configuration of factors conducive to populism will become stable in the North and remain recurrent in the South; and, ii) that the probability of more or less permanent institutionalization of these regimes is greater in the South than in the North, due to the differential robustness of the republican political institutions. Ultimately, both capitalism and democratic political institutions will suffer of strong pressures. As a result, together with innovative forms of open market economy and republican democracy, new kinds of state capitalism and elective authoritarianism will be instituzionalized in many countries. If this hypothesis is correct, populist regimes will therefore be only transitional.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the varieties of Capitalism that emerged in Latin America and Central-Eastern Europe since 1980 as instances of institutional transfer. The article considers the possibility that Capitalism, as occurs with democracy, is a complex institutional package rather than and elemental institution. Some of its' components travel faster than others through hybrid forms. These, rather than being instances of imperfect transplantation, or intermediate stages in a process of successful transfer, represent new frameworks, with potential for institutionalization. ; El propósito de este artículo es analizar las variedades de Capitalismo que emergieron en Latinoamérica y la Europa Central del Este desde 1980 como ejemplos de transferencia institucional. En el artículo considero la posibilidad de que el capitalismo, al igual que la democracia, es un complejo paquete institucional antes que una institución elemental. Algunos de sus componentes viajan más rápido que otros a través de formas híbridas, constituyendo, por tanto, nuevas perspectivas con potencial suficiente para ser institucionalizadas.

This article discusses the reversal of development in Argentina. It argues that this country switched developmental tracks: from being a "land of recent settlement," it became an underdeveloped society. This shift was the unintended consequence of two policies that were institutionalized in the postwar period: autarkic industrialization, and a corporatist system of labor relations. The author claims that these policies were a response by the state elite to a perceived revolutionary threat, that this fear of revolution was unrealistic, and that these policies had the effects they did because of the "modern" characteristics of Argentina. The peculiar pattern of Argentine development could not have been understood by either modernization and dependency approaches, and thus this case calls into question the basic assumptions of these theories of development.