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*This series is the result of an adaptation of a paper presented as part of a seminar on "Theories and Research in International Relations" at Hebrew University, July 2012. Commentaries are welcome to daniel.wajner@mail.huji.ac.il Controversial discussions about the nature of Power have characterized the study of Social Sciences, in general, and International Relations (IR) in particular. This seems logic - if we consider politics as a "game", their "participants" tend to develop a range of "skills", which allow them to assume different "roles", influencing thus in the "results". Thus, understanding the mechanisms by which this whole process ("the game") operates is intrinsic to the analysis of the outcomes, what explains why the revision of the concept of power has always been especially popular, including in recent times.Throughout this series we will review some academic approaches to the concept of power and its implementation in international politics. We will present in this first article the debates on the ontology of power (generally referred as "the faces of power"), and the ways in which this influenced the theoretical divisions in IR.In a second article we will introduce epistemological approaches, leading to controversies on the mechanisms involved in the activation of power and its dimensions (such as today's mantra "hard vs. soft power"). Finally, we will deal in a third article with some methodological schemes for Power Analysis in IR, while indicating areas for possible innovation using cases of the "Arab Spring" as illustrations.Power, Powerful, Powerless: The Ontological DebateThe first ontological debate around the concept of power could be placed in the dispute between those who address it as an interaction and those who understand it as a resource.To this end, Weber constitutes our first station. He identifies power in a relationship as the ability to control the behavior of others, even against its will. Weber is focused on the context of that relationship (one's position vis-à-vis others), which determines the capacity of empowerment.1That led him to approach the topic of legitimacy by dividing between power (Macht) and authority (herrschaft, i.e. legitimate power), issue that will be reminded in next articles.Against Weber's integral approach came out Dahl with his renowned definition: "A has power over B, if A gets B do something that B would not otherwise do", which installed "officially" the controversy in political sciences on how power is operated. According to Dahl, that "something" must be based in a change of behavior produced by an observable act - possible to analyze and be measured. His attention was centered on the characteristics of the material resources (their Base, Means, Amount and Scope) and how they are utilized to get certain effects; however, power is still conceptualized as a relationship, since what needs to be clearly discernible is the conflict, the interaction. Non-observable acts, according to Dahl, should be included in a different concept, such as Influence.2The Realist tradition in IR, as well as many scholars in the Liberal tradition, adopted Dahl's definition as a starting point for their analysis on Power Relationships, and even went one step forward. They saw the context as secondary, since certain power bases are so critical that do not really depend on circumstances or specific nature of interaction. Consequently, for classical realists as Carr, Morgenthau and Aron, the military force is "that" observable act which represents the power of the actors (albeit in most of the cases the economic resources were a prerequisite, as explain Berenskoetter and Williams).3Against that mainstream idea, some scholars battled in the sixties and seventies by presenting two approaches which became popularly known as The Second Face of Power and The Third Face of Power. It is important to note that both approaches emerge from this ontological debate on "what is power?", but their main implications would be on the epistemological discussion on "how do we study power relations?", which helped to the development of Critical and Constructivist research programs, as we will see in the next article.In the first approach, Bachrach and Baratz argue that not always a concrete change in behavior needs to be detected to confirm the existence of a conflict in Power Relationships; it could be expressed through the "mobilization of bias", an "unmeasurable element".4 In the second approach, Lukes went beyond that idea and expressed that the mere existence of conflict is not a condition; in other words, the absence of conflict do not necessarily indicate the absence of Power Relationships.5 Lukes, as a neo-marxist building on Gramsci, introduced the structural sphere of the concept of Power. Powerful and powerless agents are characterized in function of their ability to shape the system through culture and education, which will determine the interests of the actors. Foucalt and Bourdieu, with their vision of Knowledge-as-Power6 and Symbolic Power7 , respectively, went in the same direction.More recently, a similar ontological debate could be found in terms of Power Over-Power To, presented by Barnett and Duvall. In the first one, they define power as "the capacity of the actor to determine his own actions", so the perspective is based on the actor itself; by contrast, in the second one a Power Relationship is needed.8 In that sense, the famous article of Nye about Soft Power, which would be broadly approached in the following articles, builds also on this issue - power could be understood as "the ability to get the outcomes one wants" (in the form of Power-To), but also as "the ability to influence the behaviors of others to get the outcomes one wants." (in the form of Power-Over)9.1 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. (California: University of Berkeley, 1978. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich).2Robert A. Dahl, "The concept of Power", Behavioral Science 2(3), July 1957, 201-2153Felix Berenskoetter and Michael .J. Williams. Power in World Politics. (NYC: Routledge, 2007), p.64Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz. "Two Faces of Power". The American Political Science Review 56 No4 (December 1962), 947-9525Stephen Lukes, "Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds", Millennium, 33, No3 (2005), 477-4936Michael Foucalt, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-77 (Brighton: Havester, 1980)7Pierre Bourdieu, Language & Symbolic Power (NYC : Polity Press, 2001)8Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, "Power in International Politics," International Organization 59, No1, (Winter 2005), p. 469Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power- The Means to Success in World Politics (NYC: PublicAffairs, 2004), p.2 Fabian Daniel Wajner is a Research and Teaching Assistant at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Department of International Relations) and a Fellow of the Liweranth Center for Latin America Studies.

Holaaa?…- Si, soy yo, ¿con quien hablo?. Ajá, mucho gusto, ¿en qué te puedo ayudar?… ¿Que si me podés hacer unas preguntas para una entrevista? Claro que sí, estoy con un tiempo libre…-¿Cómo? Sí, claro ya votamos aquí en Argentina… ¡Ganó y ya asumió Cristina, la mujer del "presi"! Y si… se veía venir, las cosas andan mejor y ella tiene pinta de que va a mantener el rumbo… ¿Qué propuso? Bueno, vos viste, eso de que "el cambio recién empieza", de que "hay que profundizar el cambio"; o sea, todo lo que ella estuvo arreglando con los otros presidentes en la gira por España, Alemania, Francia, Brasil…-Ahh, ¿vos me preguntás que medidas planteó?. Naaa,…. cosas específicas no habló, pero más o menos propone seguir con la misma línea que viene "levantando" la cosa. Dice que no quiere frenar la economía, que va a mejorar el problema de la energía, de la educación, todo eso. Y de la seguridad o la inflación casi no habló, se ve que no le hace mucha gracia eso…- ¿Qué cuándo la escuché hablar? El otro día, en uno de esos actos que se llenan de gente… Jaja, sí, está claro que muchos van por el "chori" o el tinto, pero no me parece mal eso, qué se yo, la gente lo necesita porque no tiene… y si éstos pueden ayudar con algo, mucho mejor… ¿Un debate? No, creo que no hubo, pero eso igual es medio show, no me van esas a mi…-¿De qué? ¿Corrupción?, ¡nooo!, ¡ni una palabra habló de eso! Igual a mí no me parece que ella esté tan metida. Miráaa, te soy sincero, robar van a robar todos, lo importante es que manejen bien al país… Al final, mucho "Eskanka", mucho "sobres en los baños", mucha "valija venezolana", pero a los tres días murió el tema… fíjate todo el lío que arma la prensa, la misma que después se vende por la publicidad del Estado. ¡Dejáaaaa!, acá las cosas son así, cada uno pelea por la suya…-¿De controlar más me hablás vos? ¡si casi siempre son los propios "canas" los que afanan y la justicia funciona dependiendo de la "guita" que pongás! Acá "la cometa" ya está muy metida en la gente, no se saca así nomás… Claro, obvio que quiero que defiendan mis derechos, mis ideas, todo eso ni que hablar, pero yo mido los resultados, mentendés?.- ¿Que si fueron buenos los resultados del último gobierno?. Seeee!!!, pensá nomás cómo estábamos antes de eso con la crisis del 2001: corralitos, quiebras, hambre, muertos. ¡no se puede comparar! O sea, yo sé que no es todo color de rosas, pero siento que se va por buen camino, los Kirchner enfilaron bien con los temas de pobreza, trabajo… Y sí, a mi también me mejoró la cosa; tengo más laburo, mejor "guita", y al fin y al cabo eso es lo que importa, es con lo que se banca la familia…-¿Si creo que hubo fraude? Naaa…; alguna trampita, capaz, de las que no se pueden evitar: que no hayan papeletas, que se empiece tarde, demorar algun resultado…lo de siempre, pero no mas allá de eso. Ahí va en la viveza y el poder de cada candidato, no hay otra…-La oposición? Y… ¿cómo explicarte?. había de todo, pero a la vez muy poco. Yo que sé… la Carrió me cae bien, es buena para denunciar y tiene buenos proyectos, pero la verdad que no la veo para estar mandando… Sí, cabeza te das cuenta que tiene, pero le falta fuerza como para que no la hagan caer; le termina pasando sino como a De la Ruá en el 2001, que tuvo que salir escapando por la azotea de "la Rosada", ¡en helicóptero!… Claro, los Kirchner en eso son otra cosa, saben arreglar con los pesados, ¡porque mirá que hay que aguantarse a esos "gorilas"! Es así, guste o no para político hay que ser bravo, sino te pasan por encima…-Ta, después entró este Lavagna, que fue Ministro de Economía. Medio frío parece, aunque pinta que es bueno, que la tiene clara; pero le falta ese "no sé qué", no te llega nada cuando habla. Otro que estaba era Rodríguez Sáa, medio de la onda de Menem, y después una banda muy atrás: un tal Pino Solanas, Lopez Murphi, y otros más que no los votó ni sus familias. …-¿Cuáles eran los partidos? Paaa…., eran todos unas mezclas ahí entre peronistas y radicales, ¡no se entendía nada! Se ve que está de moda eso de hacer "coaliciones", "concertaciones", todo eso… Antes estaba todo más claro, cada uno por su lado y la gente se identificaba más con algunos, pero ahora son todos más o menos lo mismo… ¿Diputados y senadores? Jaja, ¡de eso ni me preguntes, porque no tengo la más mínima idea! Me informé algo de los candidatos y con eso me muevo, pero en lo otro estoy perdido… O sea, obvio que importa que se junten, y discutan, y todo eso, pero "la posta" es que el que manda es el Presidente y después los líderes de la oposición, los otros la miran de afuera…-¿Si ya están los ministros? Sí, asumieron también, la cosa media igual… Y más vale! Si tienen la experiencia y vienen trabajando bien, ¿por qué los van a sacar? ¡Por mí que estén 20 años todos los mismos si la cosa marcha impecable! ¿O no?.'¿Cómo? ¿Que a quién voté?. Jaja, ¡pero es secreto eso!… No, te digo la verdad, no fui porque tenía mil cosas para hacer. Total, ya estaba medio "cocinado" el asunto…-¿¿¿Quéeee??? ¡¡¡¿Cómo no me va a importar la democracia?!!! ¡Claro que sí!, pienso que es importante que la gente vote aunque haya momentos que me gustaría que "se vayan todos"; pero seamos sinceros, ¿iba a definir algo si yo votaba?. …Ah, ¿eso es todo? ¡Bárbaro! Sólo una pregunta, ¿qué tal anduve…? Estudiante de la Licenciatura en Estudios Internacionales. Facs-ORT

Un verdadero "culebrón" atrapó el escenario político israelí en las últimas semanas. La pelea por el cargo de presidente, que finalizó el pasado martes 10 de junio con la designación de Reuven Rivlin, estuvo imbuida de movidas dignas de la célebre serie "House of Cards", incluyendo contratación de detectives, traiciones y amiguismos que cortaron todo tipo de división partidaria y diferencias ideológicas.Hay que aclarar que el cargo de presidente es ante todo protocolar, simbolizando el título que el líder del Comité Supremo (Sanedrín) tenía en épocas antiguas. Dado que Israel es una democracia parlamentaria, el foco de poder político radica en el Parlamento (Knesset) y en el Primer Ministro, que surge - y se mantiene - a partir de las coaliciones partidarias. Fuera de representar al Estado durante siete años, se le reservan al presidente potestades formales: encarga al partido con más posibilidades luego de las elecciones la potestad de armar gobierno, firma leyes, tratados, nombramientos varios y credenciales diplomáticas, al tiempo que concede indultos y conmuta penas (quizás el único asunto con verdadera capacidad de afectar políticamente en el proceso de paz).Quien elige al presidente de manera secreta son los propios 120 representantes parlamentarios, por lo que los candidatos apelan a conseguir sus promesas de apoyo por medio de reuniones individuales. Sin embargo, trabajan en paralelo para conseguir en la opinión pública apoyo hacia sus candidaturas por encima de otras. De allí que la campaña puede alcanzar el nivel mediático e incluso las reglas de un "reality show" en el que parecería que todo vale, incluyendo acusaciones de acoso sexual y corrupción. Pero en esta ocasión la comedia sobrepasó todo tipo de pronóstico.El gran perdedor de esta campaña presidencial fue el actual Primer Ministro, Benjamin Netanyahu. Motivado aparentemente por diferencias personales con Rivlin, político veterano originario de su mismo partido Likud ("Unión"), hizo todo lo posible para obstaculizar su llegada a la presidencia. Luego de fracasar en la iniciativa de eliminar el cargo, Netanyahu intentó convencer durante semanas a figuras cercanas y lejanas al ámbito político a postularse, también con resultados negativos. Si bien finalmente acabó dándole el apoyo "formal" a Rivlin, todo indica que comenzó a operar por detrás de bambalinas junto con aliados intra y extra partidarios para hacerlo fracasar.Rivlin llegaba como claro candidato al día de la elección, a la que también se presentaron el Premio Nobel Dan Shejtman, la ex-jueza de la Corte Suprema Dalia Dorner, y los políticos Dalia Itzik y Meir Shitrit. No obstante, varios diputados aliados sorpresivamente le retiraron a último momento su apoyo y, si bien quedó en primer lugar en la primera vuelta con 44 votos, los analistas políticos comenzaron a especular en que el resultado habría de revertirse por el "tapado" de Shitrit que con 31 votos consiguió un lugar totalmente inesperado a la segunda vuelta. Se desató así en la hora de receso una tensa y emocionante lucha voto a voto, transmitida y estimulada por los medios. El país se detuvo expectante para presenciar las escenas finales.Como en todo buen espectáculo, no podía faltar la "vuelta de tuerca". La posible derrota de Rivlin - quien era el claro preferido del público - conmovió a diputados de su partido así como de partidos rivales y finalmente le devolvieron su apoyo de modo de conseguir 63 votos contra 53 de su rival. Final feliz para el personaje principal con su entrada triunfal al recinto parlamentario. En una escena grotesca acabó Netanyahu (claramente disgustado) coronando y elogiando a Rivlin (quien saboreaba su revancha).Todo tiene, por supuesto, su lado constructivo. En estas elecciones presidenciales se esfumaron en buena medida las barreras partidarias e ideológicas que en ocasiones parecen inquebrantables en Israel. Diputados de partidos de izquierda e incluso de los partidos árabes-israelíes apoyaron al derechista Rivlin mientras que diputados de derecha lo hicieron por los centro-izquierdistas Itzik y Shitrit. Una mayoría de diputados de partidos ultra-religiosos votaron por una mujer (Itzik), a la par que varios diputados del partido de origen oriental se inclinaron esta vez por candidatos de origen occidental y en sentido opuesto. En definitiva, los lazos personales inter-partidarios asumieron un rol central, demostrando que la convivencia y el pragmatismo saben imponerse dentro del sistema democrático israelí a pesar de los tremendos desafíos que enfrenta día a día debido a la heterogeneidad de su población.En ocasiones las democracias representativas muestran este tipo de comedias tragicómicas que despiertan pasiones en la ciudadanía por lo que ocurre en los pasillos de poder, para bien o para mal. Política y telenovela se entremezclan, a tal punto que se torna difícil de diferenciar cuál es cuál. Si conocerá de esto América Latina… Sobre el autor: Doctorando, Asistente de Cátedra e InvestigaciónDepartamento de Relaciones InternacionalesUniversidad Hebrea de Jerusalem

*This series is the result of an adaptation of a paper presented as part of a seminar on "Theories and Research in International Relations" at Hebrew University, July 2012. Commentaries are welcome to daniel.wajner@mail.huji.ac.il Click here to read Part II of the series In the first article of this series we have introduced the debates on the ontology of power, while in the second one we have presented the main epistemological approaches of the different paradigms. In this third and final article we will deal with methodological schemes for Power Analysis in IR, while indicating areas for possible innovation using the "Arab Spring" cases as illustrations. Power, Outcomes, and what brings them togetherAs we have seen in the last part, the contribution made by Barnett and Duvall with his taxonomy of four dimensions of power is very helpful as theoretical framework; nevertheless, it is still weak to implement as a methodological tool - it is very difficult to distinguish in a real case what is originated through the structure or the actor, as well as to measure if the specificity is direct or diffuse.But the same could be expressed about the majority of the mentioned schemes. In fact, Dahl itself warned about the difficulties of combining variables to compare power relations and argued that it depends on the requirements of the research.1 This complexity is even larger when normative factors are included; for example, despite the proposal of Nye of measuring soft power through polls and focus groups, he also cautioned about the limits of the intangible variables.2 Hurt addresses certain ways of skipping the difficulties in measuring the power of legitimacy, such as examining: the rates of compliance, the reasons given for compliance and for non-compliance, the support given by the centers of Power and the need for legitimacy argument (akin to a counterfactual technique).3 But, once again, no combined power relations framework is presented.In addition, Lukes argues that power depends on the "significance" of the outcomes, namely, in the capacity of affecting the interests of the agents. He refers to two methods: by changing incentives structures (indoctrination) and by influencing interests (subject freedom). However, Lukes confesses that the main question remains open: how to use certain power to shape certain preferences?4In conclusion, in these approaches no power relation mechanism explains, in a measurable way, how material and normative resources are combined to shape power and influence decisions. Therefore, I would like to subsequently suggest a very simple framework that may allow us to implement the knowledge mentioned hitherto to study specific cases in IR.In line with the majority of the authors, in order to make power measurable I consider that we have to divide it in two variables: material power (or simply Power) and legitimation power (or legitimacy). In international politics, the power of an actor is expressed by its military (backed-by-economical) resources, and for the scheme it would receive "high" or "low" values. The legitimacy of the actors, which is based on their capacity to be perceived as norms-compliers and to build consensus around them5, would receive also "high" or "low" values.A power analysis based on the combination of those two variables, as it is shown below in illustration I, leads us to the taxonomy of four types of cases, each one ascribed to an "outcome". It is important to clarify that, for this paper, the outcomes would reflect the domestic situation of the main agent (the State) given an international system; it is a sort of outside-in analysis if we take into account Gourevitch´s second image reversed.6 Further work has to be done to adapt this scheme so as to explain the conduct of the State vis-à-vis other States as well as to include the domestic sphere of legitimacy.The first actor, which has high power and high legitimacy, could describe his situation as "stable"; that means, the actor would overcome the domestic and external challenges without internal changes and high international costs.The second actor, having high power but low legitimacy, is considered to be in a "changeable" situation. Although this actor is capable of overcoming internal and external challenges, due to the fact that it lacks of support from the other actors he could suffer from high international costs and possibly domestic changes.Illustration I – Taxonomy of Power-Legitimacy outcomesPOWERLEGITIMACYHigh PowerLow Power High Legitimacy "STABLE" "PROTECTABLE" Low Legitimacy "CHANGEABLE" "REVOLUTIONABLE" To the third actor, which has low power but high legitimacy, his situation is defined as "protectable". Due to his incapacity to overcome alone the internal and external challenges, this actor may count on the support of other actors to reduce the possibility of domestic changes; otherwise he will suffer from it.The fourth actor, with low power and low legitimacy, is placed in a "revolutionable" situation; that means, this actor is candidate to suffer from internal changes and high international costs at the time he would face challenges.Testing the Power Analysis framework with the "Arab Spring"The phenomenon known as the "Arab Spring", composed of dozens of countries in which massive protests were held, constitutes an outstanding test for the theory. A large quantity of those cases happened in a very short range of time, with all the variety of domestic conditions, reactions from the regime and from the world, as well as different outcomes. This makes those events ideal for the present examination; even though it is just a "sample" of a more deeply study.7Although no State of those that suffered uprisings is considered in a "stable" situation at all, Saudi Arabia and Jordan could be mentioned as good examples of Arab countries that combined high power (relatively, of course) and high legitimacy. Their regimes faced the uprisings from the beginning (mid-January 2011), but were capable of overcoming the internal challenges through a combination of repression and reforms, without suffering changes in their regime and being supported by the international community.Egypt is probably the best representation of a country whose regime kept high power at the moment of facing domestic challenges but received low legitimacy from the world; this "changeable" situation caused drastic changes at the top of the leadership (including the president, ministers, etc), albeit not of the whole regime (still leaded by the Military Council). Syria seems to be in a similar situation; while the power of the regime is still high, the legitimacy is not low enough to bring to major changes due to the sustained support of Russia, China and Iran. As a result, Syria constitutes today an excellent test for the power of legitimacy (and norms) in international politics.Between those countries that experienced a combination of low power and high legitimacy, experiencing a "protectable" situation, it is possible to mention Bahrain. Despite its regime was not capable of overcoming the internal revolts alone, it counted with the support of most of the Arab countries in the repression, and the Western approval of the "regional intervention" leaded by Gulf countries around the GCC. Yemen was in a comparable position, but at the end of 2011 the legitimacy of its regime was reduced when the region and the world understood the necessity to remove the President to maintain the remaining, in what was denominated later "the Yemenite option".Finally, Libya constitutes the case in which the regime was in a "revolutionable" situation, owing to its low Power to contain the rapid domestic rebellion and its low legitimacy after the first days of tremendous repression. The international costs were so high that included a military intervention leaded by NATO (with the endorsement of the Arab League), that led to the total collapse of the regime. It is possible to say that Tunisia was in an analogous situation while it did not need for a civil war and an external intervention to consummate finally a revolution (i.e., the complete removal of the existing regime).ConclusionsThroughout the paper we were able to observe that the ontological, epistemological and methodological discussions about the complex concept of Power maintain their relevance in the main schools of IR, and in some cases even constitute an essential part of their latest developments.At the same time, the inter-paradigmatic efforts of the last decades are demanding new power analysis approaches; that means, theoretical schemes that would embed a combination of the different factors at stake (material and non-material, resources and interactions, agents and structures) to specific cases of study.Deeper examinations of the "Arab Spring" cases need to be implemented so as to confirm the presented findings, as it was previously said. However, these small samples could possibly reveal that the implementation of a framework that combines both material and non-material resources is possible and, even more, desirable, to a better understanding of the devices of power in IR. 1 Robert A. Dahl, "The concept of Power", p.2142 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power- The Means to Success in World Politics. p.63 Ian Hurt, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics". International Organization 53 No2 (Spring 1999), 390-3914 Stephen Lukes, "Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds", p.4925 This short definition is based on concepts presented in Ian Clark, "Legitimacy in International Society" (London: Oxford University Press, 2005). It includes components both from the structure and the agent.6 Peter Gourevitch, "The second image reversed – the international sources of domestic politics" International Organization 32 No4, (Autumn 1978), 881-911.7 An investigation is "under construction", called "The Arab League and its legitimation role in the Arab Spring". It focuses on the power of the Arab League to yield legitimacy (or not) in six different cases. Bibliography Bachrach, Peter and Baratz, Morton S. "Two Faces of Power". The American Political Science Review 56 No4, (December 1962), 947-952 Baldwin, David A. Paradoxes of Power (NYC: Basil Blackwell, 1989). Barnett, Michael and Duvall, Raymond. "Power in International Politics", International Organization 59, No1 (Winter 2005), 39-75 Berenskoetter, Felix and Williams, Michael J. Power in World Politics. (NYC: Routledge, 2007) Bourdieu, Pierre. Language & Symbolic Power (NYC : Polity Press, 2001) Carr, Edward H., The Twenty Years' Crisis,1919-1939 (NYC: Harper Torchbooks, 1964) Clark, Ian. "Legitimacy in International Society" (NYC: Oxford University Press, 2005) Claude, Inis L., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962). Dahl, Robert A. "The concept of Power", Behavioral Science 2 No3, (July 1957), 201-215 Haas, Ernst B. When Knowledge is Power (University of California Press, 1990). Finnemore, Martha and Sikkink, Kathryn "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International Organization 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), 887-917. Foucalt, Michael. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-77 (Brighton: Havester, 1980) Franck, Thomas M., "The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium." American Journal International 88 (2006), 88-106 Gourevitch, Peter. "The second image reversed – the international sources of domestic politics" International Organization 32 No4, (Autumn 1978), 881-911. Guzzini, Stefano, "The Concept of Power: A Constructivist Analysis" Millennium 33 No3, 2005, 495-521. Guzzini, Stefano, "Structural power: the limits of neorealist power analysis", International Organization 47, No3 (Summer 1993), 443-478. Hurt, Ian, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics". International Organization 53 No2 (Spring 1999), 379-408 Ikenberry, John and Kupchan, Charles A. "Socialization and hegemonic power", International Organization 44, No3 (Summer 1990), 283-315. Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., Power and Interdependence, 2nd edition (New York: Harper Collins, 1989) Krasner, Stephen D. "Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables", International Organization 36 (Spring 1982), 497-510 Lukes, Stephen. "Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds", Millennium 33 No3, (2005), 477-493 Mearsheimer, John. The Tragedy of Great power Politics (NYC: Norton, 2001) Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics among Nations, 4th edition (NYC: Knopf, 1967). Nye, Joseph S. Soft Power- The Means to Success in World Politics (NYC: PublicAffairs, 2004) Putnam, Robert. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization 42, No3, (1988), 427-460 Risse, Thomas. "Let's Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics," International Organization 54 No1 (Winter 2000), 1-40. Schmidt, Brian C. "Competing Realist Conceptions of Power", Millennium 33 No3, 523-549 Walt, Stephen. The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987) Waltz, Kenneth. Theory of International Politics. (NYC: McGraw-Hill, 1979) Weber, Max. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. (California: University of Berkeley, 1978. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich). Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 46 (1992), 391-425. Wendt, Alexander. "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory", International Organization 41/3 (1987), 335-370. Fabian Daniel Wajner is a Research and Teaching Assistant at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Department of International Relations) and a Fellow of the Liweranth Center for Latin America Studies.

*This series is the result of an adaptation of a paper presented as part of a seminar on "Theories and Research in International Relations" at Hebrew University, July 2012. Commentaries are welcome to daniel.wajner@mail.huji.ac.il In the first article of this series we have introduced the debates on the ontology of power and the ways in which these debates have influenced the theoretical divisions in International Relations (IR). In this second article we will present the main epistemological approaches of the different paradigms, leading to controversies on the mechanisms involved in the activation of power and its dimensions.Mechanisms of Power: different theoretical approachesOur first step is to address the questions "how power is activated" and "how power proceeds once it is activated". Scholars of diverse backgrounds proposed different approaches to answer those questions, leading us to the possibility of dealing with the controversies around the epistemology of power.According to the realist tradition, as explained previously, the regular way by which actors operate to assert control over the others and the system is coercion. Through the manipulation of material resources (either via sanctions or inducements), an actor could generate changes in the other's actor conduct even in contrary of their interests. As main representatives of the neo-realist paradigm, Waltz and Mearsheimer went one step forward when they affirmed that the distribution of military capabilities constitutes the best measurable expression of power1; and consequently, that the display of alterations in capabilities is what explains the main changes in decision-making.However, most of the neo-realists tend to accept another way to activate power that is based on the concept of socialization. Although renowned for being "mentioned" by Waltz himself, the concept is in fact developed by other scholars, among them Ikenberry and Kupchan, who move large away from Waltz. They explain the mechanisms and conditions of socialization using the neorealist scheme but, unlike Waltz, Ikenberry and Kupchan incorporate the "normative" element as "a different aspect of power" which guides the state's behavior.2 Moreover, they assume a pseudo-liberal perspective on the role of specific agents (elites) in providing systemic change, undermining the unitary actor assumption and thus abandoning the structuralist approach that neo-realists have usually adopted.Ikenberry and Kupchan seek to describe how hegemonic powers have a tendency to activate processes of socialization, through which secondary countries internalize the norms of the hegemon. According to them, socialization occurs primarily when countries suffer the fragmentation of internal coalitions (especially after wars and political crisis), stimulating certain elites to embrace the norms that the hegemon is articulating. If the receptivity and realignment of the elites is linked with coercive power, norms could be consolidated as well as the policies in line with them (albeit this order may vary depending on whether the socialization is carried through normative persuasion, external inducement or internal reconstruction).3 It is important to note that this is a "one-player" argument; the authors say little about "real" cases - where there are many candidates to hegemony and the socialization processes are "in competition". This appears as a very interesting research agenda for the future.The eighties and nineties developed other interesting realist approaches who explore ideational elements in power analysis. One of them is the Krasner's approach on institutional power, which consists of a "metapower" that has indirect control over outcomes by changing the setting of the confrontation.4 Baldwin went also in that direction by embedding what he called the paradox of unrealized power, in which the will of using the power is a resource by itself.5 Likewise, Walt´s theory about the balance of threat adds aggressive intentions as a main variable, what makes power not a function of material resources but of inter-subjective factors.6 The three went clearly beyond neorealist assumptions.Of course the incorporation of normative elements to analyze power relationships did not only emerge in the realist tradition, but also in the liberal one, the natural candidate. The most famous liberal twist came recently from Nye's soft power concept.7 Accepting coercion" and inducement as two relevant forms of displaying power, Nye suggests co-opting as "a third dimension of power" which affects behavior without being commanded through threats or payments, but through attracting with indirect resources (such as values, culture and policies). This "soft" version of power, argues the prestigious scholar, becomes crucial in a global information era in which "winning hearts and minds" matters more and more; an era in which hard sower and soft power are required to be connected (in what he calls smart power) in order to enable the legitimate use of power, as the war in Irak showed to the United States.Is not casual that Nye writes from a (North)American perspective in a period of time in which their legitimacy was so questioned; anyhow, his concept was rapidly attributed to other situations. Despite the popularity of Nye's scheme, the theoretical contribution is still weak. As Guzzini argued years before, it is clear that "power alone is not what we are looking for"8- what is lacking is an approach that could address the causal mechanisms of the different types of power and could identify their devices once they are activated.Guzzini himself will provide an answer to that challenge, by recommending the separation of the two types of power structural power and interactionist power in two different concepts: governance and power.9 Citing economical-rationalist terms, this new dyadic conceptualization examines the interactions between systemic rules (market constraints) and the decisions of the agents (strategic behaviors), in a power analysis. As a constructivist, Guzzini sustains that in this (inter-subjective) relationship of power, the actors change interests and identities, stressing the value of legitimate power (authority) in enabling "a widing realm of possible (in political action)".10 Despite Guzzini paved the way to other constructivist approaches11, he still leaves us with the confusion between the two different stages of the argumentative chain: the first one based on the agent-structure distinction, and the second one on the material-ideal division.Barnett and Duvall would release us from that confusion by presenting their taxonomy of four dimensions of power.12 It combines the two variables presented above with different names; on one side, the expression of the power (actor's interactions vs. structural constitution), and on the other side the specificity of the power relations (direct connection vs. diffuse relation).13 The analytic combination leads us to four types in which power operates: compulsory, institutional, structural and productive. Therefore, while in a simultaneous power analysis, one side would explain what is "possible" (closer to the Compulsory corner), the other one would explain what is "legitimate-desirable" (closer to the Productive corner).14Once this has been approached, the next challenge consists of transferring these theoretical understanding to a methodological scheme for power analysis in IR. This will be addressed on the next and last part of the series.1 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great power Politics (NYC: Norton, 2001); Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics. (NYC: McGraw-Hill, 1979)2 John G. Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and hegemonic power", International Organization 44, No3 (Summer 1990), p. 284.3 Ibid., p. 290-2914Stephen D. Krasner, "Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables", International Organization 36 (Spring 1982), 497-5105 David A. Baldwin, Paradoxes of Power (NYC: Basil Blackwell, 1989).6 Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987)7 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power- The Means to Success in World Politics.8 Stefano Guzzini, "Structural power: the limits of neorealist power analysis", International Organization 47, No3 (Summer 1993), p.478.9 Ibid.,, p.471.10 Stefano Guzzini, "Structural power: the limits of neorealist power analysis", p.477.11 In that sense, Hurd presents a similar conclusion to pose legitimacy as an ordering principle at IR, building also on Weber´s approach at the beginning. Another concept that might be reminded in constructivist literature is Risse´s "normative power", that although lacks the "material side", it contributed to highlight the devices of the "logic of truth-seeking arguing" (considered as "the power of the better argument").12 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, "Power in International Politics", 48-57.13 Although is true that Barnett-Duvall do not present this as hard power vs. soft power, with the examples given it is possible to infer that applies a similar logic.14 Ibid., p.44. Fabian Daniel Wajner is a Research and Teaching Assistant at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Department of International Relations) and a Fellow of the Liweranth Center for Latin America Studies.