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This paper empirically investigates whether developing countries can enforce their antitrust laws or not by measuring potential antitrust enforcement using two proxies: budgets and staffing levels of antitrust authorities. Data was collected from 40 developing countries since the adoption of the law until 2009. This dataset presents an alternative method to measure antitrust enforcement compared to the widespread use of formal enforcement proxies. The data shows that most developing countries actually are capable of enforcing their competition laws but with varying intensities. This finding challenges the assumption that developing countries only adopt antitrust laws to secure trade agreements and constantly fail to enforce these laws. Using this dataset the paper then assessed what issues contributed to the variation of antitrust enforcement across developing countries, using panel data estimation techniques to examine the relation between the potential antitrust enforcement proxies and variables representing macroeconomic, political, legal and institutional environments. The paper finds that the factors that heavily impact the level of potential enforcement are economic development, openness to trade and corruption.

This paper empirically investigates whether developing countries can enforce their antitrust laws or not by measuring potential antitrust enforcement using two proxies: budgets and staffing levels of antitrust authorities. Data was collected from 40 developing countries since the adoption of the law until 2009. This dataset presents an alternative method to measure antitrust enforcement compared to the widespread use of formal enforcement proxies. The data shows that most developing countries actually are capable of enforcing their competition laws but with varying intensities. This finding challenges the assumption that developing countries only adopt antitrust laws to secure trade agreements and constantly fail to enforce these laws. Using this dataset the paper then assessed what issues contributed to the variation of antitrust enforcement across developing countries, using panel data estimation techniques to examine the relation between the potential antitrust enforcement proxies and variables representing macroeconomic, political, legal and institutional environments. The paper finds that the factors that heavily impact the level of potential enforcement are economic development, openness to trade and corruption.

This article proposes the use of antitrust law to reduce poverty and address inequality. It argues that the antitrust laws are sufficiently malleable to achieve such goals. The current focus of antitrust on the efficiency-only goals does not only lead to increasing inequality further but is also inconsistent with the history of antitrust. This history is presented through the lens of the public interest that emerges into the balance between private property and competition policy. Tracing the public interest at different historical moments, we get to see how it has been broad enough to encompass social welfare concerns. Over time, the public interest concern of antitrust was narrowed to exclusively cover consumer welfare and its allocative efficiency. Once we frame antitrust as public interest law, in its broadest sense, we are empowered to use it to address inequality. A proposal to do so is exposed in this article.