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This study uses the Verbs in Context System (VICS) to analyze and compare the operational codes of President Lyndon Johnson and his advisors during the Vietnam conflict. The initial focus is on changes in Johnson's general operational code as revealed in public statements during the period leading to the decisions to bomb North Vietnam and to intervene with ground forces in South Vietnam. Johnson's public operational codes for the domestic, foreign, and Vietnam domains are then compared, and his public operational code for the Vietnam conflict is contrasted with the private operational code of his Vietnam advisors (as expressed in private memoranda). Period effects, domain effects, and other differences are revealed between the views of Johnson and those of his advisors.

Two radical models of economic foreign policy making are summarized: instrumentalist and structuralist. By means of an issue-based policy paradigm, the views of several leading conventional scholars are described. The contrasting radical and conventional models are shown to be related—radicals providing useful insights into the setting of policy and conventional scholars being strongest regarding the policy process. Cautious synthesis is recommended to students of U.S. foreign economic policy making.

"Foreign Policy and Religion: An Overview" published on by Oxford University Press.

This study addresses the impact of crisis management strategies, stress, and groupthink conditions on the integrative complexity of British decision makers in 10 decision-making episodes during two Anglo-German crises in 1938 and 1939. A systematic random sample of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's statements during British cabinet deliberations in the intragovernmental arena and British messages to Germany in the intergovernmental arena during the acute phase of each crisis was scored for integrative complexity. An ANOVA of integrative complexity for crisis, arena, and episode demonstrated a significant independent relationship between strategy and integrative complexity plus a significant interaction effect between strategy and arena on integrative complexity. There were also significant differences in Chamberlain's integrative complexity between early and later episodes of the Polish conflict in the intragovernmental arena; no significant differences occurred between episodes in either arena during the Munich conflict. These results support the hypotheses that associate low integrative complexity with the implementation of a competitive strategy in the intergovernmental arena and with high stress in the intragovernmental arena.

Walker, S. G. and Watson, G. L. Groupthink and Integrative Complexity in British Foreign Policy-Making: the Munich Case. Cooperation and Conflict, XXIV, 1989, 199-212.We focus in this paper upon the groupthink construct as a partial explanation for the flawed decision-making by British leaders in managing the Munich crisis with Germany. In order to assess its explanatory power, we follow the precedent established in previous case studies, which explore the link between groupthink and the levels of integrative complexity exhibited by decision-makers. The hypothesis linking the two phenomena is that in cases where groupthink is present, the level of integrative complexity will be significantly lower than in cases where it is absent. The Munich case is a particularly appropriate case for replicating the test of this hypothesis because, unlike other groupthink cases, it did not lead to unsuccessful military interventions or escalations. Our results indicate that: (1) groupthink existed in the Munich case; however, it did not persist throughout the entire crisis. (2) Its presence and absence within the crisis fluctuated consistently with the expectations associated with the theory which accounts for its dynamics. (3) The integrative complexity exhibited by Prime Minister Chamberlain and Foreign Secretary Halifax varied as predicted by the hypothesis linking it with groupthink.