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The Government's general reactions to the now renowned Harrison Salisbury articles on civilian casualties in North Vietnam were, first, anger that Salisbury had exaggerated the scope of the problem by depending upon the Communists for statistical data; second, an admission that there had indeed been civilian casualities in the North because it is difficult to bomb anywhere without involving some civilians; third, an emphatic declaration of intent to restrict the bombing to purely military targets. I want to argue here that this declaration was unwise, if well intentioned, for at least two reasons. It implied, first of all, that the entire conduct of World War II, both on land and in the air, was invalid - not merely the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Second, by attempting to draw the old and stark distinction between combatants and non-combatants, it obscured the nature of the problem. I want to mention a few aspects of that problem here. Jack Walker, who has seen extensive military service, recently contributed a series of articles on the "Nuclear Obsession" to worldview.

The currently emerging debate on the desirability of the U.S. undertaking to deploy an anti-ballistic missile defense system (A.B.M.) threatens to become the next national defense issue to have an impact on national elections. In the past we have all become familiar with real or alleged "bomber gaps," "missile gaps," and "conventional gaps." The basis for all these "gaps" was a deep fear that potential enemies would subject ns to nuclear blackmail, or that our own failure to develop other kinds of military forces would require us to respond to any emergency with an all-out nuclear attack.In an earlier essay, I pointed out how our obsession with nuclear war had encouraged us to discount the significance of conventional war. I want now to turn to an examination of how specific groups in the U.S. have changed their positions in recent years on the subject of defensive weapons. In doing so I have borrowed the term used in 1960 by Henry Kissinger to describe the shifting arguments of the Air Force and Navy.

In previous essays on the nuclear obsession, I have criticized those whose horror of nuclear war seems to have impaired their perceptions of military and political reality. Such individuals and groups either look for abstract theories which promise that wars can be fought at minimum cost (perhaps by mercenaries who are outside the mainstream of American life) or strive for moralistic declarations of intent designed to inhibit nuclear proliferation.

If the current U. S. desire to conclude a nuclear nonproliferation treaty with the Soviets raises some difficult questions with respect to future U. S. relationships with its allies (principally the Indians, Japanese, and Germans), it raises even more troublesome questions in connection with what many would regard as a highly desirable new objective of U. S. foreign policy. I would think it could be accepted as a verifiable fact that many of those who favor the nonproliferation treaty also favor, with equal or nearly equal vehemence, the "normalization" of relations between the U. S. and China. As this is written, the most recent expression of such a viewpoint is the proposal for a new "Two China" policy which could become the basis for the entry of China into the United Nations.

If anything has been adopted as the single, most important, immediate objective of the U.S, "Foreign Policy Establishment," it is the conclusion, with the Soviet Union, of a treaty designed to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. I use the word "discourage," because it seems clear that the treaty itself is not intended to produce anything more than an abstention, on the part of the U.S. and the USSR, from active participation in the act of proliferation. There is to be no commitment, or so it would appear, to joint action (economic, political, or military) to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

The general tone of the continuing dialogue between individuals and groups concerned with war, foreign policy in general, and morality is partly the result of the contradictions inherent in what I shall here term the "nuclear obsession." While precise definitions are not critical in an essay of this sort, the nuclear obsession is defined here as the point of view, or state of mind, which holds that nuclear questions are of such overriding importance in the conduct of war and foreign policy that they dwarf all other questions. Those who attempt to think most precisely about what the world ultimately may have to do if it is to come to grips with the nuclear problem are not at all afraid of massive political change.

Rather than striving to measure the influence of groups in the policy-making process this article concentrates instead on the ways in which interest groups are created and the means by which they remain in existence. A survey by mail was conducted during 1980-1981 of all voluntary associations that are open to membership and concerned with some aspects of public policy at the national level. The sample of groups was chosen from the Congressional Quarterly's Washington Information Directory. Questionnaires were delivered to 913 interest groups, and usable responses were received from 564, yielding a response rate of 64.8%.Most studies of groups have concerned the tactics employed by group leaders in attracting and holding their members. This study demonstrates that the origins and maintenance of groups depends even more upon the success of group leaders in securing funds from outside their membership which are needed to keep their groups in operation. Estimates of patronage from different sources are provided as well as data on the congruence between the policy goals of groups and their patrons.

RATHER THAN STRIVING TO MEASURE THE INFLUENCE OF GROUPS IN THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS THIS ARTICLE CONCENTRATES INSTEAD ON THE WAYS IN WHICH INTEREST GROUPS ARE CREATED AND THE MEANS BY WHICH THEY REMAIN IN EXISTENCE. A SURVEY BY MAIL WAS CONDUCTED DURING 1980-1981 OF ALL VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS THAT ARE OPEN TO MEMBERSHIP AND CONCERNED WITH SOME ASPECTS OF PUBLIC POLICY AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL. THE SAMPLE OF GROUPS WAS CHOSEN FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S WASHINGTON INFORMATION DIRECTORY. QUESTIONNAIRES WERE DELIVERED TO 913 INTEREST GROUPS, AND USABLE RESPONSES WERE RECEIVED FROM 564, YIELDING A RESPONSE RATE OF 64.8%. MOST STUDIES OF GROUPS HAVE CONCERNED THE TACTICS EMPLOYED BY GROUP LEADERS IN ATTRACTING AND HOLDING THEIR MEMBERS. THIS STUDY DEMONSTRATES THAT THE ORIGINS AND MAINTENANCE OF GROUPS DEPENDS EVEN MORE UPON THE SUCCESS OF GROUP LEADERS IN SECURING FUNDS FROM OUTSIDE THEIR MEMBERSHIP WHICH ARE NEEDED TO KEEP THEIR GROUPS IN OPERATION. ESTIMATES OF PATRONAGE FROM DIFFERENT SOURCES ARE PROVIDED AS WELL AS DATA ON THE CONGRUENCE BETWEEN THE POLICY GOALS OF GROUPS AND THEIR PATRONS.

Political scientists have been experiencing a 30-year boom in students, resources, opportunities and salaries unlike none other in the history of the profession, but there is little doubt that trends in all these areas are now turning downward. Some lingering skepticism remains about the magnitude of the coming troubles, but most members of our profession are aware not only that the boom is over, but that something ranging from a recession to a thumping depression is almost upon us.The Committee on Professional Development has been formed in response to the gathering difficulties faced by political scientists. The Committee's task is to identify and precisely describe the problems being encountered by the profession and to suggest solutions. We begin by communicating with members of the National Association through its committees and publications, but hope that our reports and proposals might also stimulate debate and action within political science departments across the country. The profession still is in the early stages of what surely will be an extremely trying period of its history. If foresight is exercised, however, and we are flexible enough to adapt to changing social needs, it is possible that some of our problems can be transformed into opportunities. Our Committee is intended to aid in this important process of adaptation by encouraging the entire profession to discover new bases for intellectual growth.