Suchergebnisse

Mark Walker argues for Skeptical-Dogmatism--the view that we should disbelieve our cherished philosophical views, such as beliefs about what makes for a good life, religious beliefs, and political beliefs. To not disbelieve one's preferred views in these contested matters is hubristic.

A basic income guarantee (BIG) is a payment by the federal government to all adult citizens. This book uses the United States as its model and sets the minimum income at $10,000 USD. Free Money for All seeks to show that not only is a basic income guarantee a feasible model for public policy, it is a morally attractive proposal. In this exciting new volume, Walker argues that BIG promotes three positive outcomes - social stability, gross national happiness, and gross national freedom - unlike alternate proposals such as socialism, laissez-faire capitalism, and the traditional welfare state. He uses a philosophical perspective to defend BIG against the claim that the promotion of social goals egregiously infringes the requirements of justice. Free Money for All employs a novel twist on the though that BIG can be supported by the idea of a social dividend.

Basic income guarantee -- Paying for basic income guarantee -- Fulltime capitalism : basic income guarantee as a dividend from state capital -- Capitalism : consequentialism versus rights -- Peace, robots, and technological unemployment -- Basic income guarantee happiness -- Basic income guarantee freedom -- A basic income guarantee future -- Concluding unscientific postscript --

Intro -- Praise for Happy-People-Pills forAll -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Acknowledgments -- Chapter 1: Introductory -- 1.1 The Ends: Greater Happiness -- 1.2 The Means: Pharmacology -- 1.3 The Biological Basis of Happiness -- 1.4 Therapy versus Enhancement -- 1.5 Signposts -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 2: What is Living and What is Dead in Brave New World -- 2.1 Introductory -- 2.2 Brief Summary of Brave New World -- 2.3 Brave New World and Bioconservatives -- 2.4 Alcohol Stunting, Indoctrination, and Other Pernicious Means of Soul Crafting -- 2.5 Soma -- 2.6 A Tragic Dilemma or a False Dilemma? -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 3: What Do We Mean by 'Happiness'? -- 3.1 Two Senses of 'Happiness': Wellbeing and a Psychological State -- 3.2 Affective Theories of Happiness -- 3.3 Cognitive Accounts of Happiness -- 3.4 Counterexamples to Monism About Happiness -- 3.5 Methodological Remarks -- 3.6 Sensory Hedonism -- 3.7 Not Life Satisfactionism -- 3.8 Folk Psychology -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 4: The Elements of the Good Life: It is a Very Big List -- 4.1 Three Theories of the Good Life -- 4.2 The Method of Difference -- 4.3 Refutation of Hedonism -- 4.4 Refutation of Perfectionism -- 4.5 A Very Big Objective List -- 4.6 Desire Satisfaction and the Big Objective List -- 4.7 Objections to the Big Objective List -- 4.8 Objections to the Method of Difference -- 4.9 Inventory and Indexing -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 5: Wellbeing and Virtue -- 5.1 Gyges' Ring -- 5.2 Moral Virtue -- 5.3 The Method of Difference -- 5.4 The Sympathy Test -- 5.5 Upright, Unscrupulous, and Non-virtuous -- 5.6 The Immoralist Challenge -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 6: Happiness Promotes Perfection -- 6.1 Huxley's Dilemma -- 6.2 Happiness Causes Achievement: the Common-Sense Case -- 6.3 Happiness Causes Achievement: Social Science Research.

It is argued that we have a moral duty to create, and make available, advanced pharmacological agents to boost the happiness of those in the normal, i.e., the non-depressed, range of happiness. Happiness, conceived as a propensity to positive moods, is a quantitative trait with a sizeable genetic component. One means to boost the happiness of those in the normal range is to test the efficacy of antidepressants for enhancement. A second possibility is to model new pharmacologicals based on the genetics of the happiest amongst us, that is, the hyperthymic. The suggestion, in other words, is to "reverse engineer" the hyperthymic: to investigate what makes the hyperthymic genetically and physiologically different and then put what they have into pill form. To the 'Brave New World' objection, that there is more to wellbeing than happiness and that taking happy-people-pills will require the sacrifice of these other aspects of wellbeing, it is countered that contemporary social science research supports the view that happiness promotes achievement in the 'higher' endeavors of humanity, including work, love and virtue. In other words, happiness promotes acquisition of traits valued by perfectionists. Those born with genes for hyperthymia, on average, tend to be doubly blessed: they are happier and achieve more than the rest of the population. Happy-people-pills are a means to allow everyone else to share in this good fortune. The paper seeks to rebut two further criticisms: that happy-people-pills will lead to emotional inappropriateness and inauthentic happiness. Finally, it is argued that depending on the view about the role of government in individual welfare, either government has a positive duty to develop happy-people-pills, or government has a duty not to interfere with private companies that seek to develop such pharmacological agents.

The target paper of this invited forum has a vaulting ambition: to convince readers that we ought to attempt to reduce evil in our world by constructing an interdisciplinary program, which I call the Genetic Virtue Program (GVP), to enhance the biological aspects of virtue. Most of the contributors to this forum are not sympathetic to the project—to put it mildly. Yet, one of the surprising things, at least to this author, is that comparatively little is said about the paper's overall ambition. Jamie Bronstein offers the idea that better socialization may be key: "No one would argue that there have not also been great evils; but the historical record doesn't support the level of improbability for further moral improvement through socialization that Walker would like to assign." However, nowhere do I claim that there is no prospect for further moral improvement through socialization. Indeed, in recently published work I specifically recommend that we improve socialization efforts to enhance virtue by tracking prosocialization efforts.